LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
RIVERSIDE 


THE  INSTITUTE  OF  POLITICS  PUBLICATIONS, 
WILLIAMS  COLLEGE,   WILLIAMSTOWN,   MASS. 


RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

DURING 
THE  LAST  HALF  CENTURY 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 

ATLANTA   •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO..  LIMITED 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY   •   CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA.  LID. 

TORONTO 


RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

DURING 
THE  LAST  HALF  CENTURY 


BY 
* 

BARON  S.  A!  KORFF,  D.  C.  L. 
*tt          ' 

Professor  of  Political  Science,  School  of  Foreign  Service,  George- 
town University,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Sometime   Professor   of   Russian  Law   and   History,   University    of 

Belsingfors,   Finland,   and    Women's    University    of 

Petrograd,  Russia 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

All  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1922, 
BT  THE  PRESIDENT  AND  TRUSTEES  OF  WILLIAMS  COLLEGE. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  January,  1922. 


It  is  with  some  hesitation  that  I  gave  my  con- 
sent to  the  publication  of  these  lectures.  It  is 
extremely  difficult  to  handle  such  a  vast  subject 
in  so  short  a  space,  and  consequently  some  of  the 
questions  did  not  receive  the  attention  they  de- 
serve. However,  the  other  courses,  given  at  the 
Institute  of  Politics,  will  help  considerably  to 
elucidate  various  doubtful  problems. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  express  my  feelings 
of  deep  gratitude  to  President  H.  A.  Garfield 
and  the  Institute  of  Politics  for  their  great  kind- 
ness and  hospitality. 

S.  A,  K. 
August  25,  1921. 

Williamstown,  Massachusetts. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAG* 

I    FRANCE        

II    ENGLAND 27 

III  CHINA ^ 

IV  JAPAN 75 

V    AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 93 

VI    THE  BALKAN  STATES 114 

VII    GERMANY 145 

VIII    SWEDEN        171 

IX     SOME  ITEMS      .     . 184 

X     SECRET  DIPLOMACY 190 


RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

DURING 
THE  LAST  HALF  CENTURY 


RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 
DURING  LAST  HALF  CENTURY 

CHAPTER  I. 

FRANCE. 

I. 

I  BEGAN  the  preparation  of  my  lectures  for  the  Insti- 
tute of  Politics  with  some  apprehension.  In  the  first 
place  I  felt  that  we  were  too  far  from  the  most  val- 
uable sources  of  information,  namely  the  European 
archives  of  the  foreign  offices,  especially  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office,  that  still  contain  untold  historical  treas- 
ures. 

Another  difficulty  that  confronted  me  is  the  fact  that 
the  events  of  the  last  half-century  are  too  recent,  and 
it  is  very  difficult  to  remain  absolutely  impartial.  Yet 
the  contemporary  has  one  great  asset,  his  personal 
observations,  and  these  are  particularly  valuable  in 
portraying  personal  characteristics. 

Russia's  role  during  these  last  decades  has  been  very 
important.  Little  can  be  understood  of  the  modern 
tangle  of  European  affairs  if  one  does  not  know  or 
consider  Russia's  foreign  relations. 

In  analyzing  the  latter  one  must  keep  in  mind  not 
only  the  social  forces  that  move  nations  to  certain  ends 

1 


2  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

and  achieve  national  aims,  but  also  the  role  played  by 
the  various  personalities,  the  statesmen  at  the  helm  of 
their  countries.  It  is  possible  that  a  time  will  come 
when  democracies  and  public  opinion  will  direct  for- 
eign affairs,  as  they  govern  and  influence  other  do- 
mains of  public  life,  but  with  this  great  modern  prob- 
lem I  will  deal  separately  later  on.  At  present  one  must 
acknowledge  that  very  much  still  depends  on  person- 
alities; on  the  character,  the  ideals  and  very  often  even 
on  the  moods  and  proclivities  of  foreign  secretaries, 
heads  of  states  or  ambassadors. 

In  Russia  and  eastern  Europe  this  was  very  much 
the  case  up  to  the  time  of  the  armistice  of  1918,  and  we 
cannot  yet  be  sure  that  this  state  of  affairs  has  van- 
ished forever.  Take  as  an  example  the  role  which  the 
Russian  Tsars  played  in  shaping  the  fate  of  their 
country!  How  much  Russia's  foreign  policy  depended 
on  the  likes  and  dislikes  of  her  Emperors!  We  might 
instance  the  strong  feelings  of  dislike  of  Alexander  III 
towards  Republican  France,  Bismarck's  arrogance  or 
the  tactlessness  of  Alexander  of  Bulgaria;  the  stubborn 
lack  of  understanding  of  Japan  by  Nicholas  II,  his 
alarming  weakness  when  dealing  with  the  Kaiser, 
which  led  first  to  the  Bjorko  Treaty  in  direct  contra- 
diction to  the  French  Alliance  and  later  to  the  Great 
War;  or  again  his  treacherous  demeanor  toward  the 
Duma,  when  he  left  his  ministers  to  disentangle  the 
snarled  thread  of  his  policy,  without  his  moral  sup- 
port. The  same  indictment  must  be  brought  against 
the  ministers  of  foreign  affairs.  In  a  large  measure 
Russia's  fate  depended  on  their  personalities.  Take 
for  example  Prince  Lobanoff  and  Count  Muraviev  with 


FRANCE  3 

their  limited  intellects  and  their  crass  ignorance  in 
some  matters  (especially  the  Far  East) ;  or  Count 
Lamsdorff,  the  typical  bureaucrat,  with  a  splendid 
French  style  and  no  knowledge  of  Russia;  the  honest 
but  weak-minded  Iswolsky,  who  suffered  much  from 
constant  intrigue  and  was  no  match  for  foreign  diplo- 
mats; and  finally  the  erratic  and  capricious  Sazonoff, 
acting  often  as  a  spoiled  child,  with  no  great  intellect, 
but  with  clear  nationalistic  purposes,  a  seeming  liberal 
among  reactionaries  only  because  he  was  so  very  hon- 
est and  simple. 

I  do  not  want  to  convey  the  impression  that  these 
men  were  not  fitted  for  their  office  merely  because  they 
were  the  devoted  servants  of  dying  autocracy.  We 
know  quite  well  that  the  Parliamentary  regime  ipso 
facto  does  not  necessarily  improve  matters  and  that  the 
western  countries  cannot  always  boast  of  having  in- 
tellects of  the  highest  order  directing  their  foreign 
affairs.  My  purpose  is  simply  to  point  out  how  much  \ 
Russia's  fate  did  depend  on  the  men  in  power  from 
the  Tsars  downward.  / 

In  analyzing  the  history  of  the  foreign  relations  of 
Russia  I  met  with  another  difficulty  well  known  to  all 
students  of  history,  from  what  date  to  start  the  narra- 
tive. The  history  of  a  nation  being  a  continuous  evo- 
lutionary process,  all  periods  are  equally  important  and 
it  is  hard  to  make  up  one's  mind  to  begin  with  certain 
events.  Moreover,  the  history  of  Russia  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  does  not  have  clearly  defined  periods, 
dividing  the  epochs  of  her  social  and  political  develop- 
ment. 

After  some  hesitation,  I  chose  for  a  starting  point 


r\ 


RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

the  events  of  the  Berlin  Congress  of  1878,  because  of 
their  disastrous  influence  on  the  subsequent  foreign 
relations  of  Russia.  She  entered  the  following  period 
deeply  disappointed  and  hurt  by  the  treatment  ac- 
corded her  at  the  Berlin  Congress.  After  having 
achieved  great  military  victories,  notwithstanding  the 
evident  shortcomings  of  her  army  organization,  after 
having  lost  many  thousands  of  lives  of  her  citizens  hi 
order  to  liberate  her  Slav  brothers  in  the  Balkans  from 
the  bloody  rule  of  the  unspeakable  Turk,  after  having 
herself  lived  through  a  period  of  national  uplift,  when 
the  Slavophile  movement  had  set  so  many  Russian 
hearts  aglow  for  the  Slav  cause,  she  was  now  forcibly 
thwarted  in  her  national  aims,  most  of  her  ideals  were 
shattered  and  she  was  thoroughly  disillusioned  at  home 
and  abroad.  Europe  did  her  utmost  to  muzzle  the 
Russian  bear,  and  foremost  among  its  enemies  stood, 
not  vanquished  Turkey,  but  glorious  and  self-reliant 
England,  led  by  Beaconsfield,  the  great  comedian. 
No  wonder  Russia  came  out  of  the  Berlin  Congress 
discouraged  and  dissatisfied,  cherishing  ill  feelings 
toward  the  other  great  powers,  England  in  particular. 

It  seemed  to  many  Russians  at  the  tune  that  their 
country  had  absolutely  failed  in  her  entire  foreign 
policy.  And  this  feeling  of  disappointment  was 
coupled  with  the  realization  that  Russia's  own  house 
was  badly  out  of  order.  All  through  the  70's  social 
dissatisfaction  was  constantly  gaining  in  strength,  the 
government  unfortunately  not  knowing  how  to  meet 
it  otherwise  than  by  coercion  and  repression.  The 
climax  came  with  the  assassination  of  the  Tsar  hi  1881. 

His  son  and  successor,  Alexander  III,  for  these  obvi- 


FRANCE  5 

oua  reasons  preferred  for  Russia  a  position  of  isola- 
tion, cleverly  called  by  a  Russian  historian  the  "cold 
storage  theory."  After  the  emancipation  of  her  serfs 
Russia  had  tried  an  expansive  and  ambitious  foreign 
policy,  fostering  the  Pan-Slav  movement,  interfering 
in  western  affairs,  spreading  her  influence  into  central 
Asia,  and  so  forth,  and  had  conspicuously  failed.  Now, 
it  was  thought,  Russian  autocracy  ought  to  concentrate 
all  its  attention  on  internal  affairs,  dealing  exclusively 
with  the  social  discontent  and  leaving  Europe  to  its 
own  fate. 

Yet  the  plan  of  Alexander  III  to  keep  Russia  en- 
tirely out  of  European  affairs  could  never  have  been 
carried  through  systematically;  Russia  could  not  ex- 
tricate herself,  however  much  she  tried.  There  were 
too  many  European  interests  at  stake,  and  further, 
the  Balkan  trouble  was  not  settled,  but  on  the  con- 
trary, the  Berlin  decisions  were  bound  to  call  forth 
new  complications;  we  know  only  too  well  that  the 
Balkans  remained  the  storm  center  of  Europe  till 
1914.  Further,  Russia  could  not  withdraw  her  claims 
concerning  the  Straits  of  the  Bosphorus.  Finally, 
even  if  Russia  could  have  succeeded  in  cutting  off  her 
interests  westward,  the  other  countries  had  no  intention 
of  leaving  her  unmolested.  There  was  first  the  restless 
Bismarck,  his  watchful  eye  constantly  on  his  eastern 
neighbor;  then  came  France  seeking  Russia's  friend- 
ship and  willing  to  pay  millions  to  secure  it;  and  lastly 
there  was  the  steadily  increasing  enmity  of  England, 
suspicious  of  Russia's  activities  in  central  Asia.  All 
this  tended  to  thwart  Alexander's  plans  for  keeping 
out  of  trouble. 


6  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 


II. 

The  relations  of  Russia  towards  France  during  the 
first  years  of  Alexander's  reign  were  cool,  though  not 
inimical.  Alexander  III  did  not  like  the  French  Re- 
public, he  did  not  approve  of  her  republican  institu- 
tions, he  hated  her  growing  radicalism  and  socialistic 
influences,  and  considered  republicanism  the  chief 
source  of  her  political  weakness  and  instability.  The 
character  of  the  French  people  was  not  to  his  taste. 
The  past  history  of  France's  relations  towards  Russia 
also  was  not  conducive  to  great  friendship;  for  many 
years  France  had  been  opposing  Russia  in  various 
ways.  She  was  Russia's  enemy  in  the  Crimean  War, 
she  openly  supported  the  Polish  aspirations  for  inde- 
pendence, she  was  not  on  Russia's  side  at  Berlin  in 
1878,  and  finally  there  existed  certain  political  reasons 
for  dissatisfaction,  for  Alexander  looked  askance  at 
the  French  revolutionary  sympathies  abroad  and  at 
the  growth  of  her  socialism  at  home. 

Thus  the  first  years  of  this  reign  were  a  period  of 
aloofness  between  the  two  countries  and  of  ill-dis- 
guised suspicions  on  the  part  of  the  Tsar.  And  in  that 
atmosphere  of  suspicions  and  personal  dislikes,  the 
least  incident  was  bound  to  be  magnified  into  enormous 
proportions.  For  instance,  the  rather  insignificant  fact 
of  the  recall  of  the  French  ambassador,  General 
Appert,  from  St.  Petersburg  for  purely  personal  rea- 
sons, seemed  to  Alexander  an  insult.  He  liked  Appert, 
who  was  a  military  man  of  very  conservative  views, 
whose  wife  was  of  Danish  extraction  and  intimate  with 


FRANCE  7 

the  Empress,  herself  from  Denmark.  The  Tsar  be- 
came so  infuriated  at  this  action  on  the  part  of  France 
that  he  recalled  his  own  ambassador,  Mohrenheim, 
from  Paris  and  informed  the  French  that  he  did  not 
want  any  ambassador  from  them  at  all.  The  diplo- 
matic representation  of  both  countries  remained  for 
a  long  time  in  the  hands  of  secondary  charges 
d'affaires,  and  very  naturally  Germany  used  this  inci- 
dent to  further  her  own  purposes.  Bismarck  saw  with 
joy  how  these  two  countries  were  drifting  apart,  thus 
greatly  diminishing  the  chances  of  any  French  ag- 
gressiveness against  Germany. 

The  ill  feeling  of  Alexander  III  was  increased  at 
this  time  by  two  other  events:  first,  by  the  publishing 
in  France  of  the  law  which  exiled  the  Royal  princes 
and  pretenders,  Alexander  considering  it  an  unwar- 
ranted blow  to  his  beloved  monarchical  principles; 
second,  by  the  cases  of  the  two  prominent  Russian 
revolutionaries,  Hartmann  and  Kropotkine.  They 
were  both  implicated  in  plots  to  assassinate  his  father, 
Alexander  II,  and  had  fled  to  France,  where  they 
found  refuge,  the  French  government  not  being  will- 
ing to  extradite  them  to  Russia  notwithstanding  the 
insistence  of  the  Russian  authorities.  Kropotkine  was 
first  convicted  of  murder  by  the  French  courts,  but 
later  pardoned  by  the  French,  and  this  act  aroused  the 
Tsar's  ire.  Alexander  took  it  as  a  personal  offense 
against  himself  and  his  rule. 

This  tension,  however,  was  unexpectedly  relieved, 
notwithstanding  Alexander's  strong  predilections, 
which  were  so  characteristic  of  the  man.  The  great 
and  noteworthy  change,  dating  from  about  the  year 


8  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

1887,  was  born  exclusively  of  the  aggressiveness  and 
clumsiness  of  the  German  policy.  Bismarck  seem- 
ingly misreckoned  and  counted  too  much  on  Alexan- 
der's reactionary  tendencies.  Only  the  many  and  con- 
secutive mistakes  of  Berlin  can  explain  the  drastic 
change  of  Russia's  policies. 

It  came  about  through  the  rapprochement  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria,  which  alarmed  Alexander  extremely 
and  caused  him  to  make  concessions  to  France.  The 
latter  country,  contrary  to  the  policy  of  Germany,  was 
now  making  every  effort  to  enlist  the  friendship  of 
Russia,  and  took  the  initiative  in  making  advances. 
First  came  the  reestablishment  of  ambassadorial  rela- 
tions; Mohrenheim  was  permitted  to  return  to  Paris, 
and  France  on  her  part  sent  Laboulaye,  a  remarkably 
gifted  man,  to  St.  Petersburg.  Then  came  a  Bulgarian 
incident.  A  Bulgarian  deputation  was  travelling  hi 
Europe,  enlisting  the  sympathies  of  the  various  gov- 
ernments with  the  cause  of  Prince  Alexander;  they 
were  cordially  received  in  London,  but  when  they  came 
to  Paris,  they  found  to  their  amazement  a  very  cold 
reception,  due  exclusively  to  the  desire  of  the  French 
to  please  the  Tsar,  who  disliked  the  Battenberg  prince; 
this  incident  can  rightly  be  looked  at  as  one  of  the  very 
first  landmarks  in  the  path  of  the  Franco-Russian 
friendship. 

At  a  later  date  Flourens,  who  was  at  the  time  for- 
eign minister,  asserted  that  the  idea  of  a  Russo-French 
alliance  first  originated  with  him.  We  overlook  his 
mistake.  When  Laboulaye  was  sent  to  Russia  there 
was  no  idea  in  France  of  any  possible  alliance  with 
Russia;  all  the  French  government  could  hope  for 


FRANCE  9 

was  to  reestablish  friendly  relations.  It  was  very 
gradually,  after  his  arrival  in  St.  Petersburg,  that 
Laboulaye  became  convinced  of  the  opportunity  of 
much  closer  relations  with  Russia,  and  only  later  did 
he  conceive  the  possibility  of  some  sort  of  agreement 
as  a  common  defence  against  Germany.  This  was  due 
in  great  measure  to  Bismarck's  erroneous  tactics  when 
he  hoped  to  force  the  hand  of  the  stubborn  Tsar,  and 
yet  further  to  the  great  wisdom  and  diplomacy  of  the 
French  ambassador,  who  in  a  short  space  of  time  suc- 
ceeded in  endearing  himself  to  the  Russian  people  and 
winning  the  unquestionable  sympathies  of  the  Em- 
peror. 

By  that  time  the  French  ministry  had  changed  and 
the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs  was  m  the  hands  of 
the  able  Freycinet,  who  saw  at  once  the  great  advan- 
tages and  new  vistas  opened  to  France  by  her  far- 
sighted  ambassador.  Moreover,  President  Carnot  had 
succeeded  Grevy,  and  being  convinced  of  the  advan- 
tages of  an  understanding  with  Russia,  energetically 
seconded  the  prime  minister,  Ribot,  to  bring  it  about. 
Thus  we  have  a  number  of  French  statesmen  who  were 
literally  grasping  the  opportunity  of  approaching 
Russia  and  making  her  a  friend  and  an  ally.  There 
must  have  been  very  serious  reasons  indeed  for  Alex- 
ander to  thus  change  his  policy.  As  we  have  seen,  his 
personal  predilections  had  previously  drawn  him  in 
an  exactly  opposite  direction ;  he  was  strongly  inclined 
towards  a  friendship  with  monarchical  Germany  and 
personally  disliked  the  French  people  and  their  politi- 
cal institutions. 

The  main  cause  for  this  change  was  the  increasing 


10  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

arrogance  of  the  German  chancellor,  whose  conduct 
antagonized  the  Tsar.  Then  too,  Alexander  gradually 
became  convinced  that  the  internal  troubles  of  his  own 
country  were  not  as  dangerous  as  they  had  at  first 
seemed,  after  the  assassination  of  his  father.  The 
police  .measures  of  his  government  succeeded  in  driv- 
ing the  leaders  of  the  revolutionary  movement  to  cover, 
and  outwardly  quiet  seemed  to  dominate.  This  cre- 
ated very  serious  troubles  later  on,  during  the  reign 
of  his  son,  but  Alexander  had  not  the  slightest  realiza- 
tion of  it.  Finally,  much  of  the  success  of  the  French 
policy  must  be  attributed  to  the  great  skill  and  tact 
of  Laboulaye.  He  worked  at  it  so  carefully,  paved  his 
way  so  cautiously,  and  approached  the  Russian  govern- 
ment so  gradually  that  Alexander  might  have  been 
easily  fooled,  and  not  have  noticed  during  the  first 
months  that  any  change  was  really  coming.  Certainly 
neither  his  ministers  nor  the  general  public  realized 
such  a  change. 

Least  of  all  did  Alexander  expect  to  alter  his  per- 
sonal relations  with  the  old  Kaiser;  he  openly  admired 
Wilhelm  I  and  loved  him  as  a  grandfather,  resenting 
the  brusque  way  Bismarck  was  treating  his  master. 
Perhaps  this  was  also  a  remote  cause  of  the  Tsar's 
dislike  of  the  chancellor. 

There  happened  in  1887  a  very  unfortunate  per- 
sonal incident.  The  Tsar  was  returning  home  in  the 
autumn  of  that  year,  via  Berlin,  from  a  holiday  trip  to 
Denmark,  and  had  a  stormy  interview  with  the  Ger- 
man chancellor,  during  which  he  violently  accused  Bis- 
marck of  interfering  with  Russian  affairs  by  support- 
ing Prince  Alexander  of  Bulgaria,  and  also  of  having 


FRANCE  11 

written  a  disagreeable  letter  to  the  English  govern- 
ment with  which  at  the  time  Russia's  relations  were 
strained.  This  letter  proved  later  a  forgery,  though  its, 
author  was  never  known.  The  whole  incident  made 
a  bad  and  lasting  impression  on  Alexander,  whose 
angry  feelings  towards  Bismarck  continued  unabated 
to  the  end  of  the  Tsar's  life. 

In  1888  came  the  death  of  the  old  Kaiser,  and  after 
Frederick's  reign  of  three  months  young  Wilhelm  II 
ascended  the  German  throne.  At  the  beginning  of  this 
reign  there  was  seemingly  much  sympathy  between 
Wilhelm  and  Alexander.  Wilhelm  tried  to  be  very 
respectful  and  subservient,  which  pleased  Alexander 
immensely.  Possibly  the  feelings  Alexander  had  to- 
wards Bismarck  counted  much  in  the  latter's  dis- 
missal. Alexander's  opinion  of  the  autocratic  chan- 
cellor probably  helped  to  convince  Wilhelm  that  he 
ought  to  rule  without  such  a  "nurse"  behind  his  back. 
I  rather  think  that  this  fact  does  not  receive  sufficient 
attention  from  the  historians  of  the  epoch,  especially 
from  those  who  deal  with  Bismarck's  resignation. 

To  sum  up  the  policies  of  these  years — 1886-1890 — 
we  can  say  that  Germany  constantly  irritated  Russia 
— a  policy  most  detrimental,  chiefly  to  Germany  her- 
self— by  the  personal  methods  of  Bismarck  which  an- 
tagonized the  Tsar,  and  by  her  growing  friendship  with 
Austria.  The  aims  of  that  friendship  were  never  well 
disguised  and  it  was  known  at  St.  Petersburg  that  they 
were  directed  primarily  against  Russia,  Germany  was 
relying  too  much  on  her  former  friendship  with  Russia 
and  the  family  relations  of  the  two  courts.  France, 
on  the  other  hand,  led  by  clever  men,  especially 


12  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Laboulaye,  carefully  paved  her  way  to  the  building 
up  of  an  understanding  with  Russia,  clearing  away  all 
former  causes  of  friction.  Meanwhile  Russia's  own 
policy,  planned  by  Alexander,  was  to  remain  abso- 
lutely neutral  between  France  and  Germany  and  to 
try  to  withdraw  as  much  as  possible  into  a  position  of 
isolation,  which  the  Tsar  deemed  was  the  best  guaran- 
tee of  peace  for  Russia. 

III. 

Thus  a  sort  of  equilibrium  was  achieved  in  the 
mutual  relations  of  these  great  powers,  Russia  holding 
the  balance  between  Germany  and  France.  In  1918 
the  German  government  published  some  Belgian  docu- 
ments, which  they  had  taken  from  Brussels  during  their 
occupation  of  Belgium  (Schwertjeger  vol.  V).  These 
documents  contain  the  reports  to  Brussels  of  different 
Belgian  diplomatic  agents.  They  unanimously  state 
that  they  knew  that  Russia  during  this  period  was 
standing  for  permanent  peace  and  directed  all  her 
endeavors  towards  establishing  peaceful  relations  be- 
tween France  and  Germany,  notwithstanding  the 
pressure  brought  upon  her  by  France.1 

This  was,  however,  not  at  all  what  France  wanted. 
She  had  set  her  mind  on  getting  Russia  on  her  side. 
The  next,  obstacle  that  she  had  to  put  aside  was  the 
influence  of  the  reactionary  surroundings  of  the  Tsar. 
Among  these  there  was  great  discontent,  not  only 

1  Schwertfeger,  Zur  Europaischen  Politik,  1885-1914,  Berlin,  1918. 
Hansen,  Ambassade  a  Paris  du  Baron  de  Mohrenheim,  Paris,  1907. 
Cyon,  Histoire  de  1'Entente  franco-russe,  Paris,  1895.  de  Freydnet, 
Souvenirs,  vol.  1-2,  Paris,  1913. 


FRANCE  13 

with  French  republicanism  in  general,  but  with  the 
French  policy  towards  the  Russian  revolutionaries  in 
particular.  The  police  of  the  Tsar  succeeded  hi  comb- 
ing out  the  revolutionary  movement  from  Russia,  but 
it  became  all  the  stronger  abroad  for  that  very  reason; 
many  of  the  young  Russian  revolutionaries  found  a 
haven  in  Paris,  where  their  circles  and  meeting-places 
were  well  known  to  the  Russian  gendarmes.  The  reac- 
tionaries in  Russia  constantly  urged  the  government 
to  take  drastic  steps  and  make  representations  to 
France  concerning  these  revolutionaries,  and  looked 
askance  at  the  French  for  their  seeming  lack  of  desire 
to  support  such  foolish  pretensions.  And  very  natu- 
rally this  was  bound  to  impede  the  progress  of  the 
movement  towards  a  closer  alliance. 

Knowing  this  the  French  government  opened  in 
1890  one  of  the  darkest  pages  of  the  history  of  this 
alliance  by  starting  persecutions  against  the  Russian 
revolutionaries.  The  first  one  to  take  active  measures 
against  these  Russians  was  Constans,  then  minister  of 
the  interior.  This  proved  to  be  a  terrible  mistake,  and 
remained  to  the  very  end  the  inner  cause  of  weakness 
of  the  Russo-French  alliance,  for  it  could  not  be  sup- 
ported by  the  majority  of  educated  and  enlightened 
Russians  as  long  as  it  had  such  foul  political  motives. 
They  could  not  sincerely  trust  a  republican  France 
upholding  an  autocratic  regime,  which  they  were  so 
devotedly  fighting.  Many  of  the  misfortunes  of  Russia 
during  the  Great  War  must  be  ascribed  to  this  potent 
cause  of  decay,  that  was  eating  away  the  very  core  of 
the  alliance.  It  was  certainly  a  heavy  price  France 
paid  for  Russia's  official  friendship,  not  realizing  evi- 


14  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

dently  how  much  it  estranged  the  bulk  of  the  Russian 
educated  people. 

The  Tsar  and  his  government,  on  the  contrary,  were 
filled  with  satisfaction  and  gratitude  for  such  friendly 
help  on  the  part  of  the  French.  A  short  while  after  the 
police  persecutions  against  the  Russians  had  started 
in  Paris  and  elsewhere,  there  began  the  secret  transac- 
tions between  the  two  governments  to  reach  a  definite 
agreement. 

Just  at  that  time  there  took  place  an  incident  which 
broke  the  ice.  At  the  instigation  of  the  Kaiser,  his 
mother,  the  widow  of  Friedrich,  went  incognito  to 
Paris.  It  is  supposed  by  some  that  Wilhelm  really 
hoped  for  some  unfriendly  demonstration  against  the 
poor  woman.  This  would  have  given  him  his  chance 
at  France.  The  French  government,  however,  took 
all  necessary  measures  to  prevent  any  demonstration. 
A  possible  crisis  was  thus  avoided,  but  it  was  the  first 
practical  test  of  the  new  policy  of  friendship  with 
Russia.  Would  the  latter  country  side  with  France 
in  a  case  of  distinct  German  aggression?  The  French 
did  not  hesitate  to  apply  the  test,  and  quickly  found 
that  Alexander  was  willing  to  back  them  up ;  his  sense 
of  justice  was  deeply  hurt  by  such  methods  of  the 
Kaiser  and  he  showed  sympathy  with  France,  which 
was  enough  to  warn  Germany. 

Thus  the  former  equilibrium  had  disappeared  and 
Russia  began  to  incline  to  one  side. 

Events  developed  rapidly  after  that.  First  came 
the  mission  of  General  Boisdeffre  to  Russia,  where 
he  was  allowed  by  Alexander  to  attend  the  manoeuvers 
of  the  Russian  army  near  St.  Petersburg  in  the  pres- 


FRANCE  15 

ence  of  German  officers  only,  to  the  dismay  of  the 
latter.  During  his  visit  to  Russia  Boisdeffre  had  long 
talks  with  General  Obroutcheff,  Chief  of  Staff,  con- 
cerning the  equipment  of  the  Russian  army.  A  short 
time  previously  the  Russian  army  had  adopted  the 
French  Lebel  rifle  and  Boisdeffre  was  anxious  to  know 
if  it  had  proved  satisfactory.  The  order  was  placed 
with  the  French  in  1889  at  the  time  of  a  visit  of  the 
Grand  Duke  Vladimir  to  Paris,  where  he  used  to  enjoy 
himself  at  the  theatres  and  musicales.  This  was  one  of 
the  most  subtle  means  the  French  used  to  give  Russia 
"friendly"  assistance. 

Then,  on  July  25,  1891,  came  the  visit  of  the  French 
fleet  under  the  command  of  Admiral  Gervais  to 
Kronstadt.  The  reception  accorded  the  French  was 
quite  exceptional,  due  to  the  special  effort  of  the  Rus- 
sian government.  The  Russian  reactionaries  beheld 
to  their  horror  the  Tsar  standing  at  attention  and 
saluting  while  the  revolutionary  Marseillaise  was 
being  played  by  French  and  Russian  military  bands. 
This  action  of  the  Tsar  was  afterwards  cited  by  some 
as  an  exceptional  token  of  friendship,  and  by  others 
as  a  terrible  mistake;  how  could  an  autocratic  Tsar 
salute  a  revolutionary  hymn,  asked  the  latter? 

In  August,  1891,  during  the  talks  between  Gen- 
erals Boisdeffre  and  Obroutcheff,  the  question  of  a 
possible  military  convention  between  the  two  coun- 
tries came  up.  The  first  text  of  an  agreement,  dated 
August  22,  1891,  was  rather  "platonic."  However, 
this  was  really  the  beginning  of  an  alliance. 

Next  came  the  visit  in  the  autumn  of  1891  of  the 
Russian  foreign  minister,  de  Giers,  to  Paris,  when 


16  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

he  discussed  the  same  matters,  but  on  a  broader  plane, 
with  Ribot  the  prime  minister  and  Freycinet  the 
French  foreign  secretary.  Finally  in  December,  1891, 
there  took  place  formal  transactions  at  St.  Petersburg 
between  the  French  ambassador,  Count  Montebello, 
General  Boisdeffre,  Colonel  Moulin,  on  the  one  side, 
and  the  foreign  minister,  de  Giers,  the  minister  of 
war,  General  Vannowsky,  the  chief  of  staff,  General 
Obroutcheff,  on  the  other. 

On  June  6,  1892,  came  the  visit  of  the  Grand  Duke 
Constantine  to  the  French  President  Carnot.  He  was 
magnificently  received.  A  second  text  of  an  agreement 
is  dated  August  30,  1892,  but  the  Panama  scandal  de- 
ferred the  transactions.  (This  agreement  was  the  final 
text  of  the  military  convention,  since  published  by  the 
Bolsheviki,  Paris,  1919.) 

In  October,  1893,  a  Russian  squadron  commanded 
by  Admiral  Avellan  paid  a  return  visit  to  France  at 
Toulon,  and  was  received  most  cordially  by  the  French 
government.  A  great  effort  was  made  to  please  the 
Russians.  Finally,  on  June  10,  1895,  Ribot  formally 
announced  the  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance. 


IV. 

Parallel  to  her  political  transactions,  France  en- 
deavored to  strengthen  Russia's  bond  of  friendship  by 
other,  more  subtle  means,  namely,  by  loans  for  her 
industrial  development.  One  must  remember  in  this 
respect  that  beginning  with  £he  '80's  there  was 


FRANCE  17 

started  in  Russia  a  great  industrial  expansion,  two 
consecutive  Russian  finance  ministers,  Vishnegradsky 
and  Witte,  trying  by  all  sorts  of  means  to  foster 
and  further  the  industrial  development  of  their  coun- 
try, and  one  must  say  that  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  much  of  it  was  artificial,  unnatural  and  of  hot- 
house growth,  they  still  succeeded  in  achieving  very 
remarkable  results.  In  two  decades  (the  '80's  and 
J90's)  Russia  in  that  respect  was  unrecognizable; 
towards  the  year  1900  she  possessed  a  well-developed 
industrial  movement. 

But  such  development  demands  capital,  and  Russia 
had  none  of  her  own  to  spare.  France  and  Belgium, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  abundance  of  surplus  money, 
the  savings  of  their  thrifty  populations,  ready  to  invest 
in  any  enterprise  that  would  pay  them  a  fair  per- 
centage. The  statesmen  on  both  sides,  realizing  these 
conditions,  set  to  work  to  make  the  supply  and  the 
demand  meet  to  their  mutual  satisfaction.  Their  mo- 
tives, however,  were  very  different;  the  Russians 
wanted  the  capital  for  their  young  and  promising 
industries  and  were  quite  ready  to  pay  a  handsome 
percentage;  the  French  and  Belgian  people  simply 
looked  for  a  secure  investment,  whereas  the  French 
government,  assuring  the  people  of  such  a  security  by 
government  guarantees,  sought  political  advantages  by 
establishing  financial  bonds  tying  Russia  down  to  an 
alliance  with  France. 

Germany  was  not  willing  to  participate  in  Russian 
loans;  all  her  money  in  those  days  was  being  invested 
in  her  new  colonial  enterprises. 

The  French  money  on  the  contrary  came  to  Russia 


18  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

in  great  quantities;  enormous  Russian  loans  were 
floated  on  the  French  money  market,  constantly  in- 
creasing in  size.  In  1890  three  loans  were  concluded, 
in  1891  two;  later  other  loans  succeeded  these;  1893, 
'94,  '96,  1901  and  1904  saw  others,  and  finally  in  1906 
the  largest  and  politically  the  most  important,  which 
Witte  calls  the  loan  "which  saved  Russia,"  or,  we  may 
add,  the  Russian  autocracy.  Then  government  loans 
were  succeeded  by  municipal,  provincial  (the  Finland 
loans),  metallurgic,  mining,  manufacturing,  transpor- 
tation loans  of  various  character  and  qualifications, 
amounting  to  the  enormous  sum  of  12  billions,  or 
nearly  one  quarter  of  all  the  investments  abroad  of  the 
French  nation.1 

In  the  early  history  of  the  financial  policy  of  France 
there  took  place  an  incident,  little  known  abroad,  but 
very  characteristic.  It  was  during  the  negotiations 
of  the  first  loan  of  1891 ;  the  banking  house  of  Roths- 
childs in  Paris  suddenly  interrupted  the  transactions 
and  declined  to  proceed  with  them,  giving  as  a  pretext 
the  Jewish  persecutions  which  were  then  going  on  in 
Russia.  As  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  more  back  of 
this  stand  by  the  bank.  These  transactions  coincided 
with  the  friction  that  ensued  between  Paris  and  Berlin 
on  account  of  several  incidents.  France  then  inquired 
if  Russia  would  uphold  her  in  her  policy  against  Ger- 
many. Russia  answered  that  she  would  certainly  come 
to  the  aid  of  France  if  Germany  attacked  her,  but  not 
otherwise.  This  qualification  alarmed  the  French 
government,  who  forced  the  Rothschilds  to  withdraw 
from  the  transactions  in  order  to  put  pressure  upon 

*See  A.  Tardieu,  France  and  the  Alliances,  N.  Y.,  1908. 


FRANCE  19 

Russia.  The  details  of  that  story  are  still  unknown, 
and  perhaps  there  is  some  exaggeration  in  it,  but  the 
spirit  of  it  is  undoubtedly  true.  Such  was  Russia's 
position  during  those  years;  she  would  not  back  any 
aggression  on  either  side,  and  still  endeavored  to  hold 
the  balance  as  even  as  possible.  France,  on  her  side, 
was  working  for  much  more  and  against  the  will 
of  the  Russian  people,  the  Russian  government,  and 
especially  the  Tsar,  she  forced  the  alliance  upon 
Russia,  and  willingly  employed  financial  means  to 
exert  such  pressure. 

The  real  test  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  came 
during  the  Japanese  war.  One  cannot  doubt  the  mo- 
tives of  France  in  any  way;  she  was  honestly  trying 
to  help  Russia  in  her  difficult  situation,  the  more  so 
because  Germany  was  endeavoring  to  establish  friendly 
relations  and  assist  the  Russian  government,  too,  as 
best  she  could.  There  exist  many  proofs  of  French 
sincerity;  her  help  to  Rojdestvensky's  fleet  at  Mada- 
gascar and  at  other  ports  and  her  continued  financial 
support  are  but  a  few  of  the  many  instances  that  might 
be  cited. 

There  was  one  thing  wrong,  however,  in  the  Franco- 
Russian  alliance,  and  the  events  of  the  Japanese  war 
ought  to  have  been  a  warning  to  France:  first,  the 
Russian  army  was  in  no  way  as  strong  as  the  outside 
world  thought;  the  organization  was  poor,  the  com- 
mand was  deficient,  the  system  of  supplies  was  not 
working  well,  and  what  was  more  the  army  had  not 
the  whole-hearted  backing  of  the  nation;  second, 
the  internal  policy  of  Russia  was  absolutely  un- 
satisfactory, for  it  was  undermining  her  strength  and 


20  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

creating  social  discontent,  which  had  already  burst 
forth  in  a  revolutionary  movement  in  1905.  Seething 
with  dissatisfaction  and  revolution,  Russia  could  not 
give  France  the  support  she  expected  from  her.  There 
came  a  moment  when  France  ought  to  have  realized 
this,  namely,  'in  the  spring  of  1906  when  Witte  was 
conducting  the  transactions  concerning  the  loan  "which 
saved  Russia!"  but  that  really  only  helped  to  defer  the 
revolution  for  another  ten  years.  The  factors  for 
this  last  huge  loan  from  France  were  as  follows: 
For  the  loan  were  the  already  firmly  established 
alliance  and  the  strategic  plan  of  the  two  countries, 
bound  to  each  other,  France  depending  absolutely  on 
the  military  assistance  of  Russia;  the  mercantile  hopes 
for  profits  on  the  part  of  French  investors,  who  were 
expecting  big  percentages  on  their  investments,  the 
French  government  constantly  arousing  their  hopes 
by  all  sorts  of  artificial  means  and  promises;  and  some 
elements  of  the  ruling  classes  on  both  sides,  hoping 
to  find  support  from  such  a  policy  of  backing  Russia 
and  her  autocratic  government,  though  one  cannot 
say  that  it  was  the  whole  of  these  classes,  as  there  were 
among  them  farsighted  persons  who  realized  the  pre- 
cariousness  of  the  political  condition  in  Russia. 

Witte's  parleys  concerning  this  loan  were  started 
with  the  Rouvier  government,  but  the  following 
winter  it  fell,  and  was  succeeded  by  the  Sarrien 
government,  which  concluded  the  negotiations,  Poin- 
care  having  unfortunately  the  finance  portfolio, — thus 
carrying  the  heaviest  responsibility  for  the  loan, — 
while  Clemenceau  had  the  portfolio  of  the  interior, 
which  enabled  him  to  control  the  police  and  deal  with 


FRANCE  21 

the  question  of  Russian  revolutionaries.  These  were 
the  forces  that  Witte,  the  Russian  government,  the 
French  capitalists  and  some  French  statesmen  were 
relying  on  to  carry  the  loan. 

Against  the  loan  was  a  formidable  array  on  both 
sides.  First,  political  morals  or  ethics.  I  realize  that 
there  are  many  people  who  deny  that  ethics  play  any 
role  in  politics,  but  I  consider  this  very  wrong,  and  the 
present  case  is  the  best  possible  example  and  proof  of 
the  enormous  influence  that  the  moral  point  of  view 
can  have  on  political  matters.  The  American-Chinese 
relations,  especially  concerning  the  Boxer  indemnity, 
the  open  door  policy,  and  the  Shantung  protests  afford 
other  examples.  Second,  Russian  liberal  public  opin- 
ion, which  was  unanimously  opposed  to  the  loan, 
considered  that  France  at  least  ought  to  have 
confronted  the  Russian  government  with  the  request 
for  constitutional  guarantees.  It  was  a  brilliant  oppor- 
tunity for  France  to  stand  for  constitutionalism  and 
thus  strengthen  the  Russian  liberal  movement.  This 
would  have  been  a  tremendous  advantage  for  the 
young  Duma  in  her  political  struggle.  Most  energetic 
action  was  taken  at  that  time  by  the  leading  Russian 
political  party,  the  Constitutional  Democrats  or 
Cadets,  as  they  are  usually  called.  They  even  went 
so  far  as  to  send  a  deputation  to  Paris  in  order  to  con- 
vince the  French  of  the  necessity,  if  not  of  refusing 
the  loan,  at  least  of  attaching  definite  political  and 
liberal  conditions  to  it.  Some  of  the  Cadets  were  so 
strongly  of  this  opinion  that  they  considered  the  loan 
to  be  a  real  crime  against  Russia.  (Subsequent  events 
proved,  alas,  that  they  were  not  far  from  right.)  The 


22  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Russian  government,  on  the  contrary,  naturally  con- 
sidered these  men  traitors,  not  daring,  however,  to 
court-martial  and  punish  them,  knowing  well  that 
public  opinion  all  over  Russia  was  backing  them 
strongly.  It  is  a  great  pity  that  the  French  govern- 
ment refused  to  recognize  them  and  consider  their 
point  of  view.  Much  of  the  history  of  Russia  and 
even  of  Europe  would  have  been  different  had  they 
been  recognized  by  France.  Third,  whereas  the  men 
in  power  in  France  at  that  time  never  realized  this 
chance,  there  were  many  statesmen,  especially  among 
her  radicals  and  socialists,  who  saw  clearly  enough  the 
frightful  dangers  for  France  in  backing  a  tottering 
autocracy.  To  the  lasting  shame  of  the  French  gov- 
ernment of  that  year  and  of  Witte,  the  loan  was  con- 
cluded, and  the  Tsar  and  his  government  were  saved 
from  certain  defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  liberals.  The 
first  negotiations  were  conducted  by  Witte  and  the 
French  banker,  Neutzlin;  to  the  latter  credit  must 
be  given,  for  at  the  beginning  he  was  strongly  opposed 
to  concluding  a  loan  without  the  knowledge  and  the 
sanction  of  the  Duma.  Witte,  however,  succeeded  in 
persuading  him  to  push  through  the  loan.  The  Rus- 
sian government  made  the  immoral  threat  to  France 
of  starting  a  flirtation  with  Germany  in  case  the 
French  refused  the  loan.  It  was  at  the  time  of  the 
Algeziras  conference,  and  the  Russian  government 
intimated  that  it  would  not  back  France,  but  would 
help  Germany  to  protract  the  negotiations,  which  Ger- 
many had  already  done  very  effectively.  It  was  prac- 
tically impossible  for  Russia  to  make  good  the  threat, 
but  it  brought  France  to  the  point  of  agreeing  to  float 


FRANCE  23 

the  loan.  That  threat  was  made  by  Witte.  The  Rus- 
sian liberals  requested  at  least  one  condition — that  the 
Duma  should  be  given  the  opportunity  to  sanction  the 
loan,  which  would  have  given  it  the  chance  to  criti- 
cize the  Russian  government  and  lay  bare  some  of  its 
shortcomings  and  mistakes.  But  the  French  govern- 
ment firmly  refused. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  England  took  the  posi- 
tion of  counselling  moderation  to  France,  and  was  not 
averse  to  backing  the  Russian  liberals  in  their  demand 
to  allow  the  Duma  to  sanction  the  loan  and  criticize 
the  government.  English  influence  in  Paris  during 
these  days  was  not  sufficiently  strong,  however.  A  few 
English  bankers  with  Lord  Revelstoke  did  take  part  in 
the  loan,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  English 
government  was  opposed  to  it;  the  Rothschilds  de- 
clined to  take  a  hand  in  it. 

In  only  one  particular  was  Witte  right  in  insisting 
on  the  absolute  necessity  of  that  loan.  Russia  was  in 
dire  need  of  money  and  could  obtain  it  only  in  France. 
There  were  many  payments  due  in  1906  from  previous 
loans;  there  were  the  tremendous  expenses  of  the 
Japanese  war  to  be  paid;  there  existed  a  dangerous 
tendency  for  Russian  gold  to  go  abroad,  thus  les- 
sening the  bullion  reserve,  which  was  threatening  the 
newly  established  gold  standard  of  the  Russian  cur- 
rency. But  contrary  to  Witte's  opinion  it  must  be  said 
that  when  the  loan  was  concluded  its  conditions  were 
ruinous  to  the  Russian  treasury,  and  its  political  mean- 
ing as  mentioned  above  quite  disastrous.  The  amount 
of  the  loan  was  first  fixed  at  2,750,000,000  francs,  but 
later  reduced  to  2,250,000,000  francs,  bearing  6  per 


24  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

cent  interest,  and  floated  in  April,  1906.  Germany 
absolutely  refused  to  participate  in  this  loan,  though  at 
the  start  her  bankers  did  take  part  in  the  negotiations, 
possibly  in  order  to  simply  keep  in  touch  with  what 
was  going  on.  As  the  transactions  reached  the  decisive 
point  they  withdrew,  alleging  the  prohibition  of  their 
government  to  take  part  in  the  actual  floating  of  the 
loan.  The  American  firm  of  J.  P.  Morgan  was  also 
invited  to  participate,  but  withdrew  early,  though  no 
political  reasons  came  to  the  surface  at  the  time. 


V. 

The  history  of  the  French  loan  of  1906  was  the  last 
warning  to  France.  After  that  date  the  two  govern- 
ments, Russia  and  France,  became  closely  bound  and 
had  to  stand  by  each  other,  per  fas  et  nefas. 

The  aggressiveness  of  Germany  either  against  France 
or  Russia  called  absolutely  for  the  assistance  of  the 
other  ally,  and  no  one  was  better  aware  of  this  than 
the  government  of  Berlin.  And  vice  versa,  if  France 
or  Russia  began  an  offensive  policy  against  any  other 
nation,  the  other  ally  was  forced  to  back  such  action, 
no  matter  what  its  own  opinion  in  the  matter  might 
be.  This  was  the  case,  for  instance,  in  the  Morocco 
crisis,  when  Russia  stood  by  France,  though  she  her- 
self had  no  interests  at  stake  in  northern  Africa.  But 
the  time  of  greatest  trial  came  when  in  the  summer 
of  1914  the  conflagration  started  in  the  Balkans. 
Berlin  knew  from  the  very  beginning  that  France 
would  have  to  back  the  Russian  stand  on  the  Slav 


FRANCE  25 

question.  London  and  most  of  the  other  capitals 
knew  it  as  well. 

The  only  possible  break  might  have  been  the 
Bjorko  treaty,  a  very  cleverly  laid  intrigue  of  the 
Kaiser.  For  many  reasons  it  was  bound  however  to 
fail,  thus  leaving  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  intact. 

The  great  historical  meaning  of  this  alliance  is  not 
in  doubt  at  the  present  day.  The  victory  of  the  Allies 
was  the  necessary  outcome  of  that  strong  friendship, 
built  up  between  France  and  Russia.  The  victory  of 
the  Marne  and  the  resistance  on  the  western  front  were 
due  in  no  mean  part  to  Russia's  role  in  the  east,  though 
at  the  present  tune  this  fact  is  not  always  remembered. 

The  impartial  historian,  however,  is  in  duty  bound 
to  mention  the  drawbacks  of  that  alliance  and  the  fatal 
mistakes  of  some  of  its  originators  and  constructors. 
Russia's  mistake  was  of  a  general  political  nature,  of 
not  heeding  the  signs  of  the  time;  her  reactionary  gov- 
ernment did  not  want  to  make  the  necessary  liberal 
concessions  up  to  the  moment  when  it  was  too  late ;  the 
concessions  it  did  make  were  always  insincere  and 
insufficient. 

France's  miscalculation  was  double.  First,  the 
French  statesmen  helped  much  too  willingly  the 
Russian  reactionaries  in  their  persecutions  of  their 
political  opponents;  the  exile  and  imprisonment  of 
Russian  revolutionaries  always  will  remain  a  dark 
page  in  French  constitutional  history.  Second,  when 
there  came  a  moment  of  grave  warning,  at  the  tune 
of  the  first  Russian  revolutionary  attempt,  after  the 
Japanese  war  in  1905-1906,  France  did  not  heed 
this  warning,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Russia's 


26  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

best  liberals  were  telling  her  the  undisguised  truth. 
Many  eminent  Frenchmen  understood  the  situation 
very  clearly  and  supported  the  Russian  liberals. 
England,  too,  gave  her  warning  to  France,  but  all 
in  vain.  The  money  she  loaned  Russia  only  helped 
to  support  a  decaying  and  degenerate  autocratic 
government,  which  was  fated  to  fall  sooner  or  later. 
A  constitutional  Russia  would  have  been  a  much 
stronger  and  surer  friend  and  ally  to  France.  Russia 
could  not  prove  the  strong  ally,  sincere  as  she  was  in 
her  friendship,  and  was  bound  to  go  to  pieces,  eco- 
nomically, politically  and  socially. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Stuart,  G.  H.,  French  Foreign  Policy,  New  York,  1921. 
Debidour,  A.,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  1'Europe,  Paris,  1917. 
Seymour,  C.,  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War,  New  Haven,  1916. 
Daudet,  E.,  L'avant-dernier  Romanoff,  Paris,  1920. 
Daudet,  E.,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  Palliance  franco-russe,  Paris, 

1894. 
For  further  details  see  bibliography  in  Debidour. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ENGLAND. 

I. 

CONTRARY  to  the  history  of  Franco-Russian  rela- 
tions, which  constantly  grew  closer  and  friendlier, 
our  story  concerning  Anglo-Russian  relations  starts 
with  avowed  enmity  and  keeps  this  character  for  a 
long  series  of  years.  For  several  decades  not  only  did 
there  not  exist  any  amicable  relations  between  Russia 
and  England,  but  on  the  contrary,  it  was  mostly  open 
hostility  and  mutual  dislike  and  suspicion. 

The  main  bone  of  contention  was  Turkey,  but  as 
time  went  on  new  questions  arose,  creating  further 
complications  for  the  statesmen  of  St.  Petersburg  and 
London.  First  came  the  central  Asia  trouble;  later 
the  Far  Eastern  quarrel  with  Japan,  in  which  England 
played  no  small  part,  and  only  toward  the  end  of  the 
first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  under  pressure  of 
quite  extraordinary  circumstances  did  those  feelings 
of  mutual  enmity  gradually  abate,  being  replaced  by 
an  entente,  which  grew  into  an  alliance  when  the 
German  danger  began  to  loom  above  the  horizon. 

When  there  is  so  much  inflammable  material 
amassed  by  long  years  of  mutual  suspicions  and  accu- 
sations, new  quarrels  are  bound  to  increase  in  number 
and  intensity,  and  there  always  exists  great  danger  of 

27 


28  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

a  sudden  explosion  and  consequent  warfare.  Several 
times  during  this  period  were  Russia  and  England  on 
the  very  brink  of  war,  saved  from  it  more  by  good 
luck  than  by  good  statesmanship. 

Our  narrative  begins  with  the  open  enmity  that 
existed  between  Russia  and  England  in  the  70's  of 
the  last  century  on  account  of  Turkey  and  the  Balkans. 
Each  time  the  Tsar  Alexander  II  tried  to  put  pressure 
on  the  Sultan  in  order  to  force  him  to  alter  his 
atrocious  methods  of  governing  the  Balkan  peoples, 
England,  in  the  person  of  Beaconsfield,  heartily  sup- 
ported by  Queen  Victoria,  backed  the  Porte  and  helped 
her  to  evade  the  Russian  demands,  thus  gradually 
bringing  about  the  armed  conflict  of  1877-1878.  All 
Europe  was  clamoring  for  an  end  of  the  Turkish  atro- 
cities, the  English  liberals,  headed  by  the  great  Glad- 
stone, not  least  among  those  who  insisted  on  such 
reforms.  At  the  cost  of  enormous  sacrifices,  both  in 
lives  and  money,  Russia  achieved  brilliant  military 
success  and  liberated  the  Balkan  Slavs.  She  stood  vic- 
torious at  the  walls  of  Constantinople;  the  Turks  had 
capitulated,  having  signed  the  armistice  of  San  Ste- 
fano;  some  of  the  Russian  guard  regiments  had 
already  received  the  order  to  march  into  the  Turkish 
capital,  as  a  crowning  act  of  this  war,  when  the  Eng- 
lish veto  put  a  sudden  end  to  the  plan.  The  Berlin 
Congress  that  followed  ruined  nearly  all  of  Russia's 
achievements.  Fortunately,  one  thing  remained, 
namely  the  freedom  of  the  Slavs;  but  even  this  was  not 
without  its  troubles;  the  path  of  liberty,  which  the 
Slavs  now  began  to  tread,  proved  to  be  a  very  thorny 
one. 


ENGLAND  29 

One  must  say,  however,  to  the  honor  of  the  British 
people,  that  the  defenders  of  Turkey  were  in  the 
minority;  the  masses  were  all  anti-Turkish;  this  was 
strikingly  proved  by  the  election  of  1880,  which  anni- 
hilated Disraeli,  his  policy  and  ideals,  and  brought  to 
the  government  the  liberal  leader,  Gladstone,  a  violent 
opponent  of  the  Sultan's  rule.1 

The  chief  argument  of  the  English  conservatives 
against  Russia  and  her  claims  in  the  Balkans,  was  that 
Constantinople  really  was  the  gateway  into  Asia,  the 
necessary  bulwark  of  the  Suez  Canal,  protecting  the 
routes  entering  Asia  Minor,  Mesopotamia,  Egypt  and, 
further  back,  the  Indian  Empire.  This  idea  dates  far 
back  into  the  time  of  Napoleon  I,  when  he  had  his 
strife  with  the  Tsar  Alexander  I,  that  ended  in  such  a 
brilliant  victory  for  the  latter. 

From  the  very  first  these  fears  of  the  British  im- 
perialists were  much  exaggerated  and  unduly  magni- 
fied. Russia  could  not,  even  if  she  wished,  achieve 
such  aggression  into  the  heart  of  Asia;  she  was  much 
too  weak  internally;  then  too,  one  can  now  prove 
historically,  that  responsible  Russian  statesmen  never 
seriously  considered  such  plans.  They  themselves 
would  have  been  frightened  had  they  been  obliged 
to  carry  them  out.  The  70's  were  a  period  of  great 
internal  troubles  and  social  discontent  in  Russia. 
The  only  possible  excuse  for  the  British  conservatives 
of  Disraeli's  camp,  who  trembled  for  their  Asiatic  pos- 
sessions, was  their  absolute  lack  of  knowledge  about 
Russia  and  the  Russians;  they  knew  no  more  about 

1  Compare  Viscount  Bryce,  Modern  Democracies,  New  York,  1921, 
Vol.  II,  p.  378. 


30  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

them  than  the  ancient  history  of  the  Aztecs  or 
Peruvians;  the  Russian  nation  remained  a  constant 
riddle  to  them,  unsolved  up  to  the  end  of  the  century. 

No  wonder  that  in  1879,  after  the  end  of  the  Berlin 
Congress,  Beaconsfield  was  boasting  of  a  great  diplo- 
matic victory,  and  Gortchakof,  on  the  contrary, 
thought  that  this  was  one  of  the  darkest  pages  of  Rus- 
sian history.  These  times  are  long  since  passed,  but 
what  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  is  the  fact  that  it  was 
this  feeling  of  mutual  distrust  alone  that  can  explain 
the  events  of  the  following  decade.  The  intense  enmity 
that  developed  in  the  '80's  between  Russia  and  Eng- 
land culminated  in  '85  in  the  central  Asiatic  crisis, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  at  England's  helm  stood 
for  a  long  time  a  liberal  government,  headed  by  Glad- 
stone himself. 

We  must  not  minimize  the  moderating  influences  of 
Gladstone;  he  at  least  was  never  an  enemy  of  Russia 
and  did  his  very  best  to  avoid  an  open  conflict.  There 
were  two  reasons  for  this  policy  of  Gladstone:  first, 
he  hated  Turkey  and  appreciated  the  role  Russia 
played  in  liberating  the  Balkan  Slavs,  and  second,  he 
was  never  convinced  of  the  existence  of  the  "Russian 
danger"  in  Asia.  On  the  contrary,  in  this  latter  respect 
he  was  even  not  averse  to  cooperating  at  times  with 
Russia.  This  was  shown,  for  example,  by  his  assent  to 
a  conference  with  Russia  concerning  Greece  (1880). 

During  the  '80's  Anglo-Russian  relations  passed 
through  a  double  crisis.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  the 
Bulgarian  trouble,  and  on  the  other  the  far  more  seri- 
ous events  in  this  respect  in  central  Asia,  south  of  the 
Caucasus. 


ENGLAND  31 

After  the  Berlin  Congress,  England  did  not  want  to 
see  the  resurrection  of  a  strong  Turkey.  England 
could  not  very  well  stand  for  the  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  as  she  herself  had  occupied  Egypt  and 
meant  to  retain  it.  The  Porte  had  to  be  held  down,  but 
never  with  the  help  of  Russia.  Austria  seemed  a  more 
willing  and  easy  ally  for  such  a  task.  In  other  words, 
England  wanted  to  weaken  Turkey,  but  without  any 
increase  of  the  influence  of  Russia.  As  the  latter 
country  seemed  to  have  established  a  firm  control  over 
Bulgaria,  it  was  there  that  England  planned  to  chal- 
lenge her  influence,  with  the  willing  assistance  of 
Austria. 

Bulgaria  at  that  time  had  her  own  troubles.  Her 
people  were  striving  for  more  liberty  and  final  eman- 
cipation, while  the  Russian  control  took  the  form  of 
a  military  and  despotic  rule  of  a  few  uncultivated 
generals.  Her  prince,  Alexander  of  Battenberg,  un- 
hesitatingly took  the  side  of  the  people,  and  with  the 
help  and  advice  of  England  stood  for  a  constitutional 
government,  which  only  exasperated  the  Russians, 
especially  the  stubborn  and  limited  Tsar  Alexander  III. 
Things  went  so  far  that  Russia  withdrew  from  Bul- 
garia her  representatives  and  military  instructors, 
threatened  to  sever  her  relations  entirely,  and  showed 
in  many  other  ways  her  open  hostility  to  the  Bulgarian 
people.  The  latter  succeeded  in  holding  their  own  only 
on  account  of  the  united  support  they  received  from 
Austria  and  England.1  But,  naturally  this  could  not 

*It  was  also  due  to  English  help  that  Bulgaria  could  retain  the 
province  of  Eastern  Rumelia,  which  she  annexed,  contrary  to  the 
insistence  of  Russia. 


32  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

create  any  feelings  of  friendship  between  Russia  and 
England. 

Germany  viewed  these  intimate  relations  of  Eng- 
land and  Austria  with  pleasure,  as  a  counterpart  to 
Russian  strength.  In  fact  Bismarck  even  miscalcu- 
lated in  this  respect  in  urging  Austria  on  too  much 
against  Russia,  thus  spoiling  his  own  relations  with 
the  latter  country.  As  we  have  seen  in  respect  to 
France,  this  German  policy  helped  very  much  to  bring 
about  the  friendship  of  Russia  with  France,  frustrat- 
ing the  former  monarchical  alliance  of  the  three  east- 
ern Emperors. 

The  second  crisis  of  the  period  mentioned  above 
concerned  central  Asia.  Russia  was  slowly  but  very 
steadily  moving  into  central  Asia,  like  a  powerful 
avalanche,  conquering  and  annexing  new  territories 
and  gradually  approaching  the  Indian  frontiers.  This 
last  fact  was  the  bugbear  of  England.  The  British 
government  was  extremely  alarmed  by  this  Russian 
expansion,  and  tried  by  all  sorts  of  means  to  put  a  stop 
to  it.  One  of  the  means  they  chose  was  to  establish 
their  own  influence  over  Afghanistan  and  create  out 
of  the  latter  a  buffer-state  between  Russia  and  India. 
Russia,  on  her  side,  was  attempting  to  spread  her  influ- 
ence all  around  Afghanistan,  in  Persia,  in  Turkestan, 
etc.  Thus,  naturally,  a  clash  of  interests  became  more 
or  less  inevitable.  First  arose  mutual  suspicions,  then 
came  accusations  of  intrigues,  finally,  unmitigated 
enmity. 

Great  Britain  was  not  very  fortunate  in  her  cen- 
tral Asiatic  policy  either.  It  was  Beaconsfield  who 
originated  the  idea  of  making  Afghanistan  a  buffer 


ENGLAND  33 

against  Russian  aggression ;  but  the  Afghans,  a  wild  and 
restless  people,  in  no  way  wanted  to  lose  their  inde- 
pendence. They  fiercely  resisted  the  British  intrusion, 
murdered  some  of  the  English  representatives  and  offi- 
cers and  declined  to  have  any  diplomatic  relations  with 
England.  The  Afghan  war  ensued,  and  General  Rob- 
erts vanquished  them,  firmly  establishing  the  English 
rule  over  Afghanistan. 

Meanwhile,  the  Russian  caravans  and  merchants 
were  coming  into  central  Asia,  bringing  with  them  not 
only  Russian  goods,  but  also  Russian  influences  and 
policies.  Russia  consecutively  occupied  Tashkent, 
Samarkand,  Krasnovodsk,  Khiva,  Bokhara,  Kokand, 
the  beautiful  oasis  of  Merv  and  Murgab  and  other 
minor  places.  The  years  1885-86  were  especially 
anxious  times.  Tension  between  Russia  and  England 
became  very  great,  and  at  moments  it  seemed  that  the 
friendly  ties  would  break  and  war  would  start.  Public 
opinion  and  the  press,  particularly  the  conservative 
papers,  on  both  sides  were  full  of  excitement  and  hatred 
to  their  opponents,  and  as  usual  in  such  cases,  all  sorts 
of  stories  and  lies  were  circulated,  poisoning  the  atmos- 
phere and  making  the  work  of  the  governments  still 
more  difficult.  Reading,  in  the  present  day,  the 
memoirs  or  papers  of  those  days,  one  sometimes  won- 
ders how  peace  could  have  been  maintained  under  such 
circumstances. 

The  storm  finally  blew  over,  but  it  left  behind  it  a 
very  unpleasant,  not  to  say  dangerous,  aftermath.  At 
the  least  provocation  from  either  side,  this  enmity 
flared  up  again.  The  feeling  of  mutual  distrust  and 
hostility  developed  strong  roots,  which  spread  deep 


34  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

into  the  psychology  of  these  two  nations;  it  took  a 
verj  long  while  and  quite  unusual  circumstances  to 
eradicate  the  enmity  between  the  Russians  and  the 
English.  During  many  succeeding  conflicts  and  dip- 
lomatic entanglements  do  we  often  find  traces  of  this 
national  hostility.  Germany,  with  her  mechanical 
conception  of  international  relations,  was  strongly 
counting  on  this  enmity,  when  she  was  diligently  pre- 
paring for  the  World  War.  She  was  hoping  that  the 
hostility  between  England  and  Russia  would  help  her 
to  detach  Russia  from  the  Entente  and  bring  her  over 
on  to  the  side  of  the  Teutonic  powers.  One  might 
judge  how  strong  these  feelings  of  mutual  dislike  were 
at  this  epoch  by  the  recently  published  new  memoirs  of 
Prince  Kropotkine,  the  famous  revolutionary.  No 
one  would  accuse  him  of  being  either  prejudiced  in  any 
way,  or  narrow-minded  in  general.  He  was  then  living 
in  exile  in  England,  but  kept  up  a  lively  correspond- 
ence with  some  of  his  friends,  in  Russia.  In  one  of  his 
letters  he  tells  us  that  up  to  the  very  end  of  the  cen- 
tury there  was  spread  among  Russians  in  England  a 
rather  doubtful  legend,  about  the  English  policies  of 
the  '80's.  It  was  said  that  since  1885  England  was 
working  for  a  coalition  against  Russia,  with  the  object 
of  securing  Poland  and  the  Ukraine  for  Austria, 
Bessarabia  for  Rumania  plus  a  part  of  the  Kherson 
province  including  Odessa;  Germany  was  to  receive 
the  Baltic  provinces,  Sweden  was  to  get  Finland,  and 
England  herself  the  Transcaspian  provinces  and  a 
protectorate  over  the  Caucasus.  The  gossip  went,  that 
it  was  the  French  ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  who 
told  Alexander  III  about  this  plan  and  that  that  was 


ENGLAND  35 

the  real  cause  that  forced  the  Tsar  to  conclude  an 
alliance  with  France.  Si  non  e  vero,  e  ben  trovato; 
we  might  add,  the  story  is  not  a  true  one,  but  the  spirit 
of  it  strikes  at  the  very  heart  of  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  England,  of  those  days.  It  explains  at 
least  one  phase  of  the  gradual  inclination  of  Russia 
toward  France. 

Most  interesting,  however,  is  the  fact  that  just 
those  ideas  concerning  the  partition  of  Russia  did 
actuate  repeatedly  both  England  and  Germany,  and 
the  influence  of  some  of  them  is  being  felt  even  at  the 
present  day.  Speaking  once  to  Kropotkine,  Joseph 
Cowen  asked  him:  "Will  you  divide  Russia,  when  you 
get  a  constitution?"  "No,"  said  Kropotkine,  "we  will 
have  a  federation,  excepting  Poland."  "You  could  see 
his  disappointment,"  adds  Kropotkine  in  his  letter. 
This  attitude  even  of  enlightened  Englishmen  is  ex- 
tremely characteristic. 

The  Anglo-Russian  hostility  of  the  '80's  had  only 
one  unexpected  good  consequence,  namely  the 
strengthening  of  the  bonds  between  Russia  and 
France.  The  latter  country  also  had  several  reasons 
to  dislike  the  policy  of  Great  Britain.  France  and 
England  were  by  no  means  friendly,  and  it  was  only 
natural  that  the  Tsar  Alexander  III,  in  order  to  sup- 
port his  own  anti-English  policy  and  oppose  Bis- 
marck's aggression,  turned  finally  to  France,  though 
personally  he  did  not  like  the  French  people  and  their 
political  institutions.  In  other  words,  English  hostil- 
ity unexpectedly  was  helping  the  establishment  of  the 
Franco-Russian  rapprochement,  which  later  developed 
into  an  alliance. 


36  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

II. 

In  the  following  decade  of  the  '90's  there  arose  new 
and  unexpected  difficulties,  this  time  on  account  of  the 
Armenian  massacres  (Sassoon,  Bitlis,  Mush).  Euro- 
pean public  opinion  was  very  much  aroused  by  these 
horrors  perpetrated  at  the  instigation  of  the  Sultan; 
especially  in  England  people  were  clamoring  for  pres- 
sure to  be  put  on  Turkey  to  make  her  cease  these 
persecutions.  Unfortunately,  the  initiative  of  the 
British  cabinet  met  with  stern  opposition  in  St. 
Petersburg,  and  I  am  sorry  to  say  much  of  this  action 
of  Russia  seems  to  have  been  based  upon  criminally 
personal  motives  of  Prince  Lobanoff,  the  Russian  for- 
eign minister.  Without  the  cooperation  of  Russia, 
England  certainly  could  not  succeed  in  forcing  the 
Porte  to  make  amends  and  stop  the  Armenian  terror. 
It  is  possibly  the  best  example  of  the  pernicious  con- 
sequences created  in  the  East  by  the  mutual  distrust 
and  quarrels  of  the  European  Powers. 

In  that  same  period  of  the '90's,  however,  England  did 
succeed  in  reaching  a  measure  of  understanding  with 
Russia  concerning  central  Asia.  Thus  an  agreement 
was  signed  in  1893,  recognizing  the  British  influence  in 
Afghanistan,  and  another  one  delineating  the  spheres  of 
interest  in  Tibet.  For  a  time  it  seemed  as  though  the 
two  powers  would  be  able  henceforward  to  cooperate, 
at  least  in  those  regions.  Consequent  events  proved, 
however,  the  futility  of  such  hopes.  Very  soon  the 
former  hostility  once  more  predominated. 

At  that  moment  we  find  the  personality  of  Witte 
looming  up  suddenly  and  standing  far  above  the  other 


ENGLAND  37 

Russian  statesmen,  on  account  of  his  extraordinary 
intellect  and  wonderful  energy. 

He  started,  for  instance,  in  Persia  an  experiment 
which  he  developed  later  on  a  much  larger  scale  in 
China;  he  founded  a  Russian  bank,  controlled,  financed 
and  directed  by  the  Russian  government.  The  idea  of 
the  establishment  of  this  Russo-Persian  bank  was  to 
spread  through  its  means  Russian  influence  into  Persia, 
the  Persian  market,  the  railroads,  etc.,  a  regular  plan 
of  "peaceful  penetration,"  that  would  carry  Russia 
through  Persia,  right  to  the  coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Englishmen  very  naturally  became  much  alarmed. 
The  bank  was  also  a  powerful  channel  of  influence 
upon  the  Persian  government,  where  personal  per- 
suasion was  duly  coupled  with  financial  assistance. 
We  must  note  in  this  respect  that  the  policy  of  Witte, 
coincides  with  a  similar  policy  of  Germany,  trying 
to  get  a  railroad  outlet  to  Koweit,  on  the  Persian  Gulf 
and  link  it  later  with  the  Bagdad  Railroad.  There  is 
all  reason  to  believe  that  Witte  acted  with  the  under- 
standing and  consent  of  Berlin;  he  was  constantly  in 
close  touch  with  the  Germans. 

The  Boer  war  could  not  help  to  improve  the  relations 
between  Russia  and  England.  On  the  contrary,  it 
was  another  outburst  of  the  old  enmity;  no  doubt 
Germany  was  much  to  blame  for  this.  The  Kaiser  and 
his  ministers  tried  their  very  best  to  arouse  an  anti- 
British  feeling  among  the  Russians.  Russia  twice 
asked  the  French  government  to  intervene  and  offer 
mediation,  but  in  both  cases  behind  the  back  of  the 
Russian  government  we  easily  discern  Berlin;  the 
Kaiser  repeatedly  urged  the  Tsar  to  take  active  steps 


38  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

in  this  direction;  the  incident  with  the  Kruger  tele- 
gram is  too  well  known  to  need  description  in  this 
place.  France  on  her  side  referred  Russia  to  Ger- 
many, declining  to  interfere  on  their  account. 

Finally,  the  last  and  probably  the  most  dangerous 
break  between  Russia  and  England  came  at  the  time 
of  the  Japanese  war.  From  the  very  beginning  of  the 
hostilities,  the  sympathies  of  the  English  were  with 
the  Japanese.  England  was  viewing  with  great  dis- 
trust and  anxiety  the  Russian  expansion  into  Man- 
churia. This  was  one  of  the  main  motives  that  forced 
upon  her  the  Japanese  Alliance. 

As  Kropotkine  tells  us  in  his  correspondence,  Eng- 
lish public  opinion  was  whole-heartedly  on  the  side  of 
Japan  and  foretold  from  the  first  the  Russian  defeat, 
applauding  every  Russian  reverse,  as  it  occurred. 

The  Dogger  Bank  incident  was  the  climax  of  this 
hostility; 1  We  certainly  were  on  the  very  verge  of 
war.  The  inexcusable  action  of  the  Russian  admiral 
called  forth  such  a  storm  of  indignation  in  England 
that  many  contemporaries  were  quite  convinced  that  a 
declaration  of  war  would  follow  within  a  few  days.2 

1  The  Dogger  Bank  dispute  was  settled  by  a  declaration  dated 
November  25,  1904. 

"Though  no  excuse  exists  for  Rojdestvensky's  action,  there  is  an 
explanation  for  his  foolishness.  During  the  war  there  existed  an 
active  Japanese  propaganda  among  the  Russian  revolutionaries, 
directed  toward  the  disruption  of  the  Russian  Empire;  the  Japanese 
paid  Russian  revolutionaries,  Finns,  and  others,  substantial  sums 
in  order  to  weaken  Russia  by  their  revolutionary  activities,  a 
method  very  successfully  used  by  the  Germans  ten  years  later. 
The  Japanese  also  had  numerous  agents  in  Scandinavia,  who  sent 
out  alarming  messages  to  the  Russian  fleet  proceeding  to  the  Far 
East,  in  order  to  scare  the  commander  and  give  the  impression  that 
Japan  had  torpedo-boats  in  the  North  Sea,  awaiting  the  passage 
of  the  Russian  squadron;  it  was  these  messages  that  fooled  the 
overstrained  admiral  and  made  him  fire  at  defenseless  English 
fishermen. 


ENGLAND  39 

We  can  easily  recognize  in  this  case  the  resurrection 
of  the  old  hostility  between  the  two  people,  which  had 
back  of  it  so  many  years  of  mutual  suspicions  and 
distrust. 

Two  factors,  however,  saved  the  situation  at  the 
eleventh  hour;  the  Anglo-French  entente,  which  was 
then  just  crystallizing,  and  the  fear  on  the  part  of 
England  and  France  of  a  Russo-German  alliance;  the 
latter  was  very  strongly  urged  upon  Russia  by  the 
Kaiser,  whose  feelings  at  the  time  were  highly  anti- 
British;  he  did  his  best  to  convince  the  Tsar  that 
England  was  their  common  enemy  and  that  the  only 
salvation  would  be  a  strong  Russo-German  agreement.1 
France  was  terribly  afraid  of  this,  rightly  considering 
that  it  was  a  menace  to  her  and  to  the  Franco-Russian 
alliance,  which  might  easily  fall  to  pieces.  Wilhelm, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  surely  considering  such  an 
eventuality!  This  actuated  the  French  government, 
just  then  so  ably  counselled  by  their  foreign  minister 
Delcasse,  to  make  every  possible  effort  and  exert 
strong  pressure  upon  England  in  order  to  avoid  an 
open  break  between  that  country  and  Russia.  Arbi- 
tration in  such  a  case  was  the  only  possible  means, 
and  as  is  well  known,  France  was  entirely  successful. 
As  soon  as  England  consented  to  arbitrate  the  Dogger 
Bank  case,  the  danger  was  over  and  the  future  Entente 
thus  was  made  possible. 

The  storm  had  blown  over  and  for  a  long  while 
enmity  between  Russia  and  England  had  disap- 
peared. 

*This  feeling  of  a  common  danger  from  Great  Britain  had  its 
repercussion  in  the  Bjorko  agreement,  having  personally  influenced 
the  Tsar  when  he  gave  his  consent  and  signature. 


40  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

III. 

This  great  diplomatic  and  peaceful  success  achieved, 
France  set  herself  to  slowly  building  up  the  long  de- 
sired entente  between  the  three  countries  and  against 
Germany.  It  was  at  that  time  that  the  French  found 
a  staunch  friend  in  unexpected  quarters.  We  mean 
the  personality  of  King  Edward  VII.1  Very  shrewd, 
subtle  in  his  ways,  agreeable  and  polite  in  his  manners, 
Edward  proved  to  be  a  great  factor  in  European  diplo- 
macy of  those  years.  He  was  constantly  travelling 
about,  seeing  the  crowned  heads  of  states,  interview- 
ing the  prime  ministers  and  himself  steadily  moving 
in  one  direction,  having  in  view  one  object,  the  cur- 
tailment of  German  aggression  and  creation  of  such 
conditions  as  would  thwart  the  ambitions  of  his 
nephew,  the  Kaiser.  Whatever  one  might  think  of 
Edward  personally,  no  one  can  deny  his  great  diplo- 
matic skill,  as  well  as  his  foresight.  He  evidently 
realized  from  the  very  first  the  dangers  that  were  con- 
cealed in  the  imperialistic  plans  of  Berlin,  and  he 
subtly  set  himself  to  destroy  them  at  their  very  source 
and  inception.  This  is  the  policy  that  the  Germans 
have  called  the  "Encirclement  of  Germany"  2  and  that 
was  a  menace,  not  to  the  German  nation,  but  exclu- 
sively to  the  Kaiser's  plans  for  imperialistic  expansion. 

King  Edward  and  his  government  could  well  con- 
sider at  that  time  that  the  Russian  danger  or  imperial- 

1  Queen  Victoria  died  in  January,  1901. 

a  King  Edward  VII 's  authorship  of  the  encirclement  theory,  is  ques- 
tionable, but  he  took  a  very  active  part  in  carrying  it  through. 
See  Sidney  Lee,  Article  on  King  Edward  in  the  Dictionary  of  Nat'l 
Biography. 


ENGLAND  41 

ism  was  dead  or  at  least  fatally  crippled,  and  thus  for 
England  there  could  only  accrue  advantage  from  aJ 
rapprochement  with  Russia,  as  against  Germany. 

Indeed,  in  the  Far  East  the  danger  of  Russian  ag- 
gression had  vanished  with  the  victory  of  Japan,  ap- 
parently for  ever.  Japan  herself  was  quite  willing  to 
follow  England's  lead  without  any  protest.  In  Cen- 
tral Asia  things  had  turned  all  Britain's  way :  the  expe- 
dition of  Colonel  Younghusband  assured  English  in- 
fluences in  Tibet  (Treaty  of  1906) ;  Afghanistan  was 
previously  secured;  in  Persia  Lord  Curzon  thwarted 
successfully  the  Persian  Gulf  plans  of  Russia.  FinaUy 
in  the  Balkan  question,  Russia's  weakness  also  dimin- 
ished her  influence  and  helped  to  pacify  English  fears. 
Thus  England  began  to  feel  her  way  very  cautiously 
towards  establishing  better  relations  with  Russia.  She 
had  to  be  very  careful,  however,  considering  the  past 
hostility. 

The  first  step  in  this  direction  was  the  letter  of  Lord 
Lansdowne  to  Sir  Charles  Hardinge,  ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburg  (September,  1905),  explaining  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance  as  being  in  no  way  directed 
against  Russia;  the  alliance  was  meant  to  be  a  purely 
pacific  instrument.  The  next  step  was  a  certain  pres- 
sure put  on  Japan  during  the  Portsmouth  peace  trans- 
actions counselling  moderation  and  letting  Russia 
know  about  this. 

Further,  in  Algeziras  both  countries  supported 
France  and  also  cooperated  in  Constantinople.  In 
other  words,  England  tried  everywhere  to  show  that 
she  was  ready  to  support  the  Russian  policies. 

Later,  in  the  summer  of  1907,  a  Russian  squadron 


42  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

visited  England  and  was  very  cordially  received.  The 
same  year  a  convention  was  signed  August  31,  1907, 
concerning  Persia,  Afghanistan  and  Tibet.  According 
to  this  agreement,  Persia  was  divided  into  three  zones 
of  influence,  Afghanistan  was  recognized  as  being  ex- 
clusively under  English  influence,  and  Tibet  was  made 
semi-independent,  the  powers  promising  not  to  send 
to  Lhassa  any  diplomatic  representatives  and  ac- 
knowledging the  agreement  concluded  by  Colonel 
Younghusband.  Annexed  to  this  convention  was  a  let- 
ter of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson,  am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg,  explaining  the  situation  in 
the  Persian  Gulf. 

Finally,  in  1908,  Edward  VII  went  personally  to  see 
the  Tsar.  On  June  10  they  met  at  Reval,  both  being 
accompanied  by  representatives  of  their  governments, 
the  Tsar  by  Iswolsky,  the  King  by  Sir  Charles  Har- 
dinge. 

This  seemed  a  dangerous  setback  to  Germany,  not 
only  to  the  Kaiser  and  his  government,  who  were 
very  much  alarmed,  but  to  many  German  publicists 
too.  Maximilian  Harden,  for  instance,  wrote  fiery 
articles  in  his  paper,  the  Zukunjt,  about  the  imminent 
danger  that  was  threatening  Germany.  The  Germans 
realized  for  the  first  tune  that  they  were  being  encir- 
cled. The  most  important  immediate  consequence  of 
Edward's  visit  to  Reval  was  the  Turkish  revolution, 
which  in  a  way  was  prompted  by  it  and  which  upset 
at  once  the  whole  equilibrium  of  the  Balkans. 

In  other  words,  gradually  and  slowly  the  conviction 
was  beginning  to  grow  among  more  far-seeing  English- 
men that  it  was  Germany  and  not  Russia  who  was 


ENGLAND  43 

( 

the  real  enemy  of  Great  Britain.  The  policy  ofx 
Edward  VII  helped  to  spread  these  ideas.  The  Ger- 
man nation  was  growing  in  strength  and  numbers  very- 
fast;  in  a  short  period  it  increased  from  40  to  55  mil- 
lions; the  German  government  began  to  have  im- 
perialistic designs  in  Africa,  whereas  before  Germany 
seemed  very  little  interested  in  colonies  and  colonial 
policies,  Bismarck  even  priding  himself  on  not  having 
any  colonial  policy;  now  she  started  to  make  her  influ- 
ence felt  both  in  southwest  and  southeast  Africa. 
Then  came  the  Morocco  incident.  China  too  was  ex- 
periencing German  interference.  Germany  was  very 
successful  in  acquiring  Kiao-chow  and  partaking  in 
the  Russian  aggression  in  the  Far  East,  urging  on  the 
Tsar  in  his  shortsighted  policy.  German  trade  in 
China  was  also  prospering  and  beginning  to  compete 
successfully  with  the  English.  Finally  in  the  Balkans, 
especially  in  Turkey,  the  German  hand  was  now  felt 
very  much  and  German  influences  weighed  very 
heavily;  there  too,  German  goods  began  rapidly  to 
replace  English  goods.  The  trade  mark  "made  in 
Germany"  was  everywhere  in  evidence,  and  with  it 
spread  the  German  political  influence  at  a  tremendous 
rate.  The  Bagdad  Railroad  scheme,  the  influence  of 
Germany  on  the  Young  Turks,  who  were  educated  in 
German  political  and  military  ideas,  the  Turkish  army 
reorganized,  armed  and  instructed  by  Germans — all 
proved  the  increasing  German  influence  and  the  re- 
markable growth  of  German  authority. 

On  the  other  hand  it  was  quite  evident  to  English- 
men that  Russia  was  no  possible  competitor.  Politi- 
cally she  was  very  weak  after  the  Japanese  war,  eco- 


44  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

nomically  she  was  concentrating  all  her  attention  on 
her  industrial  development.  She  gave  way  entirely 
in  central  Asia,  the  Far  East  was  out  of  the  question, 
and  there  remained  only  the  Balkans  and  Constanti- 
nople, where  England  knew  she  could  reach  some 
workable  understanding  with  the  Russian  government. 

All  this  helped  to  establish  the  Triple  Entente.  Its 
real  start  was  the  Anglo-Russian  convention  of  1907 
concerning  central  Asia;  its  practical  test  came  later, 
during  the  Balkan  troubles  that  developed  after  the 
Turkish  revolution  of  1908,  and  particularly  at  the 
time  of  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912  and  1913. 

The  Turkish  revolution  forcibly  opened  the  eyes  of 
Englishmen  as  to  the  extent -of  the  German  influence 
in  Constantinople.  England,  therefore,  -willingly  co- 
operated with  Russia  in  the  Turkish  question,  assist- 
ing Russia  in  her  endeavors  to  force  reforms  on  the 
Young  Turks.  Of  even  greater  importance  was  the 
Anglo-Russian  cooperation  during  the  Balkan  wars, 
when  this  feud  was  being  liquidated  in  London.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  helped  immensely  in  trying  to  settle  the 
trouble  and  worked  hand-in-hand  with  the  Russian 
government. 

The  appointment  of  Delcasse,  the  creator  of  the 
Anglo-French  Entente,  as  ambassador  to  St.  Peters- 
burg (February,  1913),  where  he  was  soon  to  be  joined 
by  General  Joffre,  the  future  commander-in-chief  of 
the  French  armies,  was  also  meant  to  strengthen  the 
Anglo-Russian  unity. 

France  was  now  sure  of  her  position.  Her  ambition 
was  realized ;  she  had  a  military  convention  with  Rus- 
sia assuring  the  cooperation  of  these  two  countries  in 


ENGLAND  45 

times  of  war.  But  Russia  was  still  very  weak  at  sea; 
her  fleet  was  much  weaker  than  the  German  fleet,  and 
the  Baltic  in  consequence  seemed  at  the  mercy  of 
Germany,  who  could  attack  Russia  at  any  moment 
from  Danzig  or  from  Kiel.  In  order  to  strengthen 
Russia  in  this  respect  France  was  working  steadily  for 
an  Anglo-Russian  naval  accord  that  would  protect  the 
Russian  interests  in  the  Baltic;  English  friendship 
meant  English  naval  assistance  to  Russia.  These 
transactions  culminated  in  the  signing,  just  before  the 
war  broke  out,  of  a  naval  agreement  between  Russia 
and  England,  thus  crowning  the  French  efforts. 

The  war  necessarily  consolidated  the  Anglo-Russian 
friendship;  though  of  such  recent  date,  it  seemed,  at 
that  time  at  least,  that  this  friendship  superseded  the 
former  enmity. 

After  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Russia  pressed  upon 
England  the  necessity  of  coming  to  a  final  understand- 
ing concerning  Russia's  claims  in  Constantinople  and 
the  Straits.  With  some  hesitation,  England  finally 
agreed  to  sign  a  secret  agreement  March  4,  1915, 
simultaneously  with  the  Treaty  concerning  Italy,  the 
Dalmatian  coast  and  Fiume.  According  to  this  agree- 
ment the  Ottoman  and  Austrian  empires  were  to  be 
divided  as  spoils  of  war,  Russia  receiving  Constantino- 
ple and  the  Straits.  This  promise,  however,  was  never 
kept.  The  first  thing  the  Allies  did,  when  they  saw 
that  Russia  was  going  to  pieces,  was  to  repudiate  this 
part  of  the  understanding  of  1915.  Already  in  the 
spring  of  1917,  when  M.  Albert  Thomas,  the  French 
socialist  minister,  visited  St.  Petersburg,  he  told  the 
Russian  provisional  government  that  the  Allies  repu- 


46  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

dialed  the  imperialistic  aims  of  war,  but  applying  it 
exclusively  to  Russia.  The  treaty  with  Italy  remained 
in  force,  and  so  did,  for  a  time  at  least,  the  agreement 
signed  by  the  Allies  in  February,  1917,  concerning  the 
right  bank  of  the  Rhine.  The  Russian  provisional 
government,  however,  to  the  very  last  moment  of  its 
existence  did  not  consider  these  actions  as  binding 
upon  Russia.  The  question  of  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  was  settled  by  the  Turkish  peace  treaty  without 
the  participation  of  Russia. 


IV. 

We  must  mention  in  conclusion  a  certain  phase  of 
the  Anglo-Russian  relations  that  had  special  impor- 
tance, namely  the  Persian  question.  It  has  from  our 
point  of  view  a  double  significance,  first,  because  it 
illustrates  how  diplomacy  worked  during  the  auto- 
cratic regime  of  Russia  and  second,  on  account  of  its 
contemporary  consequences.  Much  of  what  was  hap- 
pening in  Persia  during  the  years  1906-1912  has  had 
a  decided  influence  on  present  day  events  in  central 
Asia. 

As  we  have  mentioned,  the  Anglo-Russian  agree- 
ment was  finally  reached,  after  long  delays,  in  August, 
1907.  For  a  short  time  it  seemed  that  Russia  and 
England  had  at  last  found  a  solution  of  the  Persian 
question.  It  also  promised  mutual  help  and  assistance 
in  all  central  Asian  matters.  Persia  was  divided  into 
three  zones;  the  south  was  to  be  under  English,  the 
north  under  Russian  influence,  and  a  central  strip  of 


ENGLAND  47 

land  was  to  remain  neutral,  where  neither  of  the  two 
countries  could  interfere.  It  meant  that  Persia  from 
then  on  would  be  the  buffer  between  Asiatic  Russia 
and  British  India.  This  role  had  previously  been 
assigned  to  Afghanistan,  and  Persia's  position  now  was 
a  similar  one.  Afghanistan  had  not  proved  to  be  a 
good* buffer;  it  was  no  real  protection  to  the  English 
against  the  dreaded  Russian  aggression,  but  it  did  help 
to  bring  disorder  into  Afghanistan  and  make  it  a  play- 
ground of  intrigues,  Russian  as'  well  as  English.  It 
was  a  great  temptation  to  the  Afghan  rulers  and  their 
supporters  to  make  use  of  European  interference  for 
their  own  purposes.  The  necessary  consequences  were 
internal  disorders,  misrule  and  governmental  chaos. 
Exactly  the  same  thing  was  now  bound  to  happen  in 
Persia;  the  buffer  was  simply  moved  a  trifle  north- 
wards; that  was  really  all  the  difference;  the  line  of 
contact  between  the  Russian  and  English  spheres  was 
drawn  right  across  poor  Persia.  Thus  all  the  evils  of 
the  competition  between  England  and  Russia  now  fell 
upon  Persia.  No  wonder  that  a  few  liberal  statesmen 
and  scientists,  who  were  personally  interested  in  the 
fate  of  Persia,  were  heartbroken  and  violently  attacked 
the  policies  of  Great  Britain  and  Russia;  Professor 
E.  G.  Browne  was  most  prominent  among  those  who 
attacked  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

The  Russian  autocratic  government  did  not  possess 
the  necessary  inward  cohesion  and  could  not  very  well 
control  the  eastern  policies  of  its  bureaucratic  repre- 
sentatives. Take  for  example  Witte's  policy  in  Persia, 
when  he  established  there  the  Persian  Loan  Bank  in 
order  to  exploit  the  Persian  market  and  later  to  get 


48  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

an  outlet  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  a  policy 
of  intrusion,  of  sending  first  agents  and  then 
small  military  forces  which  interfered  with  the  local 
administration  and  tried  to  influence  the  local  govern- 
ment. When  the  western  powers  protested,  St. 
Petersburg  promised  to  withdraw,  sometimes  actually 
ordered  the  withdrawal,  but  the  Russian  agents  did 
not  obey  and  the  whole  thing  continued,  gradually 
increasing  in  strength,  until  a  break  somewhere  would 
release  the  political  pressure. 

Just  such  a  role  was  played  in  1908  by  a  Cossack 
Colonel,  Liakhof,  who  commanded  a  detachment  of 
Cossacks  at  the  Persian  capital,  Teheran.  The  Eng- 
lish did  not  like  his  presence  so  near  the  Persian  Court 
and  repeatedly  asked  Russia  for  his.recall;  St.  Peters- 
burg promised  the  recall,  but  really  did  nothing. 

Then  came  the  personal  clash  between  the  diplo- 
matic representatives  at  Teheran.  Both  countries  had 
strong  men  there,  unwilling  to  yield  to  their  adversa- 
ries. The  Russian  minister  was  Hartwig,  the  man  who 
played  such  an  important  role  later  on  in  Serbia.  The 
Englishman  was  Sir  George  Barclay,  no  less  energetic 
and  enterprising.  At  certain  periods,  during  his  ab- 
sence, Marling,  no  less  strong,  was  replacing  him. 
Both  were  advised  by  Major  C.  B.  Stokes,  the  strong- 
est enemy  of  Russia  among  them  all.  Finally  in  1911 
there  appeared  on  the  scene  the  American  Treasurer- 
General  Morgan  Shuster,  who  by  his  impatience  and 
unwillingness  to  compromise  soon  brought  the  crisis 
to  a  head.  It  was  distracted  Persia  who  had  to  foot  the 
bill  and  pay  for  this  diplomatic  game. 

The  trouble  became  acute  in  Persia  in  1911  mainly 


ENGLAND  49 

for  two  reasons,  first,  due  to  the  Mejlis  or  Persian 
Parliament  and  second,  because  of  the  financial  catas- 
trophe which  was  threatening  the  Persian  treasury. 

Morgan  Shuster  had  a  splendid  chance  of  playing 
Bismarck's  role  of  "an  honest  broker"  between  the  two 
contending  sides,  the  Russian  and  English,  if  only  he 
could  have  handled  the  situation  cautiously  and  tact- 
fully. He  started,  however,  just  the  other  way,  by 
violently  antagonising  the  Russians.  Far  be  it  from 
me  to  defend  the  Russian  standpoint,  but  I  think 
one  can  maintain  that  there  might  have  been  a  much 
more  peaceful  solution  of  the  Anglo-Russian  tension, 
than  the  one  brought  about  by  Mr.  Shuster  in  1911. 
One  must  say,  however,  that  he  was  not  an  official 
representative  of  the  United  States;  on  the  contrary, 
and  this  was  perhaps  unfortunate,  he  managed  the 
question  singlehanded.  The  moderating  influence 
from  Washington  was  absent. 

Mr.  Shuster  started  by  advising  the  appointment  of 
.Major  Stokes  as  Chief  of 'the  Persian  gendarmes,  who 
were  expected  to  keep  order  all  through  the  country, 
but  especially  at  the  capital.  This  act  at  once  aroused 
the  anger  of  the  Russian  representatives.  Then  fol- 
lowed several  incidents  of  personal  friction,  so  that 
when  the  Swedish  Colonel  Hjalmarsen  was  finally 
appointed  to  command  the  gendarmes,  it  was  too  late; 
the  personal  relations  were  hopelessly  spoiled. 

During  the  summer  of  1911  a  civil  war  broke  out  in 
Persia,  one  Persian  party  backing  the  Mejlis,  the  other 
standing  for  unmitigated  autocracy  and  the  restora- 
tion of  all  the  powers  of  the  Shah.  Mr.  Shuster  and 
the  English  sided  with  the  former,  the  Russians  up- 


50  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

holding  the  latter.  The  new  Russian  Minister, 
Poklevsky-Kozell,  presented  an  ultimatum  and  finally 
Persia  had  to  yield,  to  the  great  displeasure  of  England. 
Late  in  1911  Colonel  Liakhof  attacked  and  took  Tehe- 
ran with  his  Cossack  brigade.  The  Mejlis  was  dis- 
missed, the  Shah  was  returned  to  power  and  Mr. 
Shuster  was  forced  to  leave  the  country.  Russia  thus 
seemed  to  have  triumphed,  but  not  for  long. 

It  was  this  situation  in  1912,  when  Russia  acquired 
a  free  hand  in  Persia,  that  called  forth  a  storm  of 
indignation  among  the  English  liberals,  who  violently 
attacked  Sir  Edward  Grey  for  his  seeming  connivance 
at  Russian  successes.  This  case  is  often  cited  as  one 
of  the  most  glaring  examples  of  the  dangers  of  secret 
diplomacy. 

The  English  liberals  argued  as  follows:  Had  Sir 
Edward  Grey  kept  his  Persian  policy  less  secret,  Eng- 
lish public  opinion  would  have  backed  him  and  never 
allowed  the  Tsar's  government  to  restore  Persian 
autocracy.  This  also  would  have  prevented  the  massa- 
cres of  1912,  the  dissolution  of  the  Mejlis,  the  victory 
of  Liakhof  and  the  dismissal  of  Mr.  Shuster.  Further, 
the  events  of  1911  and  1912  were  deemed  to  be  the 
direct  cause  of  the  Russian  advance  in  1913  into  the 
"neutral  zone,"  of  the  gradual  spread  of  Russian  influ- 
ence all  over  Persia,  and  finally  of  the  steady  prepara- 
tion on  the  part  of  Russia  for  the  conquest  of  the  whole 
of  Asia. 

Most  of  these  accusations  can  be  dismissed  as  great 
exaggerations,  but  one  must  admit  some  truth  in  the 
statement.  It  was  on  account  of  the  secret  diplomatic 
methods  that  the  English  nation  could  not  understand 


ENGLAND  51 

the  real  meaning  of  the  Persian  policy;  Englishmen 
were  slow  to  realize  the  reason  for  Great  Britain's  sud- 
den change  of  front.  From  a  life-long  enemy  of  Russia, 
she  was  now  turning  to  be  a  devoted  friend  of  Russia 
and  upholding  a  very  obnoxious  policy  of  the  Tsar's 
government;  Englishmen  could  not  understand  this 
new  element  of  humoring  the  Russian  government  in 
central  Asia  and  elsewhere,  which  was  really  intended 
to  consolidate  the  western  Entente. 

The  very  same  arguments  apply  to  Russia,  with  this 
difference  that  they  are  hi  that  case  a  hundredfold 
stronger.  If  there  had  been  less  secrecy  about  the 
Russian  foreign  policy  in  the  Persian  question,  for 
example,  many  evil  consequences  would  have  been 
easily  avoided.  Unfortunately  secret  diplomacy  was 
always  one  of  the  most  dangerous  but  very  much  used 
weapons  of  autocracy.  It  is  certain  that  liberal  public 
opinion  in  Russia  would  have  censured  the  Persian 
policy  of  the  Tsar's  government  even  much  more  se- 
verely than  did  English  public  opinion.  Russian  lib- 
erals were  much  more  strongly  opposed  to  it  than  their 
British  colleagues. 

It  seems  very  unfair  to  accuse  Sir  Edward  Grey,  as 
the  British  liberals  did,  of  having  supported  the  Rus- 
sian autocratic  claims  and  methods  of  action  in  Persia. 
No  man  on  earth  can  better  stand  above  such  personal 
suspicions  than  Lord  Grey;  he  will  remain  in  history 
as  one  of  the  greatest  idealists  of  our  days.  The  fault 
lay  with  the  unfortunate  methods  of  all  European 
foreign  offices,  which  worked  and  planned  their  policy 
constantly  in  absolute  secrecy,  never  taking  the  nations 
into  their  confidence. 


52  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

But  there  was  more  to  it;  the  secretive  methods  of 
Downing  Street  hid  away  from  the  British  people  the 
real  motives  of  that  new  and  strange  alliance  of  liberal 
England  with  reactionary  Russia.  The  English  nation 
did  not  understand  the  full  meaning  of  this  rapproche- 
ment, nor  did  it  realize  at  large  the  growing  German 
danger  and  that  an  understanding  with  Russia  had 
become  so  imperative;  the  alliance  with  Russia  from 
the  point  of  view  of  an  uninformed  liberal  was  pre- 
posterous; as  Professor  Browne  exclaimed,  "It  was  a 
monstrous  conception  of  a  peaceful  Russia  and  a  bel- 
ligerent Germany!"  To  him,  as  to  so  many  English- 
men, Russia  was  still  the  old  enemy  and  constant  ag- 
gressor. They  simply  did  not  know  the  inner  condi- 
tions of  Russia,  her  helplessness  and  revolutionary  dis- 
content, considering  the  Kaiser  a  peacemaker  and  Ger- 
many too,  much  abused. 

These  feelings  could  have  been  changed,  and,  I  con- 
tend, they  ought  to  have  been  changed  by  one  possible 
means,  by  public  discussion  of  the  foreign  policy.  It 
would  have  helped  Russia  immensely  in  forcing  upon 
her  government  constitutional  reforms,  so  very  much 
needed  at  that  moment.  Neither  the  British  nor 
the  French  governments  realized  sufficiently  that 
they  were  backing  autocracy  and  not  the  Russian 
nation.  On  the  part  of  France  there  might  possibly  be 
found  some  psychological  excuse  for  such  a  policy, 
explained  by  her  great  anxiety  created  by  the  very  real 
German  danger,  though  even  then,  personally  I  have 
my  doubts.  In  the  case  of  England  no  possible  excuse 
exists  for  this  fatal  mistake;  it  seems  so  much  more 
strange,  because  at  the  head  of  the  British  Empire 


ENGLAND  63 

there  stood  a  liberal  government  of  avowed  humane 
and  democratic  principles  and  ideals. 

In  the  second  decade  of  the  twentieth  century,  the 
Russian  nation  had  forgotten  the  former  enmity 
against  England.  When  the  war  began  in  the  summer 
of  1914,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Russians  was  tremen- 
dous, when  they  heard  that  England  would  partici- 
pate. They  felt  a  peculiar  assurance  that  for  that  rea- 
son alone  the  war  would  be  won. 


CHAPTER  III. 

CHINA. 
I. 

RUSSIA'S  intercourse  with  China  dates  from  the 
early  part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  these  trade  re- 
lations have  always  been  most  amicable.  We  know  of 
the  Russian  religious  missions,  of  the  appointment  of 
consuls  and  agents,  and  also  of  the  Russian-Chinese 
tea  trade.  Russia's  relations  with  China  might  well  be 
divided  into  two  periods:  the  first  ending  about  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  ever  peaceful,  with 
Russia  alone  in  the  north  to  deal  with  China;  the  sec- 
ond one,  extending  from  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  to  the  present  day,  during  which  other  powers 
appeared,  and  great  competition  began. 

China's  troubles  started  in  the  year  1895  with  the 
conclusion  of  the  unfortunate  war  with  Japan,  which 
left  the  young  Empire  of  the  Rising  Sun  the  victor. 
China  was  forced  to  pay  a  heavy  indemnity,  with  no 
money  to  meet  the  demand.  Her  trusted  counselor,  Sir 
Robert  Hart,  was  called  in  to  inform  her  if  there  was 
any  possibility  of  England  coming  to  her  aid  by  grant- 
ing a  loan  for  the  payment  of  the  indemnity.  Rumors 
of  this  request  got  noised  abroad  and  the  other  Euro- 
pean powers,  afraid  that  such  a  loan  would  give  Great 
Britain  too  much  influence,  at  once  interfered.  Russia, 

54 


CHINA  55 

backed  by  France,  also  proposed  giving  a  loan  to 
China. 

After  some  hesitation  China  accepted  the  Russian 
offer  and  on  June  24,  1895,  the  agreement  was  signed 
between  the  Russian  ministry  of  finance,  six  French 
and  four  Russian  banks  and  the  Chinese  plenipoten- 
tiaries, granting  a  loan  of  400,000,000  francs  to  the 
Chinese  government  for  thirty-six  years,  carrying 
4  per  cent  interest. 

In  order  to  compete  with  this  arrangement,  Ger- 
many and  England  also  agreed  to  grant  two  loans  of 
£16,000,000  each,  one  for  thirty-six  years  at  5  per  cent, 
the  other  for  forty-five  years  at  4^  per  cent,  both 
guaranteed  by  their  respective  governments,  Germany 
and  England.  All  these  loans  were  to  be  paid  from 
customs  incomes,  the  tax  on  salt  and  the  likin. 

Thus  started  the  nervous  competition  between  the 
great  powers,  trying  to  outdo  one  another  in  the  ex- 
ploitation of  poor  China.  Then  came  the  question  of 
railroad  construction.  The  western  powers  were  also 
very  eager  to  build  many  new  railroads  to  facilitate 
their  trade  and  the  exploitation  of  the  Chinese  market. 

At  that  time  the  man  who  had  most  influence  in 
China  was  Li-Hung-Chang,  a  careful  and  farsighted 
statesman,  who  realized  the  predicament  of  his  coun- 
try, so  helpless  before  the  onslaught  of  European  greed- 
iness. During  his  whole  life  he  preferred  Russia  to  the 
other  countries  and  always  considered  Russian  sup- 
port as  the  most  profitable  for  China.  This  policy 
called  down  upon  him,  from  the  other  powers  many 
accusations  of  crimes  and  immorality,  none  of  which 
were  ever  proved. 


56  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

The  turning  point  in  China's  relations  to  Russia 
came  in  1896,  when  Li  was  sent  by  his  government  as 
ambassador  extraordinary  to  attend  the  coronation  of 
the  Tsar.  He  later  planned  a  return  trip  across  Europe 
and  the  United  States. 

Shortly  before  Li-Hung-Chang  left  Peking  impor- 
tant diplomatic  conversations  took  place  between 
his  government  and  the  Russian  minister,  Count 
Cassini,  when  the  whole  matter  of  the  Russian  rela- 
tions, railroad  construction  included,  was  discussed 
in  full  detail.  A  Shanghai  newspaper  got  hold  of  the 
rumor  and  published  an  account  of  a  supposed  agree- 
ment. It  subsequently  became  known  as  the  Cassini 
convention,  and  is  often  quoted  as  such  by  historians 
and  politicians.1  As  a  matter  of  fact  there  was  no 
such  convention,  nor  did  Cassini  sign  any  agreement 
at  the  time.  There  took  place  only  preliminary  discus- 
sions, the  conventions  being  signed  later  in  Europe. 
The  contents  of  the  article  of  the  Shanghai  newspaper, 
the  China  Daily  News  of  March  27,  1896,  however, 
corresponds  somewhat  vaguely  with  what  had  been 
going  on  in  Peking. 

The  Peking  conversations  concerned  mainly  the  fol- 
lowing points.  S.  J.  Witte,  who  was  then  at  the  head 
of  the  Russian  finance  ministry,  had  proposed  to 
lease  a  strip  of  land  across  Manchuria  in  order  to  con- 
struct the  Siberian  railroad  in  a  straight  line  to  Vladi- 
vostok, instead  of  building  it  in  the  round-about  way 
along  the  Amur  River.  From  the  middle  of  northern 

1  Cordier,  H.,  Histoire  des  relations  de  la  Chine,  etc.,  Paris,  1901-02, 
rightly  points  out  that  the  Shanghai  text  was  vague  and  inexact. 


CHINA  57 

Manchuria  there  was  to  be  built  a  line  south  to  Port 
Arthur,  with  a  branch  from  Mukden  to  Shanghaikwan ; 
this  latter  branch  to  be  built  by  the  Chinese,  but  with 
the  financial  support  of  Russia.  In  his  Memoirs,  pub- 
lished in  1921,Witte  tells  the  whole  story  of  these  trans- 
actions in  full  detail.  His  plans  were  far-reaching  and 
really  meant  the  peaceful  penetration  of  Russia  right 
into  the  heart  of  China.  He  considered  China  a  nat- 
ural market  for  Russia  and  intended  to  exclude  from 
it  all  other  competitors.  Russia  sent  a  squadron  to 
Port  Arthur,  with  the  consent  and  support  of 
France  and  Germany,  to  make  a  demonstration  against 
Japan  and  force  her  to  curtail  some  of  her  demands  on 
China.  It  was  Witte  who  originated  the  pernicious 
idea  of  taking  Port  Arthur  away  from  Japan,  along 
with  the  Liao-tung  peninsula,  both  of  which  Japan 
had  acquired  by  the  Shimonoseki  treaty  of  1895.1 
Witte  wanted  to  prevent  the  further  penetration, 
of  the  Japanese  into  Manchuria  and  thus  eliminate 
their  competition.  He  misreckoned,  however,  hi  his 
calculations,  because  Russia  herself  proved  much  too 
weak,  economically  and  politically,  to  carry  on  the  ex- 
ploitation of  the  Far  Eastern  market.  It  led  only  to 
countless  complications,  for  Russia  had  overreached 

1  Cordier,  loc.  eit.,  seems  to  think  that  the  initiative  was  taken  by 
France,  which  had  addressed  a  special  note  to  Russia,  concerning 
Manchuria,  a  week  before  the  Shimonoseki  treaty  was  signed  by 
Li  Hung  Chang,  and  that  Germany  at  once  expressed  her  consent. 
Personally  I  think  Witte  is  right.  These  transactions  took  place 
during  the  whole  time  of  the  Shimonoseki  treaty  negotiations  at  his 
instigation,  while  Russia  was  backing  Li  Hung  Chang.  It  was  the 
Russian  support  that  gave  Li  the  courage  to  withstand  the  Japanese 
demands.  Russia  for  example  helped  to  diminish  the  amount  of  the 
indemnity  China  was  made  to  pay. 


58  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

herself  and  had  thereby  created  a  dangerous  enemy  for 
herself  in  the  nation  of  Japan,  which  sooner  or  later 
was  bound  to  take  vengeance.  Again,  in  Russia  proper, 
the  Far  Eastern  plans  of  Witte  created  a  most  unwhole- 
some imperialistic  development,  fostering  greed  among 
all  sorts  of  promoters  and  adventurers.  In  his  Memoirs 
Witte  tries  to  throw  the  blame  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  on  the  Russian  Court  and  in  particular  on  General 
Kuropatkin  and  minister  von  Plehve.  Without  ex- 
culpating them  in  the  least,  we  must  say,  however,  that 
it  was  much  more  Witte's  own  fault,  because  his  "peace- 
ful penetration"  was  in  no  way  less  dangerous  and  also 
unavoidably  led  to  a  conflict  with  Japan,  which  was 
bound  to  disclose  Russia's  weakness. 

Witte,  no  doubt,  was  a  very  clever  statesman  and 
laid  his  plans  very  carefully.  He  realized  that  the 
first  attempts  of  Russia  to  help  China  financially  with 
the  backing  of  French  capitalists  were  insufficient  and 
in  a  way  incoherent.  There  was,  as  we  have  pointed 
out,  a  great  rush  at  the  time  for  financial  assistance  to 
China.  Every  power  wanted  to  take  part  in  it.  Be- 
sides the  government  loans,  there  were  many  private 
enterprises  ready  to  start  work  in  China,  as  for  ex- 
ample the  company  of  which  ex-senator  W.  D.  Wash- 
burn  was  the  active  head  and  which  failed  only  be- 
cause the  State  Department  declined  to  back  it. 

Witte  knew  of  all  this  and  proceeded  to  work  out  a 
more  successful  plan.  Again  with  French  help  he 
founded  a  semi-private,  semi-official  bank,  called  the 
Russo-Chinese  bank,  with  a  capital  of  11,250,000  rubles 
and  5,000,000  taels.  The  president  was  to  be  a  Chinese 
figurehead  and  the  active  managers,  Russians,  work- 


CHINA  59 

ing  under  the  supervision  and  direction  of  Witte's 
finance  department.  It  was  this  bank  that  was  to 
build  the  railroad,  exploit  the  Manchurian  market  and 
carry  out  Witte's  policy  of  the  peaceful  penetration  of 
China.  These  carefully  laid  plans  of  Witte  were  worked 
out  in  full  detail,  when  Li-Hung-Chang  reached  Russia 
in  the  spring  of  1896.  Russia  had  the  support  of  France 
and  Germany.  France  looked  for  a  profitable  invest- 
ment for  some  of  her  capital  (this  was  the  period  of 
intensive  French  financial  help  to  Russia) .  The  French 
were  profiting  handsomely  from  their  Russian  invest- 
ments and  many  of  their  capitalists  were  eager  to  assist 
Witte  in  his  policy.  Cordier  thinks  that  the  starting  of 
the  Russo-Chinese  bank  was  only  a  natural  consequence 
of  the  participation  in  the  loan  of  French  capitalists. 
He  does  not  mention,  however,  that  on  the  Russian  side 
the  bank  was  a  mere  tool  in  the  hands  of  Witte  and 
that  most  of  the  managers  and  directors  were  officials 
of  the  finance  department  and  Witte's  subordinates. 

Germany  on  her  side  had  other  reasons  for  taking 
part  in  these  transactions;  her  motives  were  almost  ex- 
clusively political.  She  was  not  averse  to  seeing  Russia 
become  involved  in  the  Far  East  question;  it  was  a 
sure  game  for  Germany,  heads  she  won  and  tails  Rus- 
sia lost.  The  more  Russia  became  involved  in  the  ques- 
tion of  China,  the  less  able  would  she  be  to  take  a  hand 
in  the  West  and  support  France  in  her  anti-German 
policy.  Thus  Germany  looked  with  a  complacent  eye 
on  Russia's  new  start  in  the  Far  East,  well  realizing  the 
troubles  that  were  bound  to  come  to  her.  Most  of  the 
transactions  between  Witte  and  Li-Hung-Chang  were 
known  to  Berlin. 


60  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

While  Li  was  on  his  way  to  Russia,  some  men  of 
the  Tsar's  Court,  notably  the  Buriat  doctor,  Badmaieff, 
an  irresponsible  adventurer,  who  nevertheless  had  some 
influence  with  Nicholas,  came  forward  with  a  project 
for  building  a  railroad  not  across  Manchuria,  but  down 
to  China  across  Mongolia  (from  Kiachta  to  Peking). 
Witte  had  great  difficulties  in  convincing  his  govern- 
ment of  the  advantages  of  the  Manchurian  line  and  the 
lack  of  trade  through  Mongolia.  Witte  further  states 
that  on  account  of  the  foreign  minister's  absolute  lack 
of  knowledge  of  the  Far  East  question — Prince  Loban- 
off  was  in  fact  an  ignorant  man — the  Tsar  entrusted 
him  with  the  whole  matter. 

Thus  it  was  that  Li-Hung-Chang,  after  his  arrival 
in  Russia  had  to  deal  almost  exclusively  with  Witte, 
and  as  a  consequence  these  two  men  were  the  ones  who 
worked  out  the  agreements  concerning  Manchuria,  the 
railroad  lease  (December  16,  1896)  and  the  Russo- 
China  Bank. 

The  details  of  these  conventions  are  well  known. 
(See  W.  W.  Willoughby,  Foreign  Rights  and  In- 
terests in  China,  1920.)  They  created  a  very  complex 
international  status  especially  along  the  railroad  line, 
where  the  Russians,  though  preserving  and  acknowl- 
edging Chinese  suzerainty  of  the  leased  territory, 
yet  acquired  full  rights  of  government,  establishing 
their  own  system  of  administration,  their  own  courts 
of  law — mixed  tribunals  for  mixed  cases — kept  their 
own  police  and  a  special  military  guard,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  developing  the  last  named  into  a  regular  army 
unit. 

The  visit  of  Li-Hung-Chang  to  Russia  and  all  these 


CHINA  61 

amicable  transactions  greatly  increased  the  influence 
of  Russia  in  China.  Shortly  thereafter  many  of  the 
Englishmen  working  for  the  Chinese  government  (hi 
the  customs  service,  for  example)  began  to  be  replaced 
by  Russians.  There  appeared  new  Russian  consuls 
and  vice-consuls,  etc.  But  this  was  mostly  felt  hi  the 
dangerous  corner  of  Korea,  where  Japan  had  concen- 
trated most  of  her  interests.  The  Korean  army  was 
instructed  by  Russian  officers,  and  the  Korean  arsenal 
was  placed  under  Russian  supervision.  Li-Hung-Chang 
evidently  thought  that  it  was  profitable  for  China  to 
increase  Russian  influence  in  Korea  in  order  to  oust 
the  Japanese.  However,  this  line  of  action  proved  a 
great  mistake,  for  it  worked  just  the  other  way  and 
finally  lost  Korea  to  China  entirely.  For  a  long  tune 
Korea  was  the  storm  center  in  the  Far  East,  just  as 
in  1894  Korea  was  the  real  cause  of  the  Chino-Japanese 
war,  so  was  it  the  cause  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  a 
decade  later.  Li-Hung-Chang  did  not  know  Russia 
as  well  as  he  did  Japan  and  was  much  more  afraid  of 
the  latter  than  he  was  of  Russia's  influence.  The  Rus- 
sians seemed  to  him  more  genial,  more  friendly,  than 
the  cold  and  calculating  Japanese,  who  were  for  such 
a  long  tune  China's  bitter  enemies.  This  easily  ex- 
plains why  he  preferred  to  depend  on  Russian  help. 


II. 

During  all  these  years  when  the  European  Powers 
were  trying  to  outdo  one  another  in  getting  hold  of  the 
Chinese  market  and  of  so  much  of  the  Chinese  terri- 


62  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

tory,  the  government  of  the  United  States  alone  stood 
for  the  integrity  of  China.  America  realized  that  she 
could  not  keep  aloof  and  remain  disinterested  in  what 
was  going  on  in  the  Far  East.  China  was  in  dire  need 
of  a  strong  hand  to  protect  her  from  the  invading 
foreigners.  The  assistance  of  the  United  States  was 
consequently  more  than  welcome.  It  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  save  China  from  the  encroachments  of  the 
European  Powers.  The  Department  of  State,  ably 
led  at  that  time  by  John  Hay,  knew  quite  well  that  the 
only  way  to  save  China  was  by  the  policy  of  the  so- 
called  "open  door,"  which  alone  could  restrict  Euro- 
pean monopolies,  by  prohibiting  secret  agreements 
forced  upon  China  in  order  to  get  from  her  certain  in- 
dividual privileges. 

The  knowledge  of  what  was  going  on  in  China  was 
first  brought  home  to  the  Americans  by  Lord  Charles 
Beresford,  who  lectured  in  the  United  States  on  his 
way  home  to  England,  telling  them  the  shocking  stories 
of  the  exploitation  of  China.1  How  much  official 
knowledge  there  was  in  London  of  Beresford's  speeches 
is  not  well  known,  but  we  may  suppose  that  there  was 
some  at  least,  for  when  Secretary  Hay  issued  his  famous 
note,  asking  the  Powers  to  recognize  and  adopt  the 
policy  of  the  open  door  for  China,  England  alone 
responded.  All  the  other  nations  contented  themselves 
with  evasive  answers,  not  meaning  to  stop  their  ag- 
gressiveness. The  Russian  answer  among  others  was 
possibly  one  of  the  most  unsatisfactory. 

This  can  be  easily  explained  now  that  we  know  the 

*See  Prof.  Latane's  article  in  the  May  number  of  the  World's 
Work,  1921, 


CHINA  63 

history  of  Russia's  plans  concerning  China  in  general 
and  Manchuria  in  particular.  But  behind  the  back  of 
Russia  there  loomed  the  sinister  figure  of  the  Kaiser, 
urging  her  on  to  her  foolish  effort,  for  Germany  had 
nothing  to  lose. 

The  fatal  years  of  1897-1899  saw  a  further  disastrous 
step  taken  by  the  powers  to  transform  their  purely 
commercial  aggression  into  military  action  and  occupa- 
tion of  parts  of  Chinese  territory.  Germany  was  the 
first  to  start  the  policy,  when  she  suddenly  landed  a 
force,  [late  in  1897]  on  the  Kwantung  peninsula, 
without  any  intention  of  leaving  it  there,  but  simply 
for  the  purpose  of  egging  Russia  on.  Germany  later 
assured  the  powers  and  China  that  her  force  was 
merely  a  surveying  party. 

Count  Muraviev,  Russia's  very  superficial  and 
ignorant  foreign  minister,  caught  at  the  bait  and  pro- 
posed to  the  Tsar  to  secure  a  naval  base  for  the  Rus- 
sian fleet,  making  use  of  the  ports  taken  away  from 
Japan  in  1895,  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan.  In  spite 
of  Witte's  protests  and  the  warning  of  other  Russian 
statesmen,  Muraviev  and  the  Court  circles  pressed 
the  Tsar  to  adopt  this  project  and  carry  it  through  to 
the  great  satisfaction  of  Berlin. 

In  December  1897  a  Russian  squadron,  commanded 
by  Admiral  Dubassoff,  occupied  Port  Arthur.  The 
Russian  charge  d'affaires  in  Peking  informed  the 
Chinese  government  that  Russia  had  no  intention  of 
infringing  upon  Chinese  suzerainty,  but  was  there 
merely  to  protect  China  from  the  aggression  of  other 
powers  (sic!)  and  that  she  would  willingly  withdraw 
when  the  danger  was  past. 


64  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Germany  had  thus  scored  a  brilliant  victory.  The 
policy  of  territorial  aggression  was  well  started,  but 
the  initiative  and  moral  responsibility  fell  entirely 
upon  Russia.  This  action  was  bound  to  weaken  Russia 
immensely,  detract  her  attention  from  western  Europe 
and  sooner  or  later  bring  her  into  conflict  with  Japan. 
Germany  also  exchanged  Kwantung  for  the)  much 
more  advantageous  position  in  Kiaochow,  which  she 
proceeded  to  occupy.  This  might  be  looked  upon  as 
one  of  the  greatest  successes  of  German  diplomacy, 
though  achieved  in  such  a  tricky  way.  Witte  alone 
among  Russians  realized  how  dangerous  this  step  was 
and  how  it  involved  Russia  in  unnecessary  conflicts, 
but  even  he  did  not  see  the  whole  purport  of  it.  He 
was  against  this  policy  of  the  Russian  government 
mainly  because  it  spoiled  his  own  plans  of  peaceful 
penetration.  It  altered  for  instance  the  whole  char- 
acter of  the  Manchurian  railroad,  which  he  was  con- 
structing; it  necessarily  changed  the  demeanor  of  the 
Russian  officials  in  China  and  finally  it  was  bound  to 
arouse  the  suspicions  of  the  other  great  powers.  The 
Eastern-Chinese  railroad  was  planned  by  Witte  to  be 
an  exclusively  peaceful  channel  of  advance,  meant  for 
commerce  and  culture,  without  any  element  of  political 
aggression.  The  same  could  be  said  about  the  Russo- 
Chinese  bank.  Now  they  became  the  means  of  supply- 
ing military  equipment,  of  transporting  troops,  and 
of  financing  military  enterprises.  Even  the  active  di- 
rection of  the  Russian  policy  in  the  Far  East  soon 
slipped  from  the  hands  of  Witte  into  those  of  military 
leaders  like  General  Kuropatkin. 

The  act,  leasing  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan,  in  fact 


CHINA  65 

the  leasing  of  the  whole  Liaotung  peninsula  was 
signed  and  delivered  on  March  27,  1898,  by  Li-Hung- 
Chang  and  Chang-Ing-Huan  to  the  Russian  charge 
d'affaires.  The  territorial  agreement  was  signed  on 
May  7.  Russia  paid  a  handsome  sum  to  Li-Hung- 
Chang  and  Chang-Ing-Huan  for  their  signatures,  and 
this  fact  will  always  remain  a  most  immoral  blot  on 
the  reputations  of  these  famous  Chinese  statesmen.  In 
consequence  the  French  occupied  Kuangchouwan,  May 
27,  and  the  English— Wei-Ha-Wei,  July  1. 

This  Russian  agreement  with  China  made  use  of 
the  same  juristic  ideas  which  were  laid  as  a  founda- 
tion for  the  Chinese-Eastern  railroad  line;  the  terri- 
tory leased  from  China  retained  nominally  the  Chinese 
suzerainty,  the  Chinese  living  on  that  territory  re- 
mained Chinese  subjects,  with  allegiance  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  China  and  under  its  laws  and  courts. 
Whereas  the  Russians  were  subject  to  their  own  laws 
and  authorities,  had  their  own  officials  and  courts  and 
were  practically  the  masters  of  those  territories.  For 
a  long  time  international  lawyers  did  not  know  how  to 
construe  this  new  set  of  facts  nor  how  to  fit  it  into  the 
general  system  of  international  law.  The  German 
jurists  with  the  same  problem  before  them  in  Kiao- 
chow,  where  similar  legal  forms  were  used,  created  a 
special  idea  of  their  own,  the  "public  law  lease",  to 
which  they  really  applied  the  system  of  the  civil  law 
lease  in  use  in  most  countries  of  the  civilized  world. 
This  same  theory  was  made  use  of  by  the  Russian 
jurists. 

Russia,  however  much  as  she  protested  to  the  con- 
trary, was  firmly  established  in  these  Chinese  territories 


66  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

and  had  no  idea  of  withdrawing.  It  was  then  that  the 
comedy  was  started  by  promises  of  withdrawal,  which 
were  not  meant  to  be  kept  and  which  deceived  no  one, 
but  which  proved  a  powerful  argument  in  the  hands  of 
Russia's  enemies.  In  America  especially  they  created 
a  very  bad  impression.  It  coincided  with  Hay's  pro- 
nouncement of  the  open  door  policy,  which  the  Ameri- 
can people  with  their  usual  idealism  took  very  much 
to  heart;  and  there  was  Russia,  openly  professing  to 
believe  in  that  principle  and  promising  to  follow  it  by 
withdrawing  her  troops  and  releasing  the  occupied 
territories^  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  doing  the  exact  op- 
posite and  establishing  her  rule  more  and  more  firmly. 
No  wonder  Americans  were  indignant.  This  explains 
the  fact  that  the  years,  1898-1905,  were  the  only  time 
in  history  that  America  and  Russia  were  not  friends 
and  Russians  were  decidedly  unpopular  in  the  United 
States.  This  enmity  disappeared  only  after  the  Rus- 
sian defeat  by  Japan,  when  Americans  realized  that 
this  Far  Eastern  policy  was  not  the  doing  of  the  Rus- 
sian nation,  but  of  a  very  unpopular  government, 
which  lacked  the  backing  of  the  people. 

The  shortsighted  policy  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East 
had  another  fatal  consequence,  which  still  has  some 
effect  even  in  our  days.  It  was  due  to  Russian  aggres- 
sion that  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance  was  concluded 
in  1902. 

In  1900  came  the  frightful  Boxer  uprising,  one  of  the 
most  foolish  acts  of  the  Chinese  Empress-Regent, 
which  brought  upon  her  and  her  Empire  many  dire 
complications. 

When  the  uprising  was  quelled,  after  much  fighting 


CHINA  67 

and  loss  of  life,  the  events  which  followed  seemed  for 
a  moment  to  justify  the  Russian  policy.  China  was 
being  torn  to  pieces  by  the  European  powers  and  the 
Russian  government  was  arguing  that  this  was  suf- 
ficient reason  for  their  own  aggression:  first,  to  take 
part  in  the  distribution  of  the  spoils  and  second,  to 
protect  Russian  interests  along  the  extensive  frontier, 
where  both  countries  met.  Russia  wanted  at  all  costs 
to  get  a  free  hand  in  Manchuria  and  guarantee  at  the 
same  time  freedom  of  action  in  Peking  to  her  friend 
and  supporter  Li-Hung-Chang.  The  other  powers  nat- 
urally resented  this  and  would  not  agree.  Then  began 
the  game  of  "grab".  Russia  succeeded  in  getting  a 
concession  in  Tientsin,  occupied  Newchwang  and 
Anshanshan  and  almost  entirely  absorbed  Manchuria. 

Under  the  pressure  of  the  protests  of  the  powers, 
Russia  finally  concluded  a  new  agreement  with  China 
(the  convention  of  April  8,  1902),  by  which  Chinese 
authority  was  reestablished  in  Manchuria  and  Russia 
promised  once  more  to  withdraw  her  troops  within  six 
months  and  to  restore  the  Chinese  Eastern  railroad  to 
China,  the  latter  making  the  necessary  reimbursements. 
But  again  none  of  these  promises  were  fulfilled. 

Meanwhile  rumors  began  to  spread  that  Russia  was 
negotiating  new  agreements  with  China,  consolidating 
her  possessions  in  Manchuria,  All  through  1903  these 
rumors  persisted,  notwithstanding  the  energetic  pro- 
tests of  the  Russian  government.  We  know  now 
that  the  latter  was  not  sincere,  and  though  she  did 
not  sign  any  specific  convention  (as  the  rumors  had  it), 
she  certainly  did  conduct  negotiations  at  Peking  with 
the  view  of  consolidating  her  Manchurian  acquisitions. 


68  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

At  that  time,  however,  new  developments  took  place. 
The  Russian  aggression  began  to  spread  from  Man- 
churia into  Korea  and  this  called  forth  the  Japanese 
opposition.  At  first  Japan  seemed  to  ignore  the  spread 
of  Russian  influence  in  Manchuria,  but  when  Russia 
began  to  infringe  upon  Korea,  the  Japanese  lost  pa- 
tience and  started  to  prepare  for  a  fight. 

There  was  a  period  in  1902-1903,  when  Russia  had 
full  control  over  Manchuria;  her  eastern  railroads  were 
just  finished  and  began  to  show  their  influence  on  the 
local  commerce;  Siberia  was  rejuvenated;  the  Far  East- 
ern provinces  and  the  Russian  Pacific  coast  were 
rapidly  developing  their  trade  and  so  forth.  All  these 
activities  were  ably  supported  by  the  Russo-Chinese 
bank,  started  by  Witte.  It  was  probably  the  most 
potent  agent  in  the  spread  of  Russian  influence  among 
the  Chinese.  It  gave  them  easy  and  profitable  loans, 
spread  Russian  paper  currency,  which  was  most  popu- 
lar among  the  Chinese,  for  it  not  only  replaced  their 
bulky  silver  money,  coins  and  taels,  but  also  called  for 
greater  confidence  and  protection  from  a  seemingly 
very  powerful  neighbor. 

The  author  had  just  at  that  time  a  chance  to  wit- 
ness personally  the  effect  that  the  spread  of  Russian 
currency  had  in  Manchuria.  It  was  a  deliberate  policy 
of  Witte  and  was  meant  to  offset  somewhat  the  mili- 
tary measures  of  the  Russian  government. 

Prior  to  1903  there  is  no  doubt  that  at  least  some 
Chinese  officials  favored  the  Russian  aggression  as  an 
offset  to  Japan  and  England  and  considered  the  spread 
of  Russian  influence  in  Manchuria  as  an  advantage  to 


CHINA  69 

China.  Only  in  1903  did  even  they  realize  that  this 
policy  was  creating  too  much  opposition  and  envy 
among  the  other  powers  and  especially  on  the  part  of 
Japan.  It  was  only  then  that  Peking  became  really 
alarmed  and  began  to  foresee  the  coming  complica- 
tions. 

It  was  too  late,  however.  The  Russian  policy  was  on 
an  inclined  plane  and  was  bound  to  run  to  the  bottom. 
Japan  lost  patience  and  declared  war,  which  brought 
upon  Russia  numerous  humiliating  defeats,  deserved 
by  her  government  but  disastrous  to  her  people. 

After  the  war  the  exclusive  Russian  influence  in 
China  naturally  vanished.  In  her  relations  with  China, 
Russia  now  acted  in  cooperation  with  Japan.  Only  for 
a  moment  did  independent  Russian  action  flare  up 
again  in  1912  in  the  Mongolian  question;  it  died  down 
finally  during  the  Great  War. 

Thus  in  agreement  with  Japan,  Russia  consented  to 
joint  action  in  Manchuria,  July  30,  1907.  On  July  4, 
1910  Russia  signed  a  convention  with  Japan  concerning 
the  improvement  of  railroad  lines  and  their  traffic,  and 
also  the  construction  of  a  direct  railroad  from  Siberia 
to  Peking.  Then  came  the  secret  agreements  of  1910 
and  1912.  The  same  spirit  of  cooperation  between 
Russia  and  Japan  is  made  still  more  clear  in  the  agree- 
ment between  the  two  Imperial  governments  of 
July  3,  1916.  This  agreement  does  not  restrict  the 
understanding  solely  to  Manchuria,  but  covers  on  the 
contrary  the  whole  of  China.  This  understanding  ef- 
fectively barred  American  commerce  from  Manchuria, 
ending  the  open  door  policy. 


70  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

III. 

In  recent  years  the  relations  between  Russia  and 
China  were  once  more  disturbed. 

The  trouble  came  through  the  desire  of  the  Mongol 
ruling  princes  to  emancipate  themselves  from  the 
Chinese  government.  Russia  at  once  seized  the  op- 
portunity to  establish  her  hegemony  over  Mongolia. 
On  the  whole  the  Mongolian  market  does  not  amount 
to  much,  but  there  exist  very  important  trade  routes 
which  connect  Siberia  with  inner  China.  By  this  route 
for  example  the  best  tea  is  imported  into  Russia  from 
the  Yang-Tse  valley. 

Mongolia  is  very  sparsely  populated,  most  of  its 
territory  is  desert  land  and  only  in  a  few  places  can 
one  find  inhabited  centers.  Mongolia  is  divided  into 
two  uneven  parts,  the  larger  one,  called  Outer  Mon- 
golia and  the  smaller  southern  one,  adjoining  China, 
called  Inner  Mongolia.  The  plan  of  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment was  to  establish  its  influence  over  Outer  Mon- 
golia and  leave  Inner  Mongolia  to  the  Chinese.  In 
order  to  consolidate  the  Russian  influence  over  this 
chosen  morsel  the  government  of  St.  Petersburg  was 
backing  the  Mongolian  princes  and  promising  them 
full  independence,  meaning  certainly  the  separation 
from  China.  These  princes,  about  one  hundred  and 
sixty  in  all,  especially  the  chief  Khutuktu  of  Urga,  were 
quite  willing  to  accept  Russian  dictation,  extend  their 
power  and  increase  their  wealth,  whereas  Peking  was 
insisting  that  for  centuries  Mongolia  had  been  a  prov- 
ince of  the  Chinese  empire,  controlled  and  governed 
by  the  Chinese. 


CHINA  71 

In  1881  Russia  had  signed  a  very  advantageous 
treaty  with  China,  securing  many  privileges  along  the 
Mongolian  frontier.1  This  treaty  was  concluded  for 
ten  years  and  was  renewed  in  1891  and  in  1901  and 
was  due  to  be  renewed  in  1911.  Early  in  1910  Russia 
began  to  remind  China  of  this  treaty  and  of  the  neces- 
sity to  renew  it,  but  the  Peking  government  did  not 
show  great  enthusiasm  about  the  matter,  nor  were  any 
steps  taken  in  this  direction.  This  annoyed  the  Rus- 
sians and  as  the  time  for  renewal  approached  they  be- 
came more  insistent  while  the  Chinese  seemed  to  be- 
come more  obdurate.  In  1911  the  Chinese  officials  be- 
gan to  levy  customs  duties  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty,  which  thus  seemed  to  have 
lapsed.  Then  there  began  riots  and  disorders  among 
the  Mongolians  and  the  Chinese  naturally  accused  the 
Russians  of  instigating  them. 

China,  however,  by  this  time  had  her  own  troubles. 
In  the  province  of  Szechuen  a  revolution  broke  out  in 
September  and  in  December  the  Mongolian  princes 
making  the  best  of  this  opportunity,  at  a  meeting  at 
Urga  chose  the  local  Khutuktu  as  the  Mongolian  Em- 
peror, declaring  their  independence  from  China.  The 
Russian  officials  were  certainly  in  close  touch  with  this 
movement. 

In  1912  the  revolutionary  movement  became  wide- 
spread in  China  and  very  soon  succeeded  in  overturn- 
ing the  Imperial  government.  The  Emperor  abdicated 

aThe  treaty  of  1881  provided,  first,  that  Russia  had  the  right  to 
have  consuls  in  Mongolia  and  Turkestan;  second,  that  Russian 
merchants  were  permitted  to  purchase  real-estate,  houses,  ware- 
houses and  shops,  etc.,  and  third,  that  a  zone  should  be  established 
along  the  Russo-Chinese  frontier  within  which  all  imports  and  ex- 
ports were  free  of  duty. 


72  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

and  a  Republic  was  proclaimed.  This  was  very  oppor- 
tune for  Russia's  designs  in  Mongolia,  but  even  then 
the  Chinese  did  not  want  to  give  in.  The  new  Chinese 
republican  government  refused  to  recognize  Mon- 
golian independence  and  sanction  Russian  infringe- 
ments upon  the  sovereignty  of  China.  Russia  then  de- 
cided to  use  force. 

On  September  17  the  Russian  government  declared 
that  they  considered  the  treaty  of  1881  still  in  force  and 
would  act  in  the  future  as  if  the  treaty  in  fact  existed. 
There  cannot  be  any  justification  for  such  highhanded 
proceedings.  The  Russians  coolly  explained  that  now 
that  Manchuria  was  forever  cut  off  from  Siberia  by 
Japan,  nothing  remained  for  Russia  but  to  expand  into 
Mongolia.  This  also  needs  no  explanation.  There 
never  existed  any  serious  Russian  interests  in  that  field ; 
at  the  best  Mongolia  was  very  poor.  The  policy  was 
undiluted  imperialism,  taking  advantage  of  China's 
impotence. 

At  the  same  tune  Russia  declared  that  the  neutral 
zone  of  1881  was  abolished;  this  also  lacked  both  legal 
and  moral  justification. 

On  November  3,  1912,  Russia  signed  a  special  agree- 
ment with  "independent  Mongolia"  pledging  Russian 
aid  for  the  maintenance  of  this  independence  and  for 
the  exclusion  of  Chinese  colonists  and  troops  which 
might  be  sent  out  by  the  Peking  government.  In  re- 
turn the  Mongolians  promised  all  sorts  of  privileges  to 
the  Russians  (freedom  of  travel  and  navigation,  free- 
dom of  commerce,  extra-territoriality  of  Russian  sub- 
jects, consular  service,  freedom  from  customs  duties, 


CHINA  73 

and  the  right  to  buy  and  own  real  estate,  along  with 
many  other  privileges). 

Having  reached  this  agreement  with  Mongolia,  Rus- 
sia proceeded  to  force  it  upon  Japan. 

All  this  took  some  time,  however.  A  year  later,  on 
November  5,  1913,  the  necessary  exchange  of  notes 
took  place  betwen  Peking  and  St.  Petersburg,  recog- 
nizing and  sanctioning  this  state  of  things,  certainly 
not  to  the  glory  of  Russia.  Yuan  Shi-Kai,  the  strong 
man  of  China,  did  his  best  to  make  the  Khutuktu 
acknowledge  the  sovereignty  of  China,  but  could  not 
succeed  because  of  the  support  Russia  gave  Mongolia.1 
China  was  thus  forced  finally  to  recognize  the  auto- 
nomy of  Outer  Mongolia. 

On  September  30,  1914,  Russia  signed  a  special 
agreement  with  Mongolia  which  gave  Russia  the  right 
to  "advise  Mongolia"  concerning  the  building  of  rail- 
roads. As  a  matter  of  fact  there  were  no  railroads  to 
speak  of  in  Mongolia. 

Finally  on  June  7,  1915,  a  tripartite  agreement  was 
signed  between  Russia,  China  and  Mongolia,  provid- 
ing a  definite  legal  form  for  the  following  conventional 
agreements:  2 

1.  Outer  Mongolia,  though  remaining  autonomous, 
recognized  the  Chinese  suzerainty  over  her. 

2.  The  treaty  making  power  remained  in  China's 
hands,  although  commercial  treaties  might  be  nego- 
tiated directly  by  Mongolian  authorities. 

1  China  retained  her  jurisdiction  exclusively  over  the  Chinese 
residents  in  Mongolia. 

J  For  details  see,  the  American  Journal  of  International  Law, 
1916,  vol.  X,  E.  T.  Williams. 


74  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

3.  Russia  and  China  recognized  the  autonomy  of 
Outer  Mongolia,  promising  to  abstain  from  all  inter- 
ference with  the  internal  administration  of  the  Mon- 
gols. 

4.  No  customs  duties  exist  either  on  Chinese  or  Rus- 
sian imports  into  Mongolia. 

5.  Chinese  residents  are  under  Chinese  jurisdiction, 
Russians   under   Russian    jurisdiction,    while   special 
mixed  courts  are  established  for  mixed  cases,  on  the 
model  of  the  former  Russian-Chinese  mixed  courts  of 
the  Russian-Chinese  railroad. 

6.  China  promised  to  consult  Russia  on  all  political 
questions  concerning  Outer  Mongolia. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Wilhughby,  W.  W.,  Foreign  Rights  and  Interests  in  China,  Balti- 
more, 1920. 

Cordier,  Henri,  Histoire  des  relations  de  la  Chine  avec  les  Puissances 
Occidentales,  Paris,  1901-02. 

Hoo  Chi  Tsai,  Bases  conventionelles  des  relations  modernes  entre 
la  Chine  et  la  Russie,  Paris,  1918. 

Amer.  Journal  of  International  Law,  1916,  vol.  X,  p.  798. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

JAPAN. 
I. 

WHEREAS  Russia's  relations  with  China  date  back 
far  into  the  centuries  and  were  mostly  of  a  very  peace- 
ful character,  her  relations  with  Japan  are  quite  recent, 
dating  back  but  a  few  decades  and  from  the  very  be- 
ginning they  were  exceedingly  militant. 

The  first  real  contact  took  place  at  the  time  of  the 
Sino-Japanese  War  of  1895  and  at  once  hostility  was 
apparent.  Russia  was  backing  Li-Hung-Chang  at 
Shimonoseki,  where  the  Chino-Japanese  peace  negotia- 
tions were  transacted.  It  was  due  to  Russia's  initiative 
that  the  two  European  powers,  France  and  Germany, 
joined  with  her  in  partially  depriving  Japan  of  the 
fruits  of  her  victory,  by  forcing  her  to  return  to  China 
the  Liaotung  peninsula  and  Port  Arthur,  a  splendid 
strategic  harbor. 

In  order  to  understand  Russia's  action  one  must  re- 
member that  just  at  that  time  she  was  intent  on  pene- 
trating into  northern  China  in  order  to  take  firm  hold 
on  the  Manchurian  market.  Her  Pacific  Coast  plans 
were  not  yet  so  clear.  Japan  flushed  by  her  easy  vic- 
tory over  China  had  also  an  eye  to  northern  China  with 
Korea  as  her  immediate  objective.  If  Russia  had  been 
more  careful  and  considerate  of  her  new  neighbor,  she 

75 


76  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

could  easily  have  reached  at  that  time  at  least,  a  peace- 
ful understanding  concerning  "spheres  of  influence"  at 
China's  expense.  Russia's  overbearing  attitude  towards 
Japan  in  treating  the  latter  as  a  negligible  quantity 
only  served  to  exasperate  her  and  led  the  Japanese  to 
increase  their  claims.  The  unavoidable  result  of  this 
policy  was  the  final  clash  of  arms. 

Worst  of  all  for  Japan  were  the  events  which  fol- 
lowed the  loss  of  Port  Arthur,  which  alone  was  an 
insult  to  her  pride.  Not  many  months  passed  before 
those  very  European  powers  who  claimed  to  stand  for 
the  protection  of  China  began  themselves  to  grab  her 
territory.  And  just  this  same  peninsula  of  Liaotung 
and  the  harbor  of  Port  Arthur  were  shamelessly  an- 
nexed (or  "leased"  as  the  official  documents  called  it) 
by  Russia.  What  could  Japan  think  of  European 
diplomatic  methods  after  that?  And  this  was  the 
start  of  her  intimate  dealings  with  Russia,  the  begin- 
ning of  a  new  period  and  of  new  relations.  No  wonder 
that  these  relations  from  the  beginning  took  the  shape 
of  mutual  distrust  and  dislike.  The  Japanese  are  often 
accused,  especially  by  Americans,  of  underhand  deal- 
ings and  diplomatic  duplicity  but  it  must  be  acknowl- 
edged that  they  took  their  lesson  from  the  European 
powers.  From  the  very  beginning  of  her  relations  with 
Europe,  Japan  found  nothing  but  double  play  and 
trickery  and  when  later  during  the  suppression  of  the 
Boxer  uprising  she  witnessed  the  looting  and  robbing 
of  Chinese  homes  by  Europeans,  she  must  necessarily 
have  felt  grave  doubts  about  the  lofty  ideals  of  Euro- 
pean civilization.  The  Chinese  riots  on  the  Russian 
frontier  gave  Japan  another  example  of  the  real  atti- 


JAPAN  77 

tude  of  Europe;  when  the  riots  occurred  along  the 
Amur  River  the  Russian  generals  there  behaved  most 
cruelly,  for  not  only  did  they  shoot  promiscuously  all 
Chinese  in  sight,  but  ordered  some  of  them  to  be 
placed  on  barges  in  the  river  and  the  barges  sunk.  A 
further  example  might  be  given.  Russia  first  crossed 
with  Japan  concerning  Korea  in  1895-1896.  On  Feb- 
ruary 10,  1896  Russia  even  sent  marines  to  Chemulpo 
and  Seoul;  after  taking  hold  of  some  government 
offices,  the  Russians  established  themselves  in  the 
Korean  capital  and  obtained  a  strong  influence  over 
the  Korean  government.  This  lasted  till  the  sum- 
mer of  1896  when  the  Lobanoff-Yamagata  Protocol 
was  signed  (June  16)  defining  their  mutual  interests. 
Later  on  this  was  confirmed  by  a  similar  agreement, 
signed  at  Tokyo  by  Nishi  and  Rosen  (1898).  Both 
agreements  practically  recognized  the  independence  of 
Korea, 

Thus  from  the  very  beginning  the  relations  of  Rus- 
sia and  Japan  were  marked  by  a  distinct  lack  of  trust 
and  sincerity.  The  Japanese  knew  how  to  bide  their 
time  and  hide  their  feelings.  During  those  years,  Japan 
was  not  yet  strong  enough  to  protest  vigorously  and 
unwillingly  had  to  submit. 

Then  came  the  Boxer  riots,  the  stupid  enterprise  of 
the  Chinese  Dowager  Empress  and  the  gradual  in- 
crease of  European  infringements  upon  China,  her 
territories  and  her  markets.  Russia  especially  was  very 
eager,  under  the  leadership  of  the  clever  statesman, 
Witte,  to  establish  a  firm  hold  upon  Manchuria. 
The  Russo-Chinese  bank,  the  Chinese  Eastern,  rail- 
road and  the  Siberian  expansion  all  pointed,  with  un- 


78  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

varying  clearness,  but  one  way.  Japan  was  bound  to 
realize  that  sooner  or  later  Russia  would  in  the  Pacific 
menace  her  fondest  plans. 

With  two  problems  facing  her,  namely,  the  seeming 
strength,  haughtiness,  and  duplicity  of  the  European 
governments  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other,  her 
own  weakness,  which  handicapped  her  in  her  dealings 
even  with  China,  Japan  set  out  to  find  a  friend  and  an 
ally. 

Very  carefully  did  she  begin  to  study  the  complex 
situation  in  Europe,  testing  the  relative  strength  of 
the  powers,  learning  their  history,  studying  their  mu- 
tual relations  and  trying  to  find  out  future  possibili ties. 
One  must  acknowledge  the  great  success  with  which 
the  task  was  accomplished.  Japan  really  sized  up  the 
situation  extremely  well,  due  to  the  subtle  methods  of 
investigation  she  used  and  to  the  statesmanlike  gifts 
of  her  diplomatic  representatives.  Baron  Hayashi  in 
this  respect  ranks  foremost  among  them  all,  while  Mar- 
quis Ito  was  a  close  second.  There  existed  not  nearly 
as  much  absence  of  teamwork  between  these  two  men, 
as  Mr.  Pooley's  Memoirs  of  Hayashi  would  have  us 
believe.  It  was  camouflage  to  a  great  extent  on  their 
part  that  made  it  seem  that  they  were  working  on 
different  policies. 

Very  soon  it  became  evident  that  Japan's  choice 
would  be  England  or  Russia.  France  did  not  count 
much  in  Far-Eastern  affairs  and  Germany  did  not  at 
first  seem  to  attract  the  sympathies  of  Japan;  much 
more  likely  however  Germany  was  herself  not  sufficient- 
ly interested  in  the  affairs  of  the  Far  East.  In  this 
latter  respect  we  might  surmise  that  Berlin  purposely 


JAPAN  79 

tried  to  confirm  this  impression  of  the  Japanese;  at  that 
time  it  was  Germany's  established  policy  to  push  Rus- 
sia into  the  breach  and  to  act  exclusively  behind  Rus- 
sia's back. 

In  1900  Japan  carefully  felt  her  way.  In  1901  she 
began  negotiations  with  England  and  Russia  simul- 
taneously ;  Hayashi  had  talks  with  Lansdowne  and  Ito 
came  to  St.  Petersburg  to  consult  with  Witte  and  Lams- 
dorff.  Both  these  Japanese  diplomats  reported  in  de- 
tail to  Tokyo  and  the  Japanese  government  thus  had 
a  full  picture  of  all  the  possibilities  and  contingencies. 
Germany  was  very  careful  in  the  role  she  had  chosen; 
between  England  and  Russia  she  was  the  tertius  gau- 
dens.  The  Secret  Memoirs  of  Baron  Hayashi  describe 
very  well  how  Germany  tried  to  keep  in  touch  with 
what  was  going  on  in  London  and  at  St.  Petersburg; 
how  her  representatives  called  at  proper  times  on  the 
Japanese  diplomats  and  the  local  ministers  and  how 
they  simulated  indignation  at  being  "left  out"  of  the 
agreements;  how  Lansdowne  and  Lamsdorff  tried  to 
keep  the  negotiations  secret  and  how  the  news  con- 
stantly leaked  out.  Germany,  we  think,  did  not  want 
to  take  part  in  these  agreements  and  much  preferred  to 
have  her  hands  free.  The  Kaiser  was  at  that  time  much 
too  anti-English  to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  Great 
Britain,  and  as  to  Russia,  he  liked  better  that  the  latter 
country  should  pull  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for 
him.  We  can  also  suppose  that  the  Japanese  soon 
realized  this,  but  did  not  care  about  it  one  way  or  the 
other.  Such  lack  of  desire  on  Germany's  part  to  be- 
come involved  in  the  agreement  became  quite  evident 
later  on;  in  February  1902  Komura,  then  minister  of 


80  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

foreign  affairs,  had  a  talk  with  the  German  ambas- 
sador at  Tokyo,  and  asked  him  if  Germany  would  like 
to  join,  but  the  latter  refused. 

On  the  other  hand,  Marquis  Ito  found  the  atti- 
tude of  the  St.  Petersburg  government  much  too 
haughty,  unattractive  and  overbearing.  The  Russian 
ministers  tried  to  deal  with  him  as  they  had  dealt  with 
the  Chinese ;  they  treated  the  Japanese  representatives 
as  inferiors  and  constantly  put  forward  impossible 
claims.  In  no  matter  did  they  want  to  meet  the 
Japanese  halfway,  either  in  Manchuria,  which  they 
seemed  to  consider  their  private  property,  or  concern- 
ing Korea,  where  they  wished  to  have  a  predominant 
influence.  There  is  no  doubt  that  at  the  beginning 
Tokyo  would  have  preferred  an  agreement  with 
Russia.  Two  factors  worked  strongly  in  that  direction ; 
first  the  idea  that  Russia  was  very  powerful,  and  sec- 
ond, the  conviction  that  Japan  had  more  in  common 
with  Russia  than  with  England,  due  to  the  neighborly 
situation  in  the  Far  East.  An  understanding  with 
Russia  would  have  been  so  much  more  natural,  even 
if  it  had  no  moral  background  of  sincerity.  Tokyo  had 
learned  not  to  rely  too  much  on  morals  when  dealing 
with  Europe.  However  the  Russians  spoiled  this 
chance  and  the  scales  began  to  lean  towards  England. 

Meanwhile  Baron  Hayashi  was  cleverly  conducting 
his  negotiations  with  the  British  government  all 
through  the  summer  of  1901.  His  endeavors  were  cen- 
tered on  the  question  of  Korea,  which  Japan  wanted 
to  secure  for  herself  entirely;  she  finally  succeeded  in 
doing  so. 

The  treaty  of  alliance  between  Japan  and  England 


JAPAN  81 

was  signed  in  London,  January  30, 1902,  by  Lansdowne 
and  Hayashi ;  it  was  to  be  of  ten  years'  duration. 

Hayashi  rightly  points  out  the  risks  of  conducting 
such  double  negotiations.  It  would  have  been  very 
embarrassing,  for  him  especially,  if  Ito  had  succeeded 
simultaneously  at  St.  Petersburg.  Personally  we  think 
that  Japan  would  then  have  dropped  the  negotiations 
with  England.  Later,  however,  things  changed  ma- 
terially and  Japan  was  exceedingly  happy  to  have  Eng- 
land as  an  ally  instead  of  Russia.  From  this  point  of 
view  the  overbearing  policy  of  Witte  and  Lamsdorff 
was  certainly  a  very  grave  and  unpardonable  mistake ; 
it  was  however  unfortunately  in  harmony  with  the 
general  policy  of  the  Russian  government  and  brought 
forth  its  worst  results  two  years  later. 


II. 

Having  secured  an  ally  in  Europe,  Japan  naturally 
felt  steadier  on  her  feet  and  began  to  assert  her  claims 
concerning  China  and  the  Far  East  with  much  greater 
firmness.  On  her  side,  Russia  showed  signs  of  greater 
aggressiveness  and  less  understanding  of  the  Japanese 
point  of  view. 

The  Russian  government  refused  to  take  into  con- 
sideration, even  in  the  slightest  degree,  the  Japanese 
interests.  She  was  thus  proceeding  headlong  into  a 
disastrous  conflict.  The  author  can  speak  from  per- 
sonal experience,  for  he  spent  the  winter  of  1902-1903 
in  Manchuria,  Port  Arthur,  Shanghai  and  Peking,  and 
saw  the  slow  but  steady  growth  of  Japanese  prepara- 


82  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

tions  for  an  armed  conflict.  The  strength  of  the  Japan- 
ese was  increasing  daily  and  parallel  to  this  was  aug- 
menting the  lack  of  understanding  on  the  part  of  Rus- 
sian bureaucrats.  It  was  really  tragic  to  return  to  St. 
Petersburg  in  the  spring  of  1903  and  realize  how  little 
attention  was  paid  there  to  the  Japanese  claims  and 
how  little  people  understood  the  strength  of  Japan  and 
the  danger  of  a  conflict  with  her.  In  Russia,  and  this 
applies  to  the  government  as  well  as  to  public  opinion 
in  general,  there  was  nothing  but  derision  towards  the 
Japanese.  No  one  wanted  to  take  them  seriously, 
hardly  any  one  ever  gave  a  thought  to  Far  Eastern 
events.  Russians  gave  the  government  a  free  hand  in 
these  affairs  and  we  know  now  what  a  criminal  use  was 
made  of  this  opportunity. 

It  was  during  the  author's  stay  at  Port  Arthur,  that 
he  and  his  colleagues  first  heard  of  the  new  enterprise 
of  the  Russian  government  in  Korea,  the  most  foolish 
and  criminal  one  ever  undertaken  there. 

A  few  unscrupulous  adventurers,  a  former  officer  of 
the  guards,  Besobrasoff,  an  admiral,  Abaza,  and  a  few 
less  known  men  had  succeeded  in  persuading  the  Tsar 
of  the  wonderful  possibilities  of  exploiting  the  natural 
resources  of  Korea.  These  resources,  no  doubt,  were 
of  a  remarkable  financial  potentiality,  and  Japan  well 
realizing  this  wished  to  acquire  them  herself,  and  was 
in  no  way  inclined  to  allow  Russia  or  anyone  else  to 
interfere  in  Korea.  This  latter  fact  was  clearly  evident 
in  the  Far  East,  whereas  in  St.  Petersburg  not  a  single 
person,  except  perhaps  Witte,  paid  the  slightest  atten- 
tion to  it.  The  Tsar  and  several  members  of  his  family 
invested  their  personal  capital  in  the  Besobrasoff  con- 


JAPAN  83 

cession  on  the  Yalu  River  and  made  the  whole  enter- 
prise a  personal  affair.  This  at  once  became  a  tempting 
bait  for  unscrupulous  bureaucrats  and  officials,  who 
thought  that  they  could  further  their  own  career  by 
helping  with  the  concession.  An  especially  ugly  role 
was  played  by  the  Viceroy,  Admiral  Alexeiev,  who  was 
sufficiently  clever  to  realize  the  dangers  that  this  enter- 
prise implied;  living  himself  in  Port  Arthur,  he  could 
not  but  know  the  complications  that  were  bound  to 
arise  and  the  protests  that  were  certain  to  come  from 
the  Japanese.  Yet  he  never  thought  of  protesting  vig- 
orously, or  of  tendering  his  resignation,  though  the  acts 
of  Besobrasoff  on  the  Yalu  were  even  challenging  his 
vice-regal  prestige.  He  was  the  official  link  between 
the  Russians  and  Japanese  and  was  obliged  to  tell  the 
Japanese  all  sorts  of  stories  about  the  Korean  plans  of 
Russia,  which  he  knew  were  not  true  and  which  he 
knew  that  the  Japanese  did  not  believe. 

Much  heavier  blame  however  falls  upon  some  of  the 
Tsar's  ministers,  as  well  as  on  himself.  Besobrasoff, 
Abaza  and  their  men  were  simply  promoters  and  ad- 
venturers and  could  do  their  mischief  only  because  they 
had  such  a  strong  backing  in  the  Russian  government 
circles,  whereas  the  ministers  had  no  such  excuse. 

The  psychology  of  the  Tsar  in  this  case  is  explained 
by  his  absolute  contempt  of  Japan,  on  the  one  hand, 
perhaps  even  with  a  tinge  of  vengeance  at  the  back 
of  it,  for  he  was  wounded  in  the  head  by  a  Japanese  at 
the  time  of  his  visit  to  the  Far  East,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  by  his  conceit  and  conviction  that  he,  the  Lord'a 
anointed,  could  do  no  wrong  (especially  in  dealing  with 
inferiors).  It  was  also  one  of  the  most  pernicious  influ- 


84  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

ences  of  the  Kaiser  that  told  in  this  case  very  strongly. 
Wilhelm  was  consciously  and  cleverly  urging  the 
Tsar  on  to  such  a  conflict,  upholding  his  conviction  of 
superiority  over  the  Japanese  and  flattering  him  into 
complacency.  His  game  was  a  sure  one  too ;  Germany 
could  only  win,  Russia  could  only  lose.  However,  this 
was  but  a  weak  excuse  for  Nicholas;  he  might  have 
known  better  and  there  are  indications  that  he  was  not 
so  averse  to  war  as  he  wanted  people  to  believe.  He 
was  so  sure  of  himself  and  of  the  strength  of  his  army 
that  he  firmly  believed  in  a  brilliant  and  easy  victory 
over  the  despised  Japanese. 

Among  the  ministers,  the  chief  culprits  (because 
their  policy  was  nothing  short  of  a  national  crime) 
were  General  Kuropatkin,  the  minister  of  war,  and 
von  Plehve,  the  minister  of  the  interior.  They  were 
actuated  however  by  different  motives.  Witte's  share 
of  the  blame  was  less  serious.  Though  he  started  the 
fateful  policy  of  peaceful  penetration  of  Manchuria 
and  Russian  expansion  in  the  Far  East,  he  never,  even 
for  a  moment,  contemplated  any  military  action,  never 
planned  to  spread  Russian  influence  farther  than  Man- 
churia proper  and  finally  realizing  very  early  in  the 
game  to  what  dangerous  consequences  the  Russian 
policy  in  the  Far  East  was  leading,  he  warned  the 
other  ministers  and  tried  to  put  on  the  brakes,  but 
unfortunately  it  was  too  late.  Kuropatkin  was  a 
typical  aggressive  general,  convinced  of  the  strength 
of  his  army  and  of  the  sanctity  of  the  autocratic  regime 
of  his  government.  Witte,  for  example,  writes  in  his 
Memoirs  of  how  Kuropatkin  hailed  Russian  aggression 
in  Manchuria,  his  plan  being  "to  seize  that  province 


JAPAN  85 

and  turn  it  into  a  second  Bokhara."  He  played  no 
mean  role  either  in  the  repressive  policy  against  the 
Boxers,  supporting  with  joy  the  "punitive  expedition" 
that  looted  China  and  the  Chinese.  In  the  West  Kuro- 
patkin was  not  less  aggressive;  it  was  due  to  him  that 
the  idea  started  of  exerting  pressure  upon  Sweden  by 
fortifying  Finland  and  making  it  one  with  Russia. 
It  was  due  to  Kuropatkin's  counsel  that  Russia  did  not 
withdraw  her  troops  from  Manchuria  and  repeatedly 
broke  faith  with  the  other  powers,  thus  effectively  un- 
dermining her  prestige  abroad.  In  November  1902 
Kuropatkin  was  sent  by  the  Tsar  to  Japan  and  the 
Far  East.  Here  he  became  convinced  of  the  strength 
of  Japan  and  of  the  dangers  coupled  with  the  Beso- 
brasoff  expedition  and  warned  the  Tsar.  It  was  too 
late,  however,  for  these  policies  were  well  started  and 
the  Tsar  was  too  firmly  convinced  of  Japan's  inferior- 
ity. This  warning  of  Kuropatkin  does  not  lessen  his 
culpability. 

The  other  culprit,  Plehve,  played  his  part  also  by 
urging  drastic  measures  against  Japan  but  for  different 
reasons.  As  minister  of  the  interior  he  had  to  deal 
with  the  Russian  revolutionaries  and  the  constantly 
growing  social  discontent.  At  that  time  Russia  was 
seething  with  revolution  and  Plehve  conceived  the 
awful  idea  of  recurring  to  the  Machiavellian  princi- 
ple: "when  troubles  threaten  at  home,  start  a  foreign 
war."  He  told  the  other  ministers  that  he  did  not  mind 
the  complications  with  Japan,  that  as  a  matter  of  fact 
he  was  glad  of  it:  "A  little  war  will  help  us  very  much." 
The  war,  however,  proved  to  be  neither  "little,"  nor  a 
"help"  to  these  men. 


86  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  fate  of  these  three  men, 
implicated  in  the  Japanese  embroglio.  Witte  was 
destined  to  settle  the  trouble  and  sign  the  peace  for  a 
defeated  nation,  gaining  all  that  it  was  possible  to  gain 
under  the  circumstances,  but  losing  his  own  standing 
and  popularity  among  his  people  and  with  his  govern- 
ment. General  Kuropatkin  was  appointed  after  some 
hesitation,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Russian  armies 
against  Japan,  had  to  lead  the  bad  generals  of  his  own 
appointment  and  creation 1  and  sustained  defeat  after 
defeat,  till  he  was  finally  demoted.  Plehve  was  as- 
sassinated by  revolutionaries,  whom  he  never  succeeded 
in  curbing  though  he  did  succeed  in  demoralizing  the 
system  of  his  autocratic  government. 

In  the  summer  of  1903  Japan  made  the  last  effort  to 
settle  the  trouble  amicably  by  renewing  negotiations 
with  St.  Petersburg,  but  met  with  the  same  reluctance 
on  the  part  of  Russia  to  give  any  decisive  answer. 
Russia's  replies  were  as  evasive  and  unsatisfactory  as 
they  had  previously  been.  Witte  describes  this  in  a 
striking  sentence,  "We  were  headed  straight  for  war 
and  at  the  same  time  we  did  nothing  to  prepare  our- 
selves for  the  eventuality.  We  acted  as  if  we  were  cer- 
tain that  the  Japanese  would  endure  everything  with- 
out daring  to  attack  us."  This  was  absolutely  true, 
Russia  directly  provoked  the  war  by  her  foolish  policy 
while  not  really  lifting  a  finger  to  prepare  for  it. 

On  January  16,  1904,  Japan  finally  lost  patience  and 

1  Though  most  of  the  very  poor  generals  sent  out  to  command 
the  Russian  troops  in  Manchuria  were  chosen  either  by  the  Tsar  or 
by  influences  at  Court,  their  promotions  depended  exclusively  on 
Kuropatkin,  who  as  minister  of  war,  selected  them  chiefly  for  the 
pull  they  had  at  Court. 


JAPAN  87 

presented  an  ultimatum.  She  was  ready  to  recognize 
Russian  interests  in  Manchuria,  provided  Russia  would 
recognize  her  interests,  especially  in  Korea.  The  answer 
was  again  very  unsatisfactory.  The  Tsar,  it  was  said, 
did  not  want  war,  the  people  did  not  want  it  and  they 
did  not  expect  it.  In  consequence  it  was  a  genuine 
surprise  to  the  Russian  government,  when  on  the 
night  of  February  8,  the  Japanese  destroyers  entered 
Port  Arthur  and  fired  torpedoes  at  Russian  battleships, 
unprepared  and  unprotected.  On  the  following  day 
war  was  declared. 

The  war  was  never  popular  with  the  Russian  na- 
tion. From  the  very  beginning  Russia  was  against  it, 
not  even  understanding  why  she  was  fighting  Japan. 
Under  such  conditions  defeat  was  unavoidable.  The 
people  did  not  back  the  government  in  .any  way  and 
instead  of  bringing  with  it  popular  enthusiasm  that 
would  have  diminished  social  discontent  and  weakened 
the  revolutionary  movement,  as  Plehve  expected,  the 
war  called  forth  the  exactly  opposite  results — the  grad- 
ual spread  of  dissatisfaction  among  the  people,  which 
rose  to  a  climax  in  the  summer  of  1905,  when  the  condi- 
tions in  the  army  were  at  their  worst. 

The  situation  became  so  threatening  that  in  July 
the  Tsar  had  finally  to  give  in.  He  sought  peace  abroad 
and  made  constitutional  concessions  at  home,  all  under 
the  direct  pressure  of  fear.  The  initiative  of  the  peace 
negotiations  came,  as  is  well  known,  from  President 
Roosevelt.  After  some  hesitation  the  Tsar  appointed 
Witte  as  the  chief  representative  of  Russia,  probably 
her  cleverest  man,  but  unfortunately  lacking  in  firm 
moral  principles. 


88  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Witte  gives  a  vivid  account,  in  his  Memoirs  (Chap. 
V)  of  the  Portsmouth  Peace  Conference  and  of  how  he 
won  a  brilliant  diplomatic  victory,  nearly  succeeding  in 
annihilating  the  Japanese  military  achievements.  At 
the  same  time  he  also  succeeded  in  another,  no  less  im- 
portant task  of  swinging  American  public  opinion  from 
open  hostility  to  hearty  sympathy.  This  part  of  his 
story  concerning  his  dealings  with  the  American  press 
and  his  personal  endeavors  in  the  United  States  is 
most  instructive  and  clearly  shows  the  force  of  public 
opinion  in  our  days.  Contrast  only  his  seeming  open- 
mindedness  and  civility  to  the  pressmen  with  the  cold 
aloofness  of  the  Japanese,  enshrined  in  their  dignity, 
secluded  and  secretive,  and  you  will  easily  understand 
the  results  and  consequences!  In  the  space  of  a  few 
weeks,  American  public  opinion  was  entirely  on  the 
side  of  Russia  and  against  Japan,  whereas  during  the 
war  and  previous  to  it,  while  Russia  was  dickering  in 
Manchuria,  the  trend  of  American  feelings  was  just  the 
opposite — wholeheartedly  back  of  Japan. 

There  is  no  doubt  whatever  that  this  change, 
achieved  among  Americans  affected  the  peace  negotia- 
tions and  helped  Witte  to  gain  the  upper  hand. 

Not  doubting  Roosevelt's  sincerity,  we  can  at  pres- 
ent question  his  wisdom  in  forcing  this  peace  upon 
Russia.  Not  that  we  could  have  expected  a  victory 
or  even  military  achievements  for  Russia,  but  Japan 
might  have  learned  a  lesson  which  would  have  changed 
much  of  the  succeeding  events  throughout  the  world. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  Russia's  condition  and  the  state  of 
her  army  could  not  have  become  much  worse  if  the  war 
had  dragged  on  a  few  months  longer.  The  Russian 


JAPAN  89 

army  would  never  have  been  able  to  show  much  energy, 
but  her  internal  troubles  would  have  increased  and 
forced  the  government  to  grant  more  reforms,  estab- 
lishing in  a  firmer  way  the  principles  of  constitutional 
government,  for  which  she  was  quite  ready,  but  which 
neither  the  Tsar  nor  the  ruling  class  were  yet  ready 
to  grant.  What  they  did  grant  they  tried  to  take  back 
as  soon  as  the  social  discontent  quieted  down.  Again, 
the  continuation  of  the  war  would  have  brought  im- 
portant changes  in  Japan.  Japan  at  that  moment  was 
at  the  end  of  her  tether.  Roosevelt,  in  other  words, 
saved  Japan  from  an  economic  collapse  that  might 
have  called  for  constitutional  reforms  in  Japan  also, 
and  only  the  latter  could  be  a  reliable  guarantee  against 
the  development  of  imperialism  in  the  Pacific. 


III. 

The  Portsmouth  Peace  Treaty,  September  5,  1905, 
returned  to  Japan  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  with  Port 
Arthur  and  Talienwan  or  Dalny,  which  she  had  lost 
after  the  peace  of  Shimonoseki,  owing  to  the  "friendly 
advice"  of  Russia,  Germany  and  France.  But  it  gave 
Japan  much  more  than  that.  The  Russians  had  built 
up  and  developed  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny ;  Port  Arthur 
became  a  first  class  fortress  and  was  a  splendidly 
equipped  harbor  for  the  Japanese  navy,  while  Dalny 
became  a  very  convenient  port  for  commercial  shipping. 
Further,  Japan  received  the  South  Manchurian  rail- 
road and  could  thus  spread  her  influence  unhampered 
all  over  Manchuria,  practically  controlling  that  market 


90  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

as  she  saw  fit.  From  that  moment  on  Japan  began  to 
look  upon  Manchuria  as  she  formerly  looked  upon 
Korea,  as  a  sphere  for  her  exclusive  influence,  where  no 
other  power  should  interfere.  To  Russia  all  this  meant 
pure  loss,  to  the  rest  of  the  world  it  was  simply  a  change 
in  tenants.  Russian  domination  was  now  replaced  by 
Japanese  domination,  but  the  door  to  Manchuria,  the 
"open  door"  was  tighter  closed  than  ever.  In  addition 
Russia  ceded  the  southern  half  of  the  island  of  Sak- 
halin, with  its  natural  resources  of  no  mean  value. 
On  the  other  hand  Witte  succeeded  in  thwarting  the 
Japanese  desire  for  an  indemnity;  they  asked  for  six 
hundred  million  dollars,  but  had  to  withdraw  the  claim 
before  the  treaty  was  signed. 

The  peace  treaty  was  naturally  only  the  first  step  in 
the  adjustment  of  the  Russo-Japanese  relations  after 
the  war.  China  too  had  to  be  considered,  in  some  way 
at  least.  There  had  to  follow,  consequently,  an  agree- 
ment between  Japan  and  China,  which  was  signed  in 
December  1905,  sanctioning  the  transfer  of  territory  as 
arranged  by  the  Russo-Japanese  treaty.  The  legal 
forms  of  these  transfers  were  similar  to  the  preceding 
arrangements  with  the  other  powers,  viz.,  the  sover- 
eignty of  China  was  recognized,  but  the  government 
and  administration  were  to  be  entrusted  to  Japan  on 
the  model  of  the  civil  law  lease. 

Later  followed  new  agreements  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  signed  during  the  summer  of  1907.  One  con- 
vention (signed  June  13)  concerned  the  detailed  rail- 
road arrangements,  junctions,  etc.,  between  the  East- 
ern Siberian  railroad  and  the  Southern  Japanese  sec- 
tion. Two  other  conventions  were  signed  July  28;  one 


JAPAN  91 

concerned  commerce  and  navigation  and  the  other  the 
fisheries  on  the  Pacific  coast,  especially  in  the  Behring 
and  Okhotsk  seas.  Finally  on  July  30  Iswolsky,  minis- 
ter of  foreign  affairs,  and  Motono,  Japanese  ambas- 
sador in  St.  Petersburg,  signed  a  general  agreement  de- 
fining their  respective  interests  in  the  Far  East. 

Still  later,  on  the  same  principle  of  amicable  coopera- 
tion between  these  former  enemies  and  now  close 
friends,  two  new  conventions  were  signed  July  4,  1910 
and  July  8,  1912.  These  conventions  concerned  the 
joint  action  of  Japan  and  Russia  in  Manchuria  and 
were  meant  to  reaffirm  the  policy  of  exclusion  of  the 
other  countries.  The  first  confirmed  the  status  quo 
ante  of  reciprocity  between  Russia  and  Japan,  while 
the  other  related  to  the  railroad  lines  in  Manchuria, 
their  improvement  and  expansion.  The  understanding 
of  1910  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  an  answer  to  the 
American  and  other  inquiries,  relating  to  the  open 
door  policy.  The  Western  powers  were  asking 
whether  Japan  and  Russia  were  prepared  to  accept  this 
principle  and  give  other  nations  a  chance  to  trade  in 
the  North-China  market.  The  answer  was  a  decisive 
refusal,  for  neither  Russia  nor  Japan  was  willing  to 
admit  foreign  participation  in  their  Manchurian  com- 
merce. They  eagerly  combined  to  shut  out  any  pos- 
sible competition. 

Finally,  in  still  clearer  terms  these  same  principles 
of  cooperation,  of  mutual  help  and  of  recognition  were 
stated  in  the  last  agreement  signed  by  Russia  and 
Japan,  in  the  treaty  of  July  3,  1916.  This  agree- 
ment also  mentioned  mutual  military  assistance  in 
the  war  against  Germany  then  going  on.  The  worst 


92  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

of  it  in  this  last  case  was  that  it  was  not  restricted, 
as  the  previous  arrangements  had  been,  to  North- 
China  and  Manchuria  only,  but  on  the  contrary,  cov- 
ered the  entire  field  of  the  Far  East. 

Thus  ended  the  short  feud  between  Russia  and 
Japan,  passing  away  as  suddenly  as  it  came.  If  we 
now  look  back  at  the  Russo-Japanese  conflict  of  1901- 
1905  we  can  easily  see  its  characteristic  artificiality.  It 
was  so  unnatural  and  unnecessary  and  could  have  been 
so  easily  avoided  if  each  side  had  been  willing  to  con- 
cede a  little  to  its  opponent.  Especially  does  this  fault 
lie  with  Russia.  Her  policy  towards  Japan  was  the 
height  of  foolishness  and  political  shortsightedness;  it 
will  always  remain  a  terrible  indictment  against  the 
Tsar  Nicholas  and  his  immediate  counselors,  and  it 
will  ever  be  a  striking  example  of  the  dangers  of  secret 
diplomacy.  Had  there  been  more  light  thrown  on  the 
mutual  relations  of  those  two  countries,  as  they  were 
developing  during  these  fateful  years,  the  danger  might 
have  been  avoided  or  at  least  lessened. 

After  the  war  and  the  peace  treaty  of  Portsmouth 
had  become  history,  Russia  soon  seemed  to  forget  her 
ill-feeling  towards  Japan  and  in  later  years  there  did 
not  exist  any  desire  for  vengeance,  or  enmity  towards 
the  Japanese.  This  fact  is  best  witnessed  by  the  ease 
with  which  the  mutual  agreements  that  followed  the 
Portsmouth  peace  were  reached  and  approved  by  the 
two  nations. 


CHAPTER  V. 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

I. 

WE  now  approach  one  of  the  most  entangled  prob- 
lems of  the  European  situation,  the  relations  of  Rus- 
sia towards  Austria-Hungary.  It  is  very  difficult  for 
anybody  studying  the  complex  policies  in  the  Near 
East,  with  their  parallel  alliances,  criss-cross  intrigues 
and  mutual  distrust  of  the  great  powers,  to  get  a 
straight  and  coherent  story  out  of  them.  Much  has 
been  written  about  these  problems,  and  yet  so  very 
little  is  known  concerning  their  historic  meaning.  Most 
of  the  literature  is  either  prejudiced  or  insincere. 

The  relations  of  Russia  with  the  Hapsburg  monarchy 
fall  into  three  periods:  first,  from  1878  to  1897  there 
existed  a  decided  tension  between  the  two  empires, 
brought  about  by  the  Russian  success  in  the  armistice 
of  San  Stefano  and  the  Russian  relations  with  the 
Balkan  Slavs;  second,  from  1897  to  1907  this  tension 
gradually  disappears  and  there  ensues  a  period  of  rel- 
ative friendship,  not  always  sincere,  but  at  least  out- 
wardly peaceful ;  third,  beginning  with  1908  and  up  to 
the  Great  War  of  1914,  the  relations  between  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary  steadily  grow  worse,  until  a  final 
break  became  inevitable. 

The  fate  of  Austria-Hungary  after  her  defeat  of 

93 


94  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

1867  depended  entirely  on  her  relations  with  Germany 
and  for  a  long  time  it  was  Bismarck  who  really  inspired 
the  main  principles  of  her  policy ;  with  few  exceptions, 
the  directives  constantly  came  from  Berlin. 

After  the  Berlin  Congress  of  1878,  Bismarck  expected 
from  Austria  effective  help  in  case  of  any  new  military 
conflict,  and  used  the  weight  of  her  influence  in  his 
political  and  diplomatic  game  in  opposing  the  growth 
of  the  Slav  influences.  In  the  last  mentioned  case  he 
found  a  willing  friend  in  the  Hungarian  nation,  be- 
cause it  was  most  afraid  of  a  Slav  expansion.  The 
Hungarians  are  very  much  like  the  Prussians,  national- 
istic and  chauvinistic,  having  ruled  the  Slav  popula- 
tion of  the  Dual  Monarchy  most  ruthlessly. 

Bismarck  started  by  backing  Austria  whole-heartedly 
at  the  Berlin  Congress,  meeting  all  her  demands  and 
finally  giving  her  the  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. As  Temperley  says  in  his  "History  of  Serbia," 
"where  Russia  had  spent  thousands  of  lives  and  millions 
of  pounds,  Austria  spent  only  ink  and  paper"  and  still 
she  got  the  greatest  advantages  out  of  the  Berlin 
Congress. 

At  that  time  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  was  gov- 
erned by  a  Hungarian,  Count  Andrassy,  Sr.,  who  eagerly 
met  Bismarck  more  than  half  way.  In  August  1879 
Bismarck  arranged  for  an  interview  with  Andrassy  at 
Gastein  in  order  to  discuss  the  mutual  policies.  From 
the  very  start  he  proposed  an  alliance  between  the  two 
empires  of  a  most  "general"  character,  covering  the 
west  as  well  as  the  east.  Andrassy  demurred,  realiz- 
ing the  dangers  that  were  created  in  the  west  by  the 
annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  undying,  though 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  95 

for  the  moment  hidden  ill  feeling  of  France.  He  pro- 
posed instead  an  agreement  that  would  be  directed 
against  the  east  exclusively  (against  Russia).  Bis- 
marck did  not  quite  like  it,  as  he  knew  that  the  Ger- 
man Emperor  would  be  very  unwilling  to  antagonize 
Russia  and  the  Russian  Tsar,  with  whom  he  was  bound 
by  personal  friendship  and  family  ties.  The  Chancel- 
lor overcame,  however,  these  objections,  as  he  so  often 
did  during  his  lifelong  service,  and  agreed  to  the  con- 
clusion of  the  alliance  with  Austria,  which  was  signed 
October  10,  1879  and  ratified  October  15,  1879.  The 
fate  of  the  Austrian  empire  became  henceforth  abso- 
lutely dependent  on  the  policies  of  the  Berlin  govern- 
ment; the  two  monarchies  were  bound  to  stand  and 
fall  together. 

In  dealing  with  Austria  Bismarck  had  only  military 
advantages  in  view,  considering  the  possibility  of  a 
future  war  on  either  side  of  the  German  empire,  west 
or  east.  He  did  not  care  for  taking  part  in  the  Balkan 
trouble  and  left  it  entirely  to  Austria;  Germany  had 
still  much  room  for  her  national  expansion  and  Bis- 
marck persistently  declined  to  start  any  colonial  or 
Near  East  policy;  Austria  might  deal  with  Russia  or 
the  Balkan  Slavs  as  best  she  could. 

The  treaty  of  1879  was  kept  secret  but  its  contents 
soon  were  known  to  the  world  and  aroused,  especially 
in  Russia,  a  very  natural  feeling  of  anxiety.  The  ob- 
jects of  this  dual  alliance  were,  first,  the  defence  of 
the  status  quo  created  by  the  Berlin  Congress,  sec- 
ondly, a  mutual  insurance  against  Russia.  The  first 
article  of  the  treaty  promised  reciprocal  aid  in  case  of 
an  attack  by  Russia;  if  another  power  attacked,  Aus- 


96  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

tria-Hungary  was  to  remain  neutral,  but  if  Russia 
joined  the  attacking  power,  article  I.  was  to  be  in  force; 
finally  Austria  was  to  warn  Tsar  Alexander  that  if  he 
attacked  one  of  the  allies,  the  other  one  would  be  com- 
pelled to  join  the  power  attacked.  The  treaty  was 
concluded  for  five  years,  but  was  constantly  renewed. 
The  full  text  of  this  agreement  is  published  by  Pribram 
and  Coolidge,  "Secret  Treaties  of  Austria-Hungary," 
1920.  Thus  there  was  formed  a  strong  nucleus  in  east 
Europe. 

Having  achieved  this  great  consolidation,  Bismarck 
cleverly  proceeded  to  pacify  Russia;  he  could  not  af- 
ford to  have  Russia  as  an  enemy-neighbor.  He  was 
actuated,  however,  in  the  case  of  Russia  not  only  by 
military  considerations;  there  existed  strong  political 
reasons  for  a  Russo-German  understanding:  first,  the 
personal  friendship  that  existed  between  the  two  em- 
perors, and  second,  the  need  of  upholding  the  mon- 
archical principle,  on  which  both  empires  were  built. 
In  consequence,  he  tried  to  find  means  of  approaching 
Russia  and  allaying  her  fears. 

The  situation  in  Austria-Hungary  was  much  more 
difficult.  Her  alliance  with  Germany  was  bound  to  in- 
crease her  quarrels  with  the  Balkan  Slavs,  her  own 
numerous  Slav  population  included;  many  of  them 
were  dreaming  of  entire  independence;  the  Pan-Slav 
ideal  too,  which  Austria  and  especially  Hungary  hated 
and  feared  so  much,  seemed  to  increase  steadily  in 
strength.  One  must  keep  in  mind  in  this  respect  a 
most  characteristic  trait  of  the  Russian  Pan-Slav  move- 
ment; it  was  prompted  much  more  by  hatred  of  Ger- 
mans than  by  love  of  Slavs;  Vienna  paid  too  little  at- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  97 

tention  to  this  factor.  It  soon  proved  to  be  the  main 
source  of  trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia;  for  a 
very  long  time  it  disturbed  the  peace  of  Europe  and 
unfortunately  the  question  is  still  with  us:  Is  it  solved? 

Bismarck,  meanwhile,  spent  his  time  and  efforts  in 
endeavoring  to  build  up  an  understanding  with  Russia. 
He  made  use  in  this  respect  of  the  former  alliance,  the 
so-called  "Entente  of  the  Three  Emperors,"  existing 
since  1872;  he  wanted  it  resurrected  in  spite  of  his  new 
alliance  with  Austria  and  finally  persuaded  the  two 
other  governments  to  renew  it;  it  was  signed  in  Berlin 
June  18,  1881  by  himself  and  the  two  ambassadors, 
Sabourof  for  Russia  and  Szecheny  for  Austria-Hun- 
gary. According  to  that  understanding,  if  one  of  the 
three  countries  should  be  at  war,  the  other  two  were  to 
remain  benevolently  neutral;  if  war  broke  out  with 
Turkey,  the  three  powers  had  to  reach  a  special  agree- 
ment concerning  the  outcome  of  such  a  war.  This  un- 
derstanding was  concluded  for  three  years,  and  the  first 
difficulty  arose  in  1883,  when  the  renewal  of  1884  was 
discussed  by  the  allies.  Russia  wanted  to  be  free  to- 
wards Turkey,  but  this  attitude  alarmed  and  displeased 
Austria  and  friction  seemed  imminent. 

Bismarck  then  once  more  displayed  his  great  diplo- 
matic skill.  Harping  on  the  monarchical  ideal  he  con- 
vinced the  three  emperors  of  the  necessity  of  a  per- 
sonal meeting  in  order  to  further  strengthen  their 
autocracies.  He  succeeded  in  bringing  them  together 
in  Skiernevice  in  1884,  where  they  met  accompanied 
by  their  ministers. 

One  can  easily  judge  of  the  complicated  situation 
and  the  involved  game  Bismarck  was  playing  by  the 


98  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

fact  that  simultaneously  he  succeeded  in  greatly 
strengthening  the  Dual  Alliance  by  the  accession  of 
Italy,  which  was  to  act,  at  the  same  time,  as  a  counter 
weight  to  Austria.  Italy  agreed  to  join  chiefly  for  two 
reasons,  because  of  her  isolated  position  in  Europe  and 
on  account  of  some  anti-French  feelings  that  existed 
among  certain  Italian  parties;  France  had  hampered 
the  Italian  policy  in  Tunis.  Germany  on  her  side 
promised  Italy  commercial  advantages  for  the  recon- 
struction of  her  shattered  finances.  Austria  expected 
that  Italy's  accession  would  minimize  the  dangers  of 
her  Irridenta  on  the  Italian  frontier. 

Thus  we  can  see  how  these  diplomatic  entanglements 
crossed  and  neutralized  one  another,  increasing  the 
difficulties  of  the  Eastern  Empires  and  creating  mutual 
distrust  and  dissatisfaction. 

The  Balkan  trouble,  just  then  developing  between 
Bulgaria  and  Russia,  only  helped  to  add  fuel;  Austria 
was  glad  of  making  use  of  it  and  looked  on  with  pleas- 
ure at  the  Serbian  war  with  Bulgaria  that  broke  out 
in  1885. 

Russia,  on  the  other  hand,  showed  more  distinctly 
her  dislike  of  Austria,  and  when  in  1886  the  time  came 
for  another  renewal  of  her  treaty  with  Austria  and 
Germany,  she  naturally  hesitated  and  wavered  in  her 
policy.  The  treaty  was  finally  renewed  on  June  18, 
1887,  but  without  the  participation  of  Austria,  to  the 
latter  country's  great  alarm. 

We  cannot  wonder  at  that.  Austria  was  very  much 
afraid  of  her  Slav  subjects  and  of  the  growing  Pan  Slav 
movement.  The  only  solution  for  her  would  have  been 
to  frankly  admit  the  federal  principle;  but  just  this 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  99 

she  would  not  do.  The  reasons  for  this  were  both 
political  and  economic.  She  was  too  centralized  and 
reactionary,  and  too  much  dependent  economically  on 
the  Balkan  peoples;  most  of  her  raw  materials  came 
from  there  and  her  own  products  of  industry  had  to  be 
sent  south:  Germany,  Switzerland,  Italy  and  Russia 
closed  her  other  frontiers.  Austria  had  no  colonies 
worth  mentioning  and  the  Balkans  were  thus  her 
only  market. 

Parallel  to  these  difficulties  came  the  transactions 
concerning  the  renewal  of  the  Teutonic  alliance.  Bis- 
marck rightly  pointed  out  that  since  the  accession  of 
Italy  and  the  many  changes  in  eastern  Europe  the 
premises  of  the  original  agreement  required  thorough 
revision.  This  was  achieved  during  the  years  1886- 
1887  and  the  new  text  of  the  Triple  alliance  signed  in 
1887  was  somewhat  different  from  that  of  1879.1  Thus, 
for  instance,  we  find  three  new  words  inserted,  "with- 
out direct  provocation,"  referring  to  the  possible  at- 
tack on  one  of  the  allies,  which  were  absent  in  the  text 
of  1879 ;  the  latter  was  much  simpler,  whereas  the  text 
of  1887  became  very  ambiguous;  this  can  be  easily  ex- 
plained by  the  increased  complexity  of  the  political 
situation  in  Eastern  Europe.  A  little  later  arose  a  very 
interesting,  but  troublesome  question,  as  to  the  con- 
tinuation of  the  treaty  of  1879;  some  statesmen  and 
jurists  argued  that  the  two  treaties  of  1879  and  1887 
were  two  different  instruments  and  the  one  of  1887 
could  not  be  looked  at  as  the  mere  renewal  of  the  pre- 
vious alliance  of  1879,  and  as  there  was  no  mention 
made  about  the  abrogation  of  the  treaty  of  1879,  it 
1Pribram,  A.  F.,  Secret  Treaties  of  Austria-Hungary. 


100  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

still  was  in  force,  parallel  to  the  agreement  of  1887. 
This  point  of  view  is  defended,  for  example,  by  Fried- 
Jung.1  This  made  the  involved  situation  still  more 
complicated,  but  unfortunately  there  is  much  justifica- 
tion of  the  cited  opinion,  especially  as  the  alliance  of 
1879  was  now  made  public  in  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Buda- 
pest; the  treaty  of  1887  remained  secret  up  to  the  time 
of  the  Teutonic  defeat.  Thus  the  web  of  diplomatic 
intrigue  was  unabatingly  woven  by  the  eastern  autoc- 
racies, which  were  fated  finally  to  perish  themselves, 
strangled  in  the  vicious  meshes  of  their  own  fabrica- 
tion. 

II. 

In  the  Ws  the  relations  between  Russia  and  Austria 
began  gradually  to  improve.  There  were  two  important 
causes  for  this:  on  the  one  hand,  the  Pan-Slav  move- 
ment lost  its  former  impetus  and  there  appeared  many 
points  of  disagreement  among  the  Slavs  of  different 
countries;  on  the  other,  Russia,  their  elder  sister,  sud- 
denly changed  her  policy,  henceforth  ignoring  the  Bal- 
kans and  directing  all  her  efforts  toward  an  unexpected 
expansion  in  the  Far  East;  this  latter  development  was 
bound  to  tell  on  Russia's  relations  to  her  southwestern 
neighbors. 

Vienna  was  not  slow  in  noticing  it;  in  1896  Francis 
Joseph  paid  a  visit  to  St.  Petersburg  where  he  was 
cordially  received,  and  proposed  a  new  understanding 
between  the  two  countries.  As  a  matter  of  fact  an 
agreement  was  signed  in  1897  to  the  disadvantage  of 

1  Comp.  his  book  Das  Zeitalter  des  Imperialismus. 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  101 

poor  Serbia,  which  was  left  by  Russia  to  the  mercy  of 
Austria.  The  objects  of  this  understanding  were:  first, 
,the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans, 
especially  in  Macedonia,  where  bandits  were  openly 
pillaging;  and  second,  the  delineation  of  spheres  of 
influence;  to  Russia  were  apportioned  Bulgaria,  Tur- 
key, and  Montenegro,  while  Austria  got  as  her  sphere 
of  influence  Serbia,  Macedonia,  Saloniki,  and  Albania. 

Simultaneously,  we  can  witness  the  appearance  in 
both  countries  of  new  political  groups,  working  for 
mutual  friendship,  austrophiles  in  Russia  and  russo- 
philes  in  Austria. 

But  even  during  this  period  of  better  understanding, 
the  horizon  was  never  entirely  without  clouds.  The 
storm  center  lay  in  Macedonia.  Serbia  and  Bulgaria 
continuously  clashed  there;  each  one  wanted  its  own 
schools,  its  own  influence,  its  own  advantages.  From 
the  south  there  came  also  Greek  interference.  Turkish 
maladministration  and  occasional  massacres  only  added 
fuel. 

During  this  whole  period,  1896-1907,  the  efforts  of 
the  great  powers  were  much  too  timid  and  insincere 
to  be  able  to  achieve  any  drastic  change  or  improve- 
ment. In  1902  the  Russian  foreign  minister,  Lams- 
dorff,  undertook  a  special  trip  to  Vienna,  Sophia,  and 
Nish  in  order  to  reach  some  mutual  understanding, 
but  failed;  even  the  small  nations  seemed  to  want  to 
keep  away  from  Russia.  Lamsdorff  succeeded,  how- 
ever, in  convincing  Vienna  of  the  necessity  of  discuss- 
ing amicably  the  Balkan  situation  and  of  deciding  on 
some  sort  of  mutual  policy. 

In  consequence,  a  Russian-Austrian  memorandum 


102  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

of  reforms  was  drawn  up  on  February  17,  1903  and 
sent  to  the  Sultan,  who  accepted  it  without  protest, 
but  also  without  paying  much  attention  to  it.  Later 
in  the  year  a  meeting  of  the  two  emperors,  Nicholas 
and  Francis  Joseph,  took  place  at  Miirzsteg  (Septem- 
ber 1903)  and  a  new  program  of  common  action  was 
worked  out  and  accepted.  According  to  the  provisions 
of  this  new  understanding,  a  special  Inspector-General, 
commanding  the  gendarmes  in  Macedonia  was  to  be 
appointed  by  the  Porte,  with  two  assistants,  one  of 
whom  was  to  be  a  Russian,  the  other  an  Austrian. 
Further,  there  were  to  be  mixed  courts  for  political 
crimes  and  the  Christians  were  to  receive  a  special  in- 
demnity. 

This  plan  also  failed  to  impress  the  Sultan,  who 
calmly  continued  in  his  old  policies.  Moreover,  though 
all  other  powers  sanctioned  these  reforms,  Germany 
demurred,  in  the  hope  of  secretly  sustaining  the  Turks; 
the  latter  gladly  took  this  chance  and  felt  themselves 
supported  in  their  opposition  to  Russia.  The  reform 
plans  naturally  were  bound  to  fail. 

Then  came  the  unfortunate  Japanese  war,  taking  up 
all  Russia's  time  and  strength  and  preventing  any  pos- 
sibility on  her  part  to  interfere  any  more  in  the  policies 
of  the  Balkans. 

During  the  war  Lamsdorff,  the  Russian  foreign 
minister,  signed  an  agreement  with  the  Austrian  am- 
bassador, d'Aehrenthal,  by  which  Austria  promised  to 
remain  neutral  and  keep  up  a  joint  policy  with  Russia 
in  the  Balkans;  at  that  time  Austria  did  not  take  any 
advantage  of  Russia's  weakness. 

The  last  act  of  this  friendly  period  was  Iswolsky's 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  103 

visit  to  d'Aehrenthal  and  the  Austro-Russian  note  of 
October  1,  1907,  concerning  the  Macedonian  reforms 
and  the  Miirzsteg  program,  which  seemed  to  affect 
Turkey  so  little.  This  common  action  was  weaker  than 
ever  and  showed  already  the  increasing  insincerity  in 
the  relations  of  Austria  and  Russia.  The  storm  was  not 
long  in  coming. 

III. 

The  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  was  the  per- 
sonal enterprise  of  the  energetic  count  d'Aehrenthal, 
who  had  no  scruples,  especially  when  Russia  and  Rus- 
sian interests  were  concerned. 

Before  he  became  minister  of  foreign  affairs  for 
Austria  he  had  a  long  record  of  diplomatic  service  in 
Russia  and  knew  well  the  Russian  Court  and  the  bu- 
reaucratic surroundings  of  the  Tsar.  Likewise  was  he 
acquainted  with  all  the  details  of  the  situation  of  the 
Russian  government  at  that  tune;  after  he  left  St. 
Petersburg  there  were  many  friendly  informants,  who 
kept  him  in  touch  with  what  was  going  on  there.  He 
had  for  example  a  great  friend  in  the  person  of  one  of 
the  ministers,  Mr.  Schwanebach,  of  German  descent, 
who  was  always  willing  to  send  him  any  information, 
even  to  the  extent  of  being  paid  for  it.  D'Aehrenthal 
succeeded  the  old  count  Golouchovsky  in  October  1906 
and  from  the  start  had  two  political  objects  for  future 
policy:  the  establishment  of  Austrian  supremacy  in 
Serbia  and  ousting  the  Russian  influence,  having  espe- 
cially hi  view  the  Russian  minister  at  Belgrade,  Hart- 
wig,  who  was  looked  upon  in  Vienna  as  the  source  of 
all  evils,  and  second,  the  reforms  concerning  Turkey, 


104  HUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

in  particular  her  administration  in  Macedonia  and  her 
finances.  D'Aehrenthal  was  very  clever  and  astute  and 
had  what  not  many  Austrian  statesmen  had  possessed 
before  him — firmness  of  character  and  clear  vision  of 
what  was  going  on  in  the  other  capitals  of  Europe, 
especially  in  Russia.  One  must  say  that  old  Austria, 
as  the  Russian  jurist  Baron  B.  Nolde  once  wrote,  had 
educated  a  wonderful  school  of  diplomats  and  clever 
bureaucrats,  who  administered  that  chequered  empire 
as  well  as  it  was  possible.  This  is  perhaps  the  only 
merit  of  this  defunct  monarchy,  which  was  really  an, 
abstraction,  not  a  nation.  There  was  even  no  national 
culture  to  back  the  government. 

D'Aehrenthal  was  well  aware  of  Russia's  internal 
troubles  and  of  her  great  weakness,  which  undermined 
her  forces  after  the  Japanese  war.  The  reactionary 
policy  of  the  Russian  government  further  helped  to 
increase  her  internal  trouble  and  weakness.  On  the 
other  hand  Turkey  was  also  much  too  weak  after  her 
revolution  and  seemed  powerless  to  protest  against 
whatever  Vienna  undertook  to  do  in  the  Balkan  penin- 
sula. The  moment  must  have  seemed  a  very  propitious 
one  for  him. 

Further,  after  the  Turkish  revolution  there  might 
have  come  up  at  the  instigation  of  the  nationalistic 
young  Turks  the  question  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina's 
representation  in  the  Turkish  Parliament.  Turkey 
might  have  claimed  that  after  all  these  provinces  be- 
longed to  her,  according  to  the  treaty  of  Berlin,  their 
population  was  composed  of  Turkish  subjects  and  it 
would  have  seemed  only  fair  to  give  them  a  chance  to 
participate  in  the  newly  established  system  of  represen- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  105 

tation.  The  powers  would  then  have  been  unable  to 
protest  because  such  a  measure  would  have  been  un- 
dertaken in  the  name  of  constitutional  principles  and 
civic  freedom.  This  would  have  meant,  necessarily,  the 
end  of  Austria's  "administration"  of  these  provinces, 
which  d'Aehrenthal  had  no  intention  of  losing.  Turk- 
ish chauvinism  alarmed  him  very  much. 

There  were  still  further  reasons  for  anxiety.  The 
Teuton  powers  had  just  learned  the  details  of  King 
Edward's  visit  to  the  Tsar,  which  took  place  at  Reval, 
where  the  plan  of  an  understanding  between  Russia 
and  England  was  seriously  discussed.  Austria  could 
not  afford  to  have  Germany  threatened. 

The  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  came  not 
quite  as  a  thunderbolt  out  of  a  clear  sky.  D'Aehren- 
thal had  prepared  his  way  very  carefully;  several  meas- 
ures taken  by  him  had  cleared  the  way  for  this  last 
act.  His  first  step  was  taken  in  January  1908 ;  on  the 
27th  he  proposed  in  a  speech  before  the  parliamentary 
delegation  of  Austria-Hungary  the  building  of  the 
Mitrovitza  railroad.  This  proposition  was  not  merely 
a  technical  plan  of  railroad  construction,  but  a  detailed 
program  of  economic  exploitation  of  the  whole  Balkan 
peninsula;  it  was  a  plan  destined  to  alarm  all  the 
powers,  but  especially  Russia.  Turkey  became  evi- 
dently anxious  too  for  she  protested  to  Vienna;  Rus- 
sia then  made  public  her  own  similar  plan  for  another 
railroad  going  east-west  to  the  Adriatic. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  his  administration  of 
foreign  affairs,  d'Aehrenthal  was  ably  assisted  by  the 
Austrian  Heir  Apparent  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand. The  latter  stood,  as  is  well  known,  for  the  so- 


106  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

called  "Trialism,"  viz.,  the  addition  on  equal  terms  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  union  of  a  third  part,  com- 
posed of  the  Slav  elements  of  the  empire,  Croatia- 
Slavonia,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Bohemia  and  all  others.1 
This  combination  had  great  advantages  to  speak  for  it. 
It  might  have  solved  the  problem  of  Austria's  future, 
since  it  certainly  would  have  eliminated  the  greatest 
danger— the  Slav  resistance.  It  would  have  satisfied 
them  and  guaranteed  them  full  national  equality.  Yet, 
it  had  many  staunch  enemies;  against  it  was  the  whole 
Magyar  nation,  which  did  not  want  to  give  up  its  privi- 
leges of  exploitation  of  those  parts  of  the  empire, 
which  were  predominantly  Slav.  Against  it  also  were 
the  Austrian  bureaucratic  interests  and  the  Austrian 
government  ideology.  The  Vienna  officials  were  too 
much  bound  by  their  old  methods  of  administration. 
Finally  there  existed  the  real  danger  for  Austria  in  the 
growing  Slav  hope  for  a  "Greater  Serbia,"  which 
would  have  been  given  an  impetus  by  the  system  of 
Trialism. 

The  German  influence  at  Vienna  was  also  against 
the  plan.  Berlin  could  not  look  with  indifference  upon 
the  growth  of  the  Slav  element  in  Austria-Hungary; 
we  know  that  the  Kaiser  repeatedly  tried  to  persuade 
Francis  Ferdinand  to  give  up  the  plan.  The  Austrian 
Heir-Apparent,  however,  was  insistently  pressing  it 
on  d'Aehrenthal.  The  latter's  attitude  towards  the 
plan  is  not  quite  clear  but  sufficient  evidence  exists  to 
show  that  he  did  not  altogether  sympathize  with  it; 
he  was  temporizing  when  he  was  dealing  with  Francis 

1Some  east-European  statesmen  were  even  dreaming  of  a  great 
trialistic  empire,  with  Constantinople  as  its  capital! 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  107 

Ferdinand,  whereas  the  latter  was  always  sincere  in 
his  attitude  towards  the  minister. 

The  second  step  of  d'Aehrenthal  was  consequently 
taken  in  the  same  direction  of  spreading  the  adminis- 
trative system  of  Austria  over  the  Balkans.  In  July 
1908  he  came  forth  with  the  plan  of  annexing  the  Sand- 
jak  of  Novi-Bazar;  it  entailed  a  program  more  vast 
than  the  railroad  plan  of  the  preceding  winter.  It  had 
more  strategic  advantages  for  Austria-Hungary  and  its 
economic  advantages  were  no  less.  But  for  those 
reasons  it  called  forth  much  more  energetic  protests 
from  the  other  powers,  some  of  which  like  Russia  were 
really  quite  indignant  about  it.  D'Aehrenthal  realized 
that  the  moment  for  action  had  not  quite  come  and 
withdrew  his  plan;  it  had  important  consequences, 
nevertheless.  First  of  all  because  he  succeeded  in  se- 
curing simultaneously  the  friendship  of  Bulgaria,  prom- 
ising her  support  in  case  she  would  like  to  proclaim 
her  full  independence  from  Turkey;  second,  it  bared 
the  weakness  of  Constantinople  and  the  Turks;  third, 
it  was  a  start  for  the  idea  of  federation  of  the  Balkan 
peoples,  under  the  hegemony  of  Austria,  which  greatly 
increased  the  prestige  of  the  latter  country.  Finally  it 
helped  the  negotiations  between  Austria  on  the  one 
hand  and  Rumania  and  Greece  on  the  other. 

In  order  to  meet  the  fears  of  Russia  d'Aehrenthal 
played  a  rather  contemptible  trick  on  Iswolsky,  then 
Russian  foreign  minister.  He  invited  Iswolsky  in 
September  1908  to  count  Berchtold's  country  place  at 
Buchlau  and  had  long  talks  with  him  of  a  most  intimate 
character,  succeeding  thus  in  allaying  all  his  fears  and 
promising  him  not  to  act  independently.  Iswolsky  was 


108  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

quite  satisfied  and  content  with  the  Buchlau  meeting 
and  was  certain  that  he  had  the  friendship  and  con- 
fidence of  his  unscrupulous  opponent. 

Then  came  the  sudden  coup.  On  October  5,  1908 
d'Aehrenthal  unexpectedly  announced  that  Austria- 
Hungary  was  annexing  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This  was 
a  deliberate  infringement  of  the  provisions  of  the  Ber- 
lin treaty  of  1878  and  likewise  a  breach  of  faith  with 
Russia,  and  personally  with  Iswolsky.  Those  events  in 
October  1908  created  a  sensation  all  over  Europe  and 
were  a  terrible  blow  to  the  Slavs.  Only  among  some 
Slavs  of  the  Austrian  empire  did  the  act  of  annexation 
meet  with  sympathetic  favor,  for  special  reasons.  The 
Bohemians,  especially  Kramarz,  were  not  averse  to  the 
annexation,  because  they  argued,  it  strongly  increased 
the  Slav  element  of  Austria.  This  element  was  bound 
to  triumph  some  day.  It  was  not,  however,  what 
d'Aehrenthal  wanted.  The  Serbians  were  very  much 
alarmed  and  considered  d'Aehrenthal's  policy  a  direct 
threat  to  their  kingdom. 

The  Turks  were  anxious,  also,  and  declared  a  boy- 
cott on  Austrian  goods  in  the  Levant,  which  proved 
very  successful  and  materially  hurt  Austrian  products. 
Finally,  Italy  looked  askance  on  the  increase  of  Aus- 
tria's strength  and  was  in  no  way  ready  to  support  the 
latter's  claim.  We  see  here  probably  the  first  fissure 
in  the  triple  alliance  between  Germany,  Austria  and 
Italy;  Italy  was  unwilling  to  follow  the  leadership 
of  the  other  two.  There  is  little  wonder  that 
contemporaries  at  that  time  considered  the  equilib- 
rium in  the  Balkans  seriously,  if  not  permanently, 
shaken. 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  109 

Russia  at  once  took  steps  to  counteract  Austria's 
policy.  Iswolsky  sent  out  a  note  and  then  went  per- 
sonally to  see  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  order  to  protest  and 
to  propose  a  European  conference  instead,  which  would 
settle  the  whole  Balkan  matter.  He  worked  out  a  de- 
tailed program  concerning  all  the  disputed  questions, 
but  his  labor  was  in  vain. 

The  idea  of  a  European  conference  was  untenable 
both  to  Vienna  and  to  Berlin  and  for  a  simple  reason. 
In  both  those  capitals  the  statesmen  realized  very  well 
that  their  claims  and  policies  had  not  the  least  chance 
of  being  accepted  by  the  other  powers.  They  were 
far  too  selfish  and  aggressive.  Austria  especially  pre- 
ferred direct  dealings  with  Russia,  hoping  to  bluff  her, 
which  would  never  have  been  allowed  by  the  other 
powers.  Perhaps  it  was  a  mistake  on  Iswolsky's  part 
to  have  included  in  his  program  the  question  of  Con- 
stantinople and  the  Straits.  This  inclusion  might  have 
frightened  England  and  not  have  secured  for  Russia 
her  whole-hearted  support. 

Germany  on  her  side  was  strongly  opposed  to  any 
conference  and  her  action  proved  decisive  for  Russia. 
The  displeasure  of  Berlin  came  forth  first  in  a  speech 
of  the  Chancellor,  delivered  October  7,  1908,  in  the 
Reichstag,  in  which  von  Bulow  unrestrictedly  accepted 
Austria's  act  of  annexation.  Vienna  was  simultane- 
ously notified  by  the  German  ambassador  of  the  whole- 
hearted support  of  Berlin. 

Later  came  a  token  of  personal  friendship  in  the 
form  of  a  trip  of  the  Kaiser  to  Vienna  (April  1909), 
meant  to  accentuate  the  mutual  understanding,  and 
a  blunt  notification  of  St.  Petersburg,  that  Germany 


110  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

will  "stand  in  shining  armor"  by  the  side  of  her  ally, 
which  was  practically  an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  and  was 
thus  understood  by  her  government  and  her  people, 
by  the  press  and  public  opinion.  All  were  terribly  in- 
dignant, but  none  could  help,  for  Russia  was  much 
too  weak  after  her  war  with  Japan  and  unsuccessful 
attempt  at  revolution.  Russia  could  not  resist  the 
German  threat.  The  insult,  however,  was  never  for- 
gotten. 

In  only  one  way  did  Russia  score  a  success.  She 
helped  to  estrange  Italy  from  Austria.  In  December, 
1908,  Iswolsky  spoke  in  the  Duma  and  Tittoni  spoke 
in  the  Italian  parliament  about  the  Italo-Russian 
friendship,  both  hinting  that  all  was  not  quite  right 
with  Austria.  Then  came  the  visit  of  the  Tsar  to 
Racconigi,  where  he  met  the  King  of  Italy.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  note  in  this  respect  that  the  Tsar's  trip,  under- 
taken from  Odessa,  was  routed  in  a  wide  circle  in  order 
to  avoid  any  Austrian  territory;  this  was  an  intentional 
demonstration  against  Vienna. 

But  if  Russia  was  not  ready  for  a  conflict,  neither 
was  Germany.  So,  after  brandishing  the  sword  and 
appearing  in  "shining  armor"  Wilhelm  sheathed  his 
sword  and  put  away  his  armor,  attempting  again  to 
make  friends  with  Russia  as  best  he  could.  The  fol- 
lowing summer  he  took  a  cruise  in  the  Baltic,  coming 
to  see  the  Tsar  (June  17,  1909)  at  Bjorko.  This  visit 
does  not  speak  well  for  the  sincerity  of  the  Kaiser,  nor 
for  the  cleverness  of  the  Tsar.  Seemingly  each  tried 
to  fool  the  other,  but  it  is  a  splendid  example  of  the 
great  dangers  to  a  nation  of  such  autocratic  rule,  where 
a  monarch  by  his  personal  acts  can  endanger  the  peace 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  111 

of  the  world  and  the  happiness  of  his  own  people. 
The  two  emperors  patched  up  their  differences  a  year 
later,  when  in  November,  1910,  the  Tsar  paid  a  return 
visit  to  the  Kaiser  at  Potsdam. 

Finally  we  must  note  the  important  role  the  Aus- 
trian press  played  in  the  hands  of  d'Aehrenthal.  He 
knew  how  to  manage  it  wonderfully  well  and  manipu- 
lated it  without  any  scruples;  he  realized  the  influence 
of  the  press  on  public  opinion  in  modern  times.  All 
through  this  crisis  of  1908-1909,  d'Aehrenthal  con- 
stantly held  a  firm  grip  over  the  Vienna  papers,  filling 
their  columns  almost  daily  with  his  propaganda  and 
coloring  all  the  news  that  came  through  them  to  the 
Austrian  people.  His  assistants  were  men  of  no  mean 
ability;  we  need  mention  but  one,  the  famous  his- 
torian Fried jung.  It  was  not  the  first  time  this  man 
had  worked  for  the  Ballplatz  government.  Later  on 
Berchtold  followed  the  example  of  his  predecessor  in 
handling  effectively  the  Austrian  press. 

IV. 

The  Balkan  wars  of  1912-1913  once  more  changed 
the  whole  aspect  of  the  Near  East  policies  of  the  Rus- 
sian government  and  her  relations  with  Austria. 

The  first  war  and  especially  the  alliance  of  the 
Balkan  people  greatly  alarmed  Vienna  for  they  were 
exactly  contrary  to  her  interests.  However,  she,  as 
well  as  Germany,  soon  saw  that  the  alliance  would  not 
last  and  that  Russia  had  not  the  influence  in  it  that 
they  had  at  first  imagined.  The  quarrels  between  the 
Balkan  allies,  which  soon  followed,  filled  Vienna  with 


112  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

joy.  As  a  noted  French  writer  said :  the  hatred  of  the 
Balkan  peoples  helped  "Austria  to  definitely  break  up 
the  Balkan  block." 

This  meant  the  estrangement  of  Russia  from  Bul- 
garia and  her  growing  feeling  of  friendship  for  Serbia; 
the  farther  Russia  got  away  from  Bulgaria,  the  easier 
did  it  become  for  Vienna  and  Berlin  to  spread  their 
own  propaganda  among  the  Bulgarian  people.  The 
consequences  of  this  began  to  tell  at  once  after  the 
Great  War  broke  out  and  led  to  Bulgaria  taking  sides 
with  the  Teuton  powers. 

The  liquidation  of  the  wars  of  1912-1913  wa&assisted 
by  the  united  action  of  Russia  and  Austria;  this  gave 
the  latter  an  important  trump  and  helped  to  strengthen 
her  influence  in  the  Balkans. 

Russia  could  not  afford  the  victory  of  the  latter  and 
yet  Germany's  "Drang  nach  Osten"  seemed  at  times 
impossible  to  stop.  It  was  unfolding  so  rapidly  and 
so  cleverly,  receiving  from  Berlin  such  a  tremendous 
impetus. 

Great  Britain  was  also  alarmed,  and  so  much  so, 
that  she  forgot  her  century  old  feud  with  Russia  con- 
cerning Constantinople  and  was  willing  to  back  Rus- 
sia's claims  even  to  the  extent  of  establishing  an 
entente  with  Russia. 

Italy  gained  from  these  conflicts'  and  simultaneously 
weakened  her  ties  with  the  Teutonic  powers. 

Russia  was  hailing  with  joy  the  alliance  of  the 
Balkan  people,  but  her  wavering  and  inconsequential 
policy  could  not  make  use  of  events  and  was  never 
really  successful.  Austria  was  against  such  an  alliance 
unless  it  was  put  under  her  full  control  and  hegemony, 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  113 

which  the  Slavs  neither  liked  nor  wanted.  These  two 
powers  were  constantly  at  odds  in  the  Balkans  and 
Germany  made  use  of  this  for  her  own  purposes  in 
order  to  strengthen  her  eastward  rush. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Larmeroux,  J.,  La  Politique  exterieure  de  1'Autriche-Hongrie,  1875- 

1914,  1-2,  Paris,  1918. 

Schwertfeger,  Zur  Europiiischen  Politik,  1897-1914,  1-5,  Berlin,  1918. 
Debidour,  A.,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  1'Europe,  1 — 1878-1904,  2 — 

1904-1914,  Paris,  1916. 
Pribram,  A.  P.,  Secret  treaties  of  Austria-Hungary,  1879-1914.    Eng. 

edit,  by  Coolidge,  A.  C.,  Harvard,  19?9. 
Friedjung,  Das  Zeitalter  des  Imperialismus,  Berlin,  1919. 
Molden,  Graf  d'Aehrenthal,  Stuttgart,  1917. 
Steed,  H.  W.,  The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  London,  1914. 
Stuart,  Graham  H.,  French  Foreign  Policies,  N.  Y.,  1921. 
TUtoni,  Tommaso,  Italy's  Foreign  and  Colonial  Policy,  London,  1914. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  BALKANS. 

I. 

We  may  approach  the  Bulgarian  problem  from  two 
angles.  In  the  first  place  Bulgaria  was  looked  upon  by 
the  world  as  a  child  of  Russia,  though  their  relations 
had  in  them  the  tinge  of  those  of  a  foster  child. 
There  was  much  sentimentalism  in  the  idea  of  Pan- 
Slavism:  the  religious  element  of  St.  Sophia  was  often 
a  factor  subsequent  to  the  conquest  of  1453.  It  failed 
because  the  Slavs  did  not  want  to  be  liberated  by  the 
autocracy  of  Tsardom. 

The  Black  Sea  and  the  Straits,  which  Bismarck  so 
well  named  "the  keys  to  Russia's  back  door,"  we  will 
examine  as  the  second  part  of  the  question.  Russia 
often  changed  her  policy,  sometimes  for  and  sometimes 
against  the  Turkish  possession  of  the  Straits,  but  her 
purpose  was  ever  constant  and  clear — to  acquire  her- 
self the  control  over  the  Straits.  As  early  as  Septem- 
ber, 1877,  Nelidoff,  future  ambassador  to  Turkey, 
stated  the  two  purposes  of  this  policy:  free  communi- 
cation for  Russia  with  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  and 
closing  access  to  enemy  ships  to  enter  the  Black  Sea 
to  attack  the  southern  Russian  coast.  Never  for  a 
moment  did  Russia  lose  sight  of  this,  even  at  the  time 

114 


THE  BALKANS  115 

of  her  worst  reverses;  one  can  find  it  in  the  reigns  of 
Catherine  II,  Alexander  I,  and  Nicholas  I,  during  the 
Crimean  War,  or  the  Turkish  War;  Beaconsfield  pre- 
ferred to  help  the  Turks  rather  than  assist  Russia, 
effectively  thwarting  the  Russian  claims  and  policy, 
but  Russia  doggedly  held  on  to  her  diplomatic  game. 

It  was  a  great  national  aim,  coupled  with  sentimen- 
tal mysticism  and  religious  superstitions,  but  it  was 
invariably  handicapped  by  the  very  deficient  political 
organization  of  Tsardom  as  well  as  by  English  jealous- 
ies and  supported  by  misrepresentations  of  narrow- 
minded  nationalists  on  both  sides. 

Pan-Slavism  as  a  national  movement  is  very  little 
known  abroad  and  one  might  add  that  not  so  long  ago 
Russians  themselves  did  not  quite  realize  the  purport 
of  the  movement. 

Pan-Slavism  can  be  studied  under  three  different 
aspects.  It  has  first  a  strong  sentimental  side  to  it. 
This,  however,  can  easily  be  disposed  of.  In  the  past 
it  was  constantly  much  exaggerated  and  at  times  even 
distorted  by  nationalistic  jingoism. 

In  the  psychological  element  of  Pan-Slavism  an  im- 
portant role  was  played,  for  instance,  by  historic 
memories  of  Russian  conquests,  when  prince  Oleg 
nailed  his  shield  on  the  gates  of  Byzantium,  or  the 
Russian  armies  stood  victorious  at  the  walls  of  Con- 
stantinople; further,  the  Christian  feelings  were  easily 
aroused  by  the  Turkish  Crescent  dominating  over  the 
Holy  Cross  on  St.  Sophia,  as  an  emblem  of  vanquished 
Christianity  and  a  symbol  of  the  victorious  Ottoman. 
The  religious  element  was  prominent  only  at  times  and 
always  for  a  short  while,  as,  for  example,  in  1876-1877, 


116  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

when  a  holy  war  was  preached  among  Russians  and 
Slavs,  which  resulted  finally  in  the  liberation  of  the 
Balkan  peoples.  Among  the  latter,  the  desire  for  pro- 
tection against  the  Turks  was  naturally  very  strong 
and  forced  them  to  look  to  Russia  for  their  salvation. 

And  yet  we  can  see  at  present  how  much  this  feeling 
was  exaggerated.  The  racial  element  among  the  Slavs, 
all  belonging  to  the  same  historic  group  of  people, 
played  a  much  more  important  role.  Leaving  aside 
the  doubtful  question  of  the  early  origin  of  the  Bulgars, 
we  can  definitely  state  that  to  all  practical  purposes 
they  belonged  to  the  Slav  family  for  many  centuries. 
And  it  is  this  racial  element  that  creates  the  strong 
feelings  of  unity  and  of  mutual  bonds,  that  are  bound 
to  play  a  most  important  role  in  the  near  future.  Here 
we  find  the  really  sound  foundation  for  Pan-Slavism. 

But  in  order  to  establish  friendship  and  unity,  alli- 
ance or  federation,  something  more  is  necessary.  And 
it  was  this  third  element  or  aspect  of  Pan-Slavism  that 
constantly  was  either  entirely  lacking  or  badly  warp- 
ing the  mutual  relations  of  the  Balkan  States  and 
Russia,  namely,  the  confidence  of  the  former  in  the 
policy  and  government  of  the  latter. 

There  always  existed  a  tremendous  difference  be- 
tween Russia  and  the  Balkan  peoples  in  size  and  in 
potential  social  force;  Russia  was  many  times  stronger 
and  larger  than  all  the  other  Slav  nations.  The  small 
size  of  the  latter  made  them  naturally  very  cautious 
and  suspicious,  and  historical  developments  prove 
sufficiently  that  such  feelings  were  well  grounded. 
The  political  system  of  the  larger  sister-state  was 
quite  unsatisfactory  and  could  not  arouse  confidence 


THE  BALKANS  117 

among  the  Balkan  nations;  they  were  afraid  of  Rus- 
sia's hegemony.  Their  dearly  won  independence  was 
constantly  threatened  by  Russian  autocracy,  which 
viewed  with  an  evil  eye  the  constitutional  develop- 
ments in  the  Balkans,  and  consequently  imperilled 
local  autonomy  and  self-government.  The  history  of 
the  Russo-Bulgarian  relations  is  the  best  possible  illus- 
tration in  this  case,  as  the  Tsar's  government  for  many 
years  impeded  and  thwarted  all  the  liberal  efforts  of 
the  Bulgarian  people. 

Under  such  circumstances  there  is  small  wonder  that 
the  main  ideas  of  Pan-Slavism  could  not  find  any  real 
response  in  the  Balkans,  and  that  the  other  Slav  na- 
tions shunned  the  friendship  of  Russia.  Russian 
friendship  or  assistance  meant  to  them  much  more 
domination  than  federation. 

Among  the  Balkan  peoples  the  Bulgarians  suffered 
most  and  longest  from  Turkish  oppression,  and  stood 
closest  to  the  Russians,  territorially  and  spiritually; 
there  existed  a  constant  interdependence  of  culture 
between  Bulgaria  and  Russia;  this  was  very  evident, 
for  example,  in  the  70's. 

There  broke  out  at  that  time  in  the  Balkans  a  suc- 
cession of  uprisings  and  Russia  came  to  the  rescue. 
The  war  of  1877-1878  was  a  war  of  Liberation  of  the 
Slavs  and  an  epoch  when  Pan-Slavism  was  at  its  best, 
being  a  sincere  outburst  of  friendly  feelings.  Even  at 
the  present  day  this  fact  is  not  forgotten  by  the  Balkan 
peoples,  who  are  sincerely  grateful  to  Russia  for  their 
freedom. 

Unfortunately,  these  feelings  of  friendship  never  had 
free  play;  they  constantly  encountered  political  oppo- 


118  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

sition  within  Russia  and  hostile  influences  without, 
from  other  nations,  especially  England.  Thus,  one  of 
the  main  objects  of  the  Berlin  Congress  of  1878  was  to 
weaken  Russia  and  frustrate  her  influence  in  the 
Balkans. 

In  Bulgaria  use  was  made  of  the  new  prince,  Alex- 
ander of  Battenberg,  a  nephew  of  Tsar  Alexander  II, 
elected  on  April  29,  1879.  It  was  the  more  easy  because 
of  the  short-comings  of  the  Russian  government 
regime.  Instead  of  an  enlightened  guidance,  Russia 
sent  to  Bulgaria  some  of  her  most  tactless  generals, 
who  soon  succeeded  in  alienating  most  of  the  Bulgarian 
statesmen  and  politicians. 

According  to  the  Berlin  arrangements,  Turkey  kept 
her  suzerainty  over  Bulgaria,  but  the  administration 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Russian  generals,  first 
Dondoukoff,  later  Ehrnroot,  Soboleff,  and  Kaulbars. 
The  Bulgarian  army  had  Russian  officer-instructors. 

Then  came  the  awakening  of  the  Bulgarian  nation 
and  a  remarkable  growth  of  their  liberal  aspirations, 
which  displeased  the  reactionary  Tsar.  It  soon  became 
evident  that  the  rule  of  the  Russians  not  only  was 
powerless  to  stop  the  movement,  but  on  the  contrary 
helped  to  spread  dissatisfaction  among  the  Bulgarian 
people,  who  were  aspiring  to  full  independence.  They 
could  not  understand  what  purpose  could  exist  for  up- 
holding any  longer  their  Turkish  oppressors.  From  a 
humanitarian  point  of  view  it  was  inexplicable.  The 
worst  fact  to  them  was  that  Russia  was  now  against 
them. 

Prince  Alexander  unhesitatingly  took  the  side  of  his 
people  and  thus  aroused  the  ire  of  the  Tsar,  Alexander 


THE  BALKANS  119 

III.  Friction  with  Russia  appeared  very  early;  the 
first  trouble  came  on  account  of  the  railroad  construc- 
tion plans;  the  Bulgarian  ministry  proposed  a  different 
project  from  the  one  worked  out  by  Russians,  but  it 
connected  the  Bulgarian  railroads  with  the  Austrian 
net,  whereas  the  Russians  insisted  on  building  a  line 
much  more  expensive  and  connected  with  the  Russian 
net.  The  Bulgarians  were  forced  to  agree.  In  1883 
the  differences  with  Russia  became  very  acute  when 
prince  Alexander  appointed  a  liberal  ministry,  with 
Zankoff  at  its  head.  But  the  act  of  prince  Alexander 
that  aroused  the  Tsar's  strongest  anger  was  the  restora- 
tion, in  1883,  of  the  Bulgarian  constitution,  which  had 
been  in  abeyance  since  1881.  That  really  maddened 
the  Tsar,  who  also  looked  askance  at  the  annexation 
of  eastern  Rumelia  (October  21,  1885).  Russia  was 
not  averse  to  the  annexation,  but  it  was  her  desire  to 
do  it  herself  instead  of  Bulgaria.  On  November  3, 
1885,  the  Tsar  struck  the  name  of  prince  Alexander 
from  the  lists  of  the  Russian  army.  This  definite  rup- 
ture between  Bulgaria  and  Russia  found  favor  both 
with  England  and  Austria.  Austria  now  set  herself 
to  the  task  of.  sowing  seeds  of  discord  among  the 
Balkan  peoples  in  order  to  weaken  them  for  future 
exploitation. 

Serbia  then  stepped  into  the  breach.  She  was  as 
the  grain  between  millstones  for  Austria  hemmed  her 
in  on  the  north,  while  Turkey  and  Greece  were  on  the 
south.  Her  natural  outlet  was  eastward  and  she  was 
therefore  strongly  opposed  to  the  strengthening  of 
Bulgaria;  thus  the  annexation  of  Rumelia  could  in  no 
way  lessen  that  opposition.  Austria  was  assiduously 


120  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

fomenting  this  discontent  and  made  use  of  the  Serbian 
King  Milan,  of  the  Obrenovich  line,  to  further  her  pur- 
poses. He  was  a  mere  tool  of  Vienna  and  was  easily 
persuaded  to  attack  Bulgaria  that  he  might  thereby 
acquire  more  territory  for  Serbia;  but  superiority  of 
numbers  proved  no  help  to  him;  he  was  badly  defeated 
by  the  Bulgarians  at  Slivnitsa.  Serbia  was  the  more 
ready  to  engage  with  Bulgaria  because  she  thought 
that  the  Bulgarian  army  had  been  demoralized  by  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Russian  instructors.  Austria 
helped  because  of  her  treaty  with  Serbia,  June  28, 
1881;  the  treaty  was  renewed,  February  9,  1889,  and 
continued  in  force  up  to  1895. 

Peace  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  was  concluded 
March  8,  1886.  Bulgaria,  though  victorious,  gained  no 
advantages;  the  occupation  of  Pirot  meant  nothing 
for  her,  though  it  worried  Serbia.  It  was  on  the  thresh- 
old of  Serbia.  After  that  prince  Alexander  gradually 
began  to  lose  his  popularity.  As  the  Tsar  still  con- 
tinued to  be  opposed  to  his  rule,  Alexander  could  not 
hold  out  and  Stambouloff  had  no  great  difficulty  in 
deposing  him  on  August  21,  1886.  The  prince  at- 
tempted to  come  back  to  Sophia  in  September,  but 
the  Tsar  would  not  allow  it.  The  new  regime  lasted 
about  a  year — until  the  Sobranje  succeeded  in  electing 
a  new  prince,  July  7,  1887.  He  was  Ferdinand  of  Saxe- 
Coburg-Gotha,  whom  Russia  did  not  want  either. 

The  stubborn  Alexander  III  did  not  change  his  rela- 
tions with  Bulgaria  up  to  the  last;  he  disliked  the 
liberal  tendencies  of  the  Bulgarians  and  hated  their 
constitution.  Only  after  his  death  in  1894  did  the  rela- 
tions of  Russia  and  Bulgaria  begin  to  improve. 


THE  BALKANS  121 

Thus  ended  the  first  period  of  Russian-Bulgarian 
relations,  1878-1894,  a  time  of  constant  strife  and 
mutual  discontent,  after  the  brilliant  but  short  period 
(1876-1878)  of  liberation  and  friendship.  The  history 
of  those  years  shows  already  what  a  storm  center  the 
Balkans  were  for  Europe,  how  complicated  and  unsat- 
isfactory was  the  solution  of  the  Berlin  Congress  of 
1878  and  how  selfish  were  the  great  powers  in  foment- 
ing and  upholding  this  dissatisfaction. 

This  epoch  left  a  disagreeable  aftermath  both  for 
Russia  and  Bulgaria;  true  their  mutual  relations  after 
1894  kept  rapidly  improving  up  to  the  time  of  the 
conclusion  of  the  Russo-Bulgarian  convention  of  1902, 
but  under  that  outward  friendship,  under  cover  of 
handsome  Pan-Slavic  decorations,  there  constantly  ex- 
isted a  vicious  undercurrent  of  distrust,  fed  by  the  in- 
consistency of  Russia's  policy,  undermining  the  Rus- 
sian prestige. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  great  difficulties  of  the 
situation  in  the  Balkans,  one  must  never  forget  the 
constant  interference  of  the  other  powers,  of  England 
especially,  who  endeavored  to  keep  Russia  out  of  Con- 
stantinople, and  of  Austria,  who  made  great  efforts  to 
get  control  over  the  Balkan  peoples.  Only  later  did 
the  third  competitor,  Germany,  appear  on  the  scenes. 
It  was  this  coming  forth  of  Germany  that  caused  such 
a  drastic  change  in  {he  English  policy,  for  it  put  her 
suddenly  and  unexpectedly  on  the  side  of  Russia. 

The  years  1896-1910  were  the  happiest  in  the  his- 
tory of  Russo-Bulgarian  relations.  This  was  also  the 
period  of  redoubled  activities  of  Bulgaria  in  Macedonia, 
which  proved  so  very  dangerous  to  her  later  on. 


122  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

The  seeming  stability  of  the  situation  was,  however, 
achieved  at  a  high  cost  to  Russia,  namely,  her  under- 
standing with  Austria.  The  cost  was  high  since  their 
interests  were  so  contradictory  in  the  Balkans  and 
Russia  did  not  succeed  in  upholding  her  prestige. 

This  policy  of  balancing  Russia  against  Austria  was 
the  favorite  idea  of  prince  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria;  he 
always  insisted  that  Bulgaria  must  lean  on  both  powers 
simultaneously,  that  just  as  soon  as  she  gave  prefer- 
ence to  one  of  them  she  was  lost.  The  idea  is  not 
without  truth. 

In  1902  a  Russo-Bulgarian  convention  was  con- 
cluded against  Rumania;  its  most  important  clause 
was  a  promise  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  guarantee  Bul- 
garia her  territorial  possessions.  In  1910-1911  this 
convention  was  renewed.  On  March  8,  1905,  came  the 
treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation.  Further,  Russia 
promised  Bulgaria  in  September,  1907,  an  outlet  to 
the  JEgean  Sea.  Prince  Ferdinand  visited  St.  Peters- 
burg on  February  23, 1910,  and  had  a  cordial  reception; 
unfortunately  even  then  we  cannot  find  any  definite 
policy  on  the  part  of  Russia. 

Beginning  with  the  year  1911  there  started  a  rapid 
decline  of  Russian  influence  in  Bulgaria;  especially 
did  the  wars  of  1912  and  1913  prove  how  weak  was 
Russia's  hold  on  the  Balkan  peoples.  At  that  time 
there  was  an  understanding  between  Bulgaria  and 
Austria.  With  the  acquiescence  of  the  latter,  Bulgarian 
independence  was  proclaimed  October  5,  1908.  At  the 
initiative  .of  Iswolsky,  the  Turkish  debt  to  Russia, 
existing  from  the  war  1878,  was  transferred  upon 
Bulgaria,  on  condition  that  the  Bulgarians  should  re- 


THE  BALKANS  128 

ceive  the  management  of  the  Oriental  railroad.  Bul- 
garia was  to  pay  Russia  in  long  installments,  having 
the  privilege  of  exploiting  this  railroad.  Turkey 
recognized  Bulgarian  independence  April  20,  1909, 
and  her  example  was  soon  followed  by  the  other 
Powers. 

The  war  of  1912,  as  is  well  known,  was  the  outcome 
of  the  alliance  of  the  three  Balkan  peoples:  Bulgarians, 
Serbians  and  Greeks.  The  treaty  of  alliance,  1912,  had, 
added  to  it,  special  military  conventions.  It  was 
planned  and  carried  out  without  the  participation  of 
the  great  powers,  and  in  most  details,  even  without 
their  knowledge.  Russia  was  informed  about  the  alli- 
ance by  a  special  ambassador,  Danef,  in  March,  1912, 
and  in  answer  the  St.  Petersburg  government  hastened 
to  express  a  wish  for  moderation  on  the  Bulgarian 
side. 

Russia  was  very  much  afraid  of  this  armed  conflict. 
Repeatedly  did  her  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  Sazo- 
noff,  warn  the  Bulgarians  to  be  cautious  and  avoid 
any  aggression.  It  was  not  the  first  time  that  Russia 
counselled  moderation  and  warned  Bulgaria  of  evil  con- 
sequences of  aggression.  Russia  told  the  Sophia  gov- 
ernment, through  Dr.  Danef,  that  she  would  not  brook 
the  Bulgarian  claims  in  Macedonia.  Bulgaria's  posi- 
tion was  always  embarrassing;  she  could  not  afford  to 
discard  Russian  advice,  but  it  was  at  the  same  time 
very  hard  for  her  not  to  protect  her  brothers  and  sons, 
the  Bulgarians  in  Macedonia,  suffering  from  Turkish 
cruelty  and  maladministration. 

Sazonoff  travelled  to  Paris  and  London  to  find  some 
peaceful  solution  of  this  trouble.  He  had  conceived  a 


124  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

little  earlier  a  plan  to  marry  one  of  the  Tsar's  daugh- 
ters to  the  Bulgarian  crown  prince  Boris,  but  under 
the  conditions  existing  in  1912  this  plan  was  bound  to 
fail.  It  was,  however,  too  late,  mainly  for  psychologi- 
cal reasons.  Russia's  arguments  were  lost  on  the  Bul- 
'garian  people  because  the  latter  refused  longer  to 
trust  Russia's  judgment,  having  set  their  hearts  on 
finally  getting  rid  of  the  Turkish  oppressors.  Russian 
sympathies  were  with  the  Balkan  people  from  begin- 
ning to  end;  she  helped  them  diplomatically,  kept 
Rumania  out  of  the  war,  supplied  them  with  munitions 
of  war.  In  doing  so,  her  objects  and  possible  advan- 
tages during  the  conflict  of  1912  were:  first,  the  con- 
solidation of  Balkan  peoples;  second,  she  was  afraid 
that  Turkey  would  defeat  the  Slavs;  third,  Russia 
hoped  to  maintain  the  status  quo  of  Turkey  and  had 
herself  designs  on  Constantinople;  and  finally,  Russia 
was  not  prepared  for  a  European  conflict,  which  was 
evidently  threatening. 

Much  more  astonished  and  surprised  by  the  Balkan 
alliance  were  Austria  and  Germany.  Austria  was 
naturally  very  much  alarmed  by  the  Balkan  alliance 
and  tried  to  help  Turkey  by  sending  her,  through 
Rumania,  heavy  artillery  for  her  fortresses.  Still, 
outwardly  Austria  kept  with  Russia  and  even  sent  a 
joint  note,  October  8,  1912,  warning  the  allies  not  to 
go  to  war.  This  was  Sazonoff's  last  achievement  be- 
fore war  broke  out.1  The  results  of  the  war  of  1912 

1See,  Hanotaux,  G.,  La  guerre  des  Balkans  et  1'Europe,  1912-13; 
also  Carnegie  Endowment  for  Intern.  Peace,  Report  of  the  Interna- 
tional Commission  to  inquire  into  the  causes  and  conduct  of  the 
Balkan  wars,  1914. 


THE  BALKANS  125 

were  that  the  Turks  were  beaten  to  the  surprise  of  all, 
but  especially  of  Germany.  Germany's  whole  plan 
seemed  torn  to  pieces. 

But  unfortunately  these  very  excellent  achievements 
were  soon  thwarted  by  the  fratricidal  war  that  fol- 
lowed between  the  Balkan  allies  themselves  in  1913. 
Russia  again  tried  to  mediate;  this  time  quite  unsuc- 
cessfully, as  her  policy  after  the  victories  of  1912  was 
opposed  to  Bulgaria's  claims.  Russia  was  at  that  time 
most  unpopular  in  Bulgaria.  In  this  atmosphere  the 
proposition  that  Nicholas  II  should  mediate  was  quite 
unacceptable.  It  was  bound  to  fail.  According  to 
article  1  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  between  Bulgaria 
and  Serbia,  these  governments  promised  to  ask  the 
Tsar  to  arbitrate  in  case  of  differences.  On  June  8, 
1913,  the  Tsar  telegraphed  to  both  Bulgaria  and  Serbia, 
counselling  them  to  avoid  a  quarrel;  the  telegram  was 
couched  in  strict  terms  and  contained  a  special  warn- 
ing to  Bulgaria,  mentioning  the  pending  danger  and 
the  impossibility  for  Russia  of  helping  her  in  case  of 
disaster.  It  was,  however,  again  too  late.  The  feeling 
in  Bulgaria  was  too  strong  against  Russia  and  war 
broke  out  to  the  great  joy  of  Germany  and  Austria 
and  to  the  undoing  of  Bulgaria. 

On  June  16,  Ferdinand  gave  his  army  orders  to 
attack  the  Serbs  even  without  the  knowledge  of  his 
own  government  and  on  June  26  Bulgaria,  defeated 
and  humiliated,  was  forced  to  sign  the  disgraceful  peace 
of  Bucharest. 

Russia,  however,  could  not  allow  Bulgaria  to  be  ut- 
terly crushed  by  Rumania;  this  would  have  meant 


126  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

upsetting  the  whole  balance  of  the  Balkans;  a  too 
strong  Rumania,  with  her  Teuton  leanings,  seemed 
quite  undesirable  at  St.  Petersburg.  So  the  Russian 
representatives  had  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  on  the 
transactions  at  Bucharest  and  put  a  damper  on  the 
designs  of  the  victors. 

In  Bulgaria  there  was  no  feeling  of  gratitude  towards 
Russia;  on  the  contrary,  I  should  say  that  the  anti- 
Russian  tendencies  strongly  dominated.  Bulgaria  felt 
deeply  her  humiliation,  not  realizing  her  own  faults 
and  the  criminal  activity  of  Ferdinand,  who  started  the 
whole  trouble. 

It  was  with  such  feelings  that  Bulgaria  met  the  news 
of  the  Great  War.  The  Bulgarian  government  was 
strongly  anti-Russian.  At  the  same  time  there  existed 
among  the  Bulgarians  intense  hatred  of  the  Serbs  and 
an  unshakable  belief  in  the  strength  of  unconquerable 
Germany. 

No  wonder  the  Bulgarian  statesmen  of  those  days 
leaned  towards  Germany  and  not  towards  the  Allies, 
though  the  majority  of  the  Bulgarian  people  never 
evinced  Teutonic  sympathies.  In  addition  one  must 
say  that  the  Entente  seemed  unable  to  elaborate  any 
program,  sufficiently  alluring  to  the  Bulgarians.  Theh* 
proposals  were  neither  coherent,  nor  consequential. 
Russia,  knowing  the  strong  anti-Russian  tendencies 
in  the  government  and  among  some  political  circles, 
was  wary  and  over-cautious  in  her  proposals  at 
Sophia.  After  many  waverings  the  Allies  finally  pro- 
posed to  Bulgaria,  May  16,  1915,  the  following  pro- 
gram: first,  a  frontier  line,  Media-Enos;  second,  a 
Serbian  Macedonia  up  to  the  line  Egra-Palanka-Sopo*- 


THE  BALKANS  127 

Ochrida;  third,  the  exchange  of  Ravala,  which  was 
to  go  to  Bulgaria  for  new  .acquisitions  for  Greece  in 
Asia  Minor;  further,  the  Bulgarians  were  promised 
allied  support  in  case  of  transactions  with  Rumania, 
in  order  to  give  Bulgaria  the  Dobrudja,  and  financial 
help  as  well. 

Unfortunately,  all  that  was  much  too  late.  German 
offers  proved  more  enticing,  and  what  was  more  im- 
portant, more  certain.  The  die  was  cast.  Bulgaria 
made  her  choice  in  favor  of  the  Teuton  Alliance. 

In  conclusion,  I  must  mention  that  at  the  present 
day  Russia  in  her  plight  gets  much  sincere  help  from 
the  Bulgarian  people;  there  is  a  numerous  Russian 
colony  in  Bulgaria  that  receives  a  wonderful  hospi- 
tality; many  Russian  professors  lecture  at  the  Sophia 
University,  and  there  seem  to  grow  up  strong  cultural 
ties. 

II. 

I  have  much  less  to  say  about  Serbia,  except  that 
she  too  got  her  freedom  at  the  hands  of  Russia,  as  a 
consequence  of  a  war  with  Turkey  (Treaty  of  Adria- 
nople  1829).  During  the  first  decades  after  the  Berlin 
Congress,  1878,  there  was  not  much  in  common  be- 
tween Russia  and  Serbia.  It  was  Bulgaria,  not  Serbia, 
that  drew  most  of  Russia's  attention;  the  latter  was 
considered  only  when  the  main  question  of  a  general 
Pan-Slav  movement,  concerning  all  the  Slav  people, 
was  raised.  This  was  not  often  the  case,  because  the 
Pan-Slav  movement  had  after  all  no  great  hold  on  the 
Russian  people;  its  fame  was  much  exaggerated 
abroad ;  then  too,  that  movement  was  made  use  of  by 


128  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Russian  reactionary  influences,  which  estranged  the 
liberal  and  educated  men. 

This  gave  Austria  the  chance  to  concentrate  her 
attention  on  Serbia  and  for  some  years  Russia  seemed 
to  consider  Serbia  the  legitimate  sphere  of  Austrian 
influence.  For  example,  when  a  Russo-Austrian 
agreement  was  reached  concerning  the  Balkans,  Aus- 
tria invariably  was  given  control  of  Serbian  interests. 
There  existed  many  points  of  contact  between  Austria 
and  Serbia,  many  economic  interests,  strategic  matters, 
a  long  frontier,  and  last,  but  most  important,  the  Slav 
element  in  the  Austrian  Empire,  which  was  constantly 
affected  by  the  proximity  of  Serbia.  Many  of  the 
Austrian  Slavs  were  eager  to  follow  the  example  of 
Serbia  and  get  their  independence;  they  were  fretting 
under  the  Austrian  rule.  The  Serbians,  on  their  part, 
were  not  averse  to  making  use  of  this  feeling  of  their 
Slav  brothers,  against  the  Austrians. 

The  Obrenovitch  dynasty  was  absolutely  under  the 
control  of  Vienna,  but  after  the  abdication  of  Milan 
and  the  murder  of  Alexander  and  his  wife  Draga,  with 
the  new  dynasty  of  the  Karageorges,  the  influence  of 
Russia  began  to  be  felt  in  opposition  to  Austria.  The 
new  king  evinced  no  friendship  or  gratitude  towards 
Vienna  and  felt  free  to  act  as  was  best  for  his  people. 

The  change  of  dynasty,  occurring  in  1903,  was 
mainly  an  outburst  of  ill-feeling  of  the  people,  due  to 
the  long  misrule  of  the  Obrenovitchi,  though  the  bloody 
form  it  took  was  a  great  misfortune  for  Serbia's  future. 
King  Peter  I  was  handicapped  in  his  policy  from  the 
very  beginning  for  just  that  reason.  His  relations  to 
the  great  powers  were  necessarily  not  quite  sincere, 


THE  BALKANS  129 

due  to  the  manner  in  which  he  had  gained  the  throne. 
He  made  no  effort  at  all  to  punish  the  assassins  of 
Alexander  and  Draga. 

Most  of  the  diplomatic  representatives  were  with- 
drawn from  Belgrade  (except  those  of  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary)  and  allowed  by  their  governments 
to  return  only  in  1904.  However,  by  very  tactful  pro- 
ceedings king  Peter  and  his  government  succeeded  in 
reestablishing  the  confidence  of  the  powers,  but  with 
the  difference,  that  he  showed  much  more  independ- 
ence than  the  Obrenovitchi  ever  had.  Serbia  began  to 
drift  away  from  Austria  and  the  latter's  influence  was 
gradually  replaced  by  that  of  Russia.  The  internal 
conditions  improved  rapidly  and  this  .helped  the  hopes 
of  the  Serbian  patriots  for  further  achievements. 

The  test  came  at  the  time  of  count  d'Aehrenthal's 
coup  of  1908.  The  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
very  naturally  affected  the  Serbians  greatly.  Serbia 
was  much  alarmed  by  the  increase  of  Austria's  strength 
and  by  the  fate  of  the  Slavs,  living  in  the  annexed  terri- 
tories. It  was  entirely  against  her  interest  and  policy. 
We  know  that  Russia  also  felt  very  badly  about 
the  annexation,  which  thwarted  her  Balkan  plans. 
In  consequence  they  became  broth ers-in-misfortune; 
Serbia  was  glad  to  find  a  sincere  friend  in  Russia,  ready 
to  back  her  in  her  indignant  protest  to  Austria.  How- 
ever, German  interference  forced  Russia  to  withdraw 
her  support. 

As  Russia  herself  was  not  ready  for  any  quarrel  and 
had  not  yet  overcome  the  consequences  of  her  Japanese 
defeat,  she  was  even  obliged  to  tell  Serbia  frankly,  that 
she  could  not  help  her  and  counselled  moderation. 


130  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Serbia  naturally  had  to  withdraw  her  protests  and 
hide  her  indignation  for  a  while.  She  sought  the 
friendship  and  moral  support  of  another  member  of 
the  great  .Slav  family,  her  small  but  brave  neighbor, 
the  princedom  of  Montenegro. 

Soon,  however,  there  came  a  new  provocation  from 
Austria.  The  Vienna  government  turned  its  attention 
to  hunting  down  those  Serbian  patriots,  who  were  help- 
ing the  Slav  movement  among  the  Austrian  subjects, 
trying  to  accuse  Serbia  of  instigating  a  revolutionary- 
spirit.  Thus,  several  Serbs  were  arrested  in  Croatia 
and  Bosnia  and  court-martialled  in  Zagreb.  On  Octo- 
ber 5,  1909,  thirty  of  them  were  sentenced  to  heavy 
punishment,  notwithstanding  the  protests  of  many 
prominent  men.  It  was  then  that  Professor  Masaryk, 
now  President  of  Czechoslovakia,  started  a  campaign 
to  prove  that  these  men  were  indicted  on  false  docu- 
ments, forged  by  .some  Austrian  officials,  a  fact  which 
was  well  known  by  the  Vienna  government.  Two  men 
played  an  important  role  in  these  forgeries;  professor 
Friedjung,  a  talented  historian,  but  an  extreme  nation- 
alist, without  any  moral  scruples  whatever,  and  the 
Austrian  minister  in  Serbia,  count  Forgatch.  The 
disclosures  of  Masaryk  saved  the  lives  of  the  poor 
Serbs,  accused  by  Austria,  .but  certainly  could  not  stop 
either  the  further  persecutions  of  Vienna  or  the  na- 
tionalistic propaganda  of  Belgrade.  Too  many  hatreds 
were  now  loose  and  matters  were  bound  to  get  worse. 

In  March,  1910,  King  Peter  visited  St.  Petersburg, 
received  a  most  cordial  reception  and  established  per- 
manent friendly  relations  with  the  Russian  govern- 
ment. Russia  henceforth  became  the  avowed  protector 


THE  BALKANS  131 

of  Serbia.  Tragic  results  ensued  four  years  later,  for 
Russia  was  now  in  honor  bound  to  support  Serbia  in  all 
circumstances. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Denis,  E.,  La  grande  Serbie,  Paris,  1915. 
Temperley,  H.  W.  V.,  History  of  Serbia,  London,  1917. 
Nekludoff,  A.,  Diplomatic  Reminiscences,  etc..  New  York,  1920. 
Serkis,  C.,  La  Roumelie  Orientale  et  la  Bulgarie  actuelle,  Paris,  1898. 


III. 

The  relations  between  Montenegro  and  Russia  have 
never  had  a  complicated  historical  development. 
From  olden  days  they  were  based  on  very  close  friend- 
ship and  intimate  Court  bonds.  There  was  a  time, 
for  example,  when  Alexander  III  often  used  to  say 
that  prince  Nicholas  was  his  only  true  friend  in  the 
whole  of  Europe.  At  most  of  the  international  con- 
ferences, Montenegro  was  represented  by  Russians; 
thus  the  well  known  jurist,  Th.  Martens,  used  to  have 
the  Montenegrin  vote  at  many  an  international  meet- 
ing. 

On  January  1,  1910,  Montenegro  was  proclaimed  a 
kingdom  and  recognized  as  such  by  Russia  and  the 
other  powers.  It  was  not  agreeable  to  Austria,  but 
she  could  not  help  it.  Russia  on  the  contrary  was 
very  much  pleased  in  getting  one  more  element  of 
support  in  the  Balkans  against  Austria.  Montenegro 
played  an  important  role  in  two  cases:  in  the  Albanian 
question  and  during  the  first  Balkan  war  of  1912.  In 
both  cases  Russia  had  in  this  little  kingdom  a  warm 
friend.  Its  strength  was  certainly  small  and  negligible, 


132  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

but  its  moral  weight  was  not  unimportant,  and  gave 
Russia  a  chance  for  interference  in  support  of  her  own 
interests  in  the  Balkans.  Nicholas  of  Montenegro 
knew  very  well  how  to  make  use  of  this  for  his  own 
purposes.  Two  of  his  daughters  were  married  to  two 
Russian  Grand  Dukes  and  at  times  exerted  great  influ- 
ence at  the  Russian  Court.  The  worst  of  this  was,  that 
one  of  them  helped  the  so-called  "occult"  influences, 
Rasputin  among  others,  to  get  hold  of  the  Tsar  and 
his  wife. 

IV. 

With  Rumania,  on  the  contrary,  Russia  never  had 
cordial  relations.  One  reason  was  that  subsequent  to 
1883  (October  30)  Rumania  had  a  treaty  of  alliance 
with  Austria,  renewed  in  1892  (July  25),  the  purport 
of  which  was  directed  against  Russia.  In  1883  a  treaty 
was  concluded  also  with  Germany  and  later  in  1888 
with  Italy.  On  November  23,  1892,  they  were 
changed  into  one  agreement,  which  was  renewed  in 
1896,  1902,  and  in  1913.  This  was  mostly  the  work 
of  Bratianu;  his  argument  was  that  Rumania  had  no 
choice.  England  and  France  were  cool  towards  her, 
while  Russia  acted  quite  inimically  when  she  annexed 
the  Rumanian  province  of  Bessarabia. 

Great  assistance  was  given  at  that  time  to  Bratianu 
by  the  Rumanian  king,  Carol,  himself  a  Hohenzollern 
and  a  profound  admirer  of  Germany.  The  people  were 
more  or  less  indifferent,  mostly  due  to  their  very  rudi- 
mental  social  development.  The  alliance  of  Rumania 
with  the  Teuton  powers  was  a  direct  menace  to  Russia 


THE  BALKANS  133 

and  helped  immensely  to  strengthen  Russian  fears  of 
the  evil  influences  in  the  Balkans.  A  consequence 
was  the  conclusion  of  an  alliance  between  Russia  and 
Bulgaria,  in  1902,  directed  against  Rumania  and  prom- 
ising Russian  support  to  Bulgaria  against  Rumania. 
The  latter  was  economically  entirely  dependent  on 
Austria,  which  took  all  possible  advantage  from  this 
situation. 

Rumania  never  dared  to  show  any  signs  of  unfriend- 
liness against  Russia,  but  she  always  could  try  to 
attack  Bulgaria,  which  had  thus  to  seek  the  support 
of  Russia.  At  tunes  there  was  open  enmity  between 
these  two  countries,  Bulgaria  and  Rumania.  Rumania 
avenged  herself  in  1913,  when  she  helped  to  defeat  and 
humiliate  Bulgaria;  unfortunately  it  was  the  latter 
country's  fault  entirely. 

V. 

The  quarrel  between  Russia  and  Turkey  is  a  very 
old  one.  It  dates  back  centuries,  sometimes  abating, 
sometimes  wildly  flaring  up  again.  Many  a  war  has 
Russia  fought  against  Turkey  and  with  few  exceptions 
always  getting  the  best  of  her,  but  never  really  suc- 
ceeding hi  destroying  her  ancient  enemy. 

Russia's  aim  of  conquest  of  Constantinople,  dating 
back  so  many  centuries,  is  too  well  known  to  need 
elucidation;  it  is  an  historic  trend  toward  the  open 
sea.  With  great  difficulty  did  Russia  reach  the  coast 
of  the  Black  Sea  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
and  then  only  to  find  that  her  outlet  was  blocked  by 
Turkey,  strongly  entrenched  on  the  Bosphorus  and 


134  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

the  Dardanelles.  It  was  mostly  due  to  England  alone 
that  Russia  could  never  achieve  this  historic  task  of 
hers,  to  oust  the  "despicable  Turk"  from  Europe. 
England  was  constantly  opposed  to  Russia  getting  a 
foothold  on  the  Straits,  and  thereby  she  saved  Turkey 
time  and  again. 

The  last  time  this  happened  was  in  1878  after  Rus- 
sia was  at  the  doors  of  Constantinople  and  had  already 
signed  the  victorious  armistice  of  San  Stefano.  Due 
to  Lord  Beaconsfield's  energy,  the  Berlin  Congress 
undid  all  that  Russia  accomplished  by  her  victorious 
armies  and  left  Russia  dissatisfied  and  discouraged. 

The  commercial  importance  of  Constantinople  is 
also  too  well  known  to  call  for  any  special  mention; 
most  of  Russia's  southern  trade  is  bound  to  pass 
through  the  Bosphorus.  Her  wheat  and  hides,  her 
coal  and  oil  cannot  reach  the  European  markets  any 
other  way;  her  manganese  and  petroleum  are  inac- 
cessible to  other  nations  if  they  cannot  find  an 
outlet  from  the  Caucasus  by  the  Dardanelles.  This 
was  clearly  demonstrated  during  the  Turko-Italian 
war,  when  the  Ottoman  government  suddenly  closed 
the  Straits  and  bottled  up  the  Russian  commerce.  The 
Dardanelles  were  closed  for  only  a  few  days  to  Russian 
sea  trade  and  yet  about  one  hundred  and  fifty 
steamers  were  held  up  and  the  loss  to  Russian  business 
houses  amounted  to  eight  million  francs.  Communica- 
tions were  soon  reestablished,  but  it  taught  Russia  a 
lesson,  showing  her  once  more  how  important  a  role 
the  Bosphorus  played  in  her  commercial  development. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  century,  Germany  began  to 
interfere  with  the  Levant  commerce.  The  German  im- 


THE  BALKANS  135 

ports  rose  appreciably  and  began  to  replace  the  Eng- 
lish and  French  goods;  gradually  even  Russia  began  to 
feel  the  new  competition  and  with  it  came  political 
influences.  Germany  started  to  build  up  her  friend- 
ship with  the  Turks  with  great  care  and  perspicacity; 
she  helped  to  reform  the  Turkish  army,  gave  the  Turks 
instructors,  furnished  artillery  and  ammunition  and 
reorganized  her  system  of  defence.  At  the  same  time 
German  influence  began  to  be  felt  at  the  Porte,  in 
the  very  heart  of  the  Ottoman  government. ,  Turkey 
seemed  to  grow  much  stronger  and  consequently  re- 
sented the  Russian,  English  or  French  ways  of  inter- 
fering in  Balkan  matters  and  her  own  affairs,  invari- 
ably finding  support  in  German  counsels.  This  natu- 
rally caused  great  anxiety  among  the  statesmen  of  the 
European  capitals  and  thwarted  all  their  efforts  to 
force  Turkey  to  reform  and  accept  their  plans  con- 
cerning Macedonia,  Asia  Minor  or  Armenia. 

Then  suddenly  came  the  unexpected  break.  For 
some  time  between  1902  and  1904  the  attentive  ob- 
server could  have  noticed,  that  there  was  developing 
in  Turkey  a  strong  revolutionary  discontent.  About 
1903  a  small  but  very  energetic  party  came  to  the 
front;  they  soon  were  known  to  the  world  as  the  Young 
Turks,  standing  for  reform  and  constitution,  but  led 
by  German  influence.  Most  of  them  had  German  edu- 
cation or  training,  some  were  directly  under  German 
leadership.  They  formed  the  Committee  of  Union  and 
Progress  in  1904  and  founded  the  powerful  and  influ- 
ential paper,  The  Ikdam.  Most  prominent  among 
them  were  Taalat  and  Enver  Bey,  both  strongly  pro- 
German;  their  headquarters  were  among  the  officers 


136  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

of  the  second  and  third  army  corps;  their  propaganda 
affected  mostly  Macedonia  and  Saloniki. 

The  years  1907-1908  were  very  anxious  ones  for  the 
Sultan.  He  must  have  felt  that  his  powers  were  being 
undermined.  Finally  the  Ottoman  government  offi- 
cials lost  their  heads  entirely  and  were  overthrown 
without  much  difficulty  in  July,  1908.  This  was  a 
great  triumph  for  Germany.  She  scored  a  political 
success  of  high  significance  and  importance  and  at  the 
same  tune  disarmed  the  protests  of  the  other  powers, 
as  the  coup  was  made  in  the  name  of  liberalism  and 
freedom.  Neither  Russia  nor  England  could  very  well 
protest  against  the  deposition  of  the  Red  Sultan,  whom 
they  hated  so  much  themselves.  And  everything  was 
accomplished  exclusively  through  German  help  and 
German  inspiration. 

The  causes  of  the  revolution  of  July,  1908,  are  rather 
complex.  It  was  mostly  the  constant  interference  of 
the  European  powers  in  the  Macedonian  question  that 
hurt  the  pride  of  the  Turks.  They  attributed  this  to 
the  undue  weakness  of  the  Sultan.  The  Young  Turk 
propaganda  pointed  this  out  repeatedly,  arousing  the 
nationalistic  feelings  of  the  Mussulmen.  Maybe  we 
have  in  this  respect  a  part  explanation  of  the  strong 
nationalistic  feelings  that  characterized  the  Young 
Turks  from  the  very  beginning  and  proved  so  very 
harmful  to  them  later  on. 

There  was,  however,  an  immediate  cause,  explaining 
why  the  revolution  broke  out  just  at  that  moment;  I 
mean  the  German  influence.  Germany  was  much 
alarmed  by  the  visit  king  Edward  paid  to  the  Tsar  at 
Reval  in  June  of  that  year;  she  consequently  hastened 


THE  BALKANS  137 

to  establish  her  firm  rule  at  Constantinople,  as  an  out- 
let before  it  should  be  too  late.  For  that  purpose  she 
deliberately  let  loose  the  Turkish  revolutionary  forces 
and  carried  out  her  eastern  plans  with  great  pre- 
cision. 

Germany's  position  was,  however,  a  delicate  one, 
on  account  of  her  relations  to  Austria,  her  weak 
sister.  Vienna  could  not  have  been  much  pleased  by 
the  revolution,  as  she  did  not  like  to  see  Constantinople 
strengthened  and  Germany  had  to  display  great  tact 
in  order  to  lull  the  Austrian  suspicions.  The  feeling 
of  growing  independence  of  the  Young  Turks  could 
not  be  agreeable  to  Austria  in  any  way;  it  was  just  at 
that  time  that  d'Aehrenthal  was  carrying  out  his  pro- 
gram of  annexation  of  the  Turkish  provinces  of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  a  policy  which  was  as  much 
against  Turkey,  as  it  was  against  the  Slavs,  Serbia  and 
Russia. 

Without  serious  difficulty  Berlin  convinced  both 
Vienna  and  Constantinople  that  moderation  was  the 
only  possible  and  profitable  policy ;  this  seemed  to  sat- 
isfy both  sides.  Russia  was  entirely  excluded  for  the 
moment  by  her  difficulties  with  Austria,  by  the  German 
support  of  the  latter,  and  her  own  internal  revolu- 
tionary troubles.  Thus  did  Germany,  by  persistent 
effort,  succeed  in  firmly  establishing  herself  at  the 
Porte. 

Russia  and  England,  now  for  the  first  time  close 
allies  in  the  Turkish  question,  recognized  the  new 
Ottoman  government  without  hesitation.  They  were 
hoping  that  this  new  regime  would  finally  bring  to 
Turkey  the  long  expected  reforms.  They  were  disillu- 


138  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

sioned,  however,  by  the  characteristic  traits  of  the 
Young  Turks,  which  soon  became  evident.  These 
Turks  proved  to  be  intensely  chauvinistic,  hating  all 
foreigners,  without  ever  trying  to  conceal  their  hatred. 
With  alarm  did  those  two  powers  witness  the  increas- 
ing strength  and  influence  of  Germany  at  Constanti- 
nople; it  ruined  their  own  policy  and  threatened  their 
fondest  hopes. 

Then  came  the  unexpected  surprise  with  the  first 
war  in  the  Balkans;  the  sudden  and  overwhelming 
defeat  of  the  Turks  was  a  thunderbolt. 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  was  so 
thoroughly  convinced  of  Turkey's  strength  under  the 
military  leadership  of  German  instructors  and  gen- 
erals, that  she  even  viewed  with  pleasure  the  brewing 
storm  in  the  Balkans  and  in  no  way  impeded  the  alli- 
ance of  the  Balkan  nations.  Thus  to  Germany  the 
Turkish  defeat  meant  much  more  than  to  any  other 
power;  it  really  spelled  the  ruin  of  the  whole  of  her 
Near  East  plans.  It  meant,  first,  the  destruction  of 
her  own  military  prestige;  everyone  could  easily  see 
that  it  was  the  German  military  methods  that  were 
defeated  by  the  Balkan  allies;  her  military  leadership 
was  now  questioned,  her  instructors  seemed  at  fault 
and  her  generals — incapable;  second,  the  victory  of 
the  Balkan  allies  threatened  the  existence  of  Turkey; 
it  shook  the  foundation  of  the  Balkan  equilibrium, 
so  painstakingly  built  up,  tearing  to  pieces  the  Ger- 
man plans  of  advance  through  Turkey  into  Asia  Minor. 
Even  the  Bagdad  railroad  lost  its  meaning  with  the 
defeat  of  the  Porte.  No  wonder  Berlin  was  furious 
and  felt  upset.  The  whole  German  policy  of  aggres- 


THE  BALKANS  139 

siveness,  of  getting  "a  place  in  the  sun"  had  to  be  re- 
constructed from  the  very  beginning. 

For  several  months  Germany  was  extremely  nervous, 
but  to  her  great  joy  the  Balkan  allies  did  not  know  how 
to  share  the  spoils  in  peace.  Presently  it  became  evi- 
dent that  they  would  quarrel  and  destroy  with  their 
own  hands  the  military  achievements  of  the  first  war. 

The  second  war,  of  1913,  was  a  pleasant  sight  to 
Germany,  whereas  the  other  powers,  and  especially 
Russia,  did  all  they  could  to  prevent  it.  The  St. 
Petersburg  government  realized  very  well  both  sides 
of  the  question,  the  German  political  defeat,  which 
came  with  the  Turkish  military  disaster,  and  the  rising 
hopes  of  Germany  when  the  Balkan  allies  began  to 
bicker  and  quarrel.  The  Russian  warnings  were  of 
no  avail,  however;  after  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  was 
signed,  Germany  had  regained  her  former  influence  in 
Constantinople  and  was  once  more  set  on  establishing 
her  supremacy  in  the  Levant.  During  the  long  and 
wearying  peace  negotiations  in  London,  1912-1913, 
Russia  was  effectively  backing  the  Slav  nations  and 
earnestly  trying  to  find  a  way  of  mutually  satisfying 
the  contradictory  interests  of  the  Balkan  peoples.  She 
was  careful  and  considerate,  but  perhaps  just  for  that 
reason  her  advice  had  no  great  influence  in  the  Balkans. 

It  thus  happened  that  when  the  Great  War  broke 
out,  Turkey  was  once  more  under  the  spell  of  Germany 
and  it  took  no  great  effort  on  the  part  of  the  latter  to 
persuade  Turkey  to  join  her  against  the  western 
Allies. 

There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  events  of  1914,  which 
led  to  the  Great  War  were  in  no  mean  degree  hastened 


140  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

by  that  nervous  desire  of  Germany  to  assert  her  final 
power  in  Constantinople  while  the  Young  Turks  had 
still  a  predominant  influence  there.  Germany  could 
not  have  stood  the  chance  of  a  second  defeat  and  over- 
throw of  the  Young  Turks. 

Germany  was  not  alone  in  a  nervous  state  during 
those  two  eventful  years,  1913-1914.  Russia  was  also 
getting  restless.  With  great  anxiety  did  she  watch  the 
renewals  of  German  intrigues  at  Constantinople,  after 
the  peace  of  Bucharest;  she  looked  at  these  develop- 
ments as  a  direct  threat  to  herself.  Indeed,  Germany 
firmly  entrenched  on  the  Bosphorus,  meant  a  national 
danger  to  her.  Germany  would  thus  be  able  to  control 
the  entire  southern  export  trade  of  Russia,  as  well  as 
her  relations  with  all  southern  powers.  Sazonoff  con- 
sequently tried  to  persuade  the  Russian  government 
to  take  urgent  steps  to  counteract  that  policy  of  Ger- 
many. The  Bolsheviki  made  known  to  the  world 
the  Russian  plan  of  action,  in  their  publication  of  secret 
treaties  (Paris,  1919).  On  March  23,  1914,  four 
months  before  the  Great  War  broke  out,  Sazonoff  made 
a  special  report  to  the  Tsar,  after  having  debated  the 
questions  with  military  and  diplomatic  representatives. 
He  contemplated  the  occupation  by  Russia  of  the 
Straits  and  of  using  military  force  if  necessary,  to 
coerce  the  Porte.  Nothing  came  of  it,  fortunately  for 
Russia,  because  otherwise  she  would  surely  have  been 
accused  of  having  started  the  general  European  confla- 
gration, as  Germany  would  never  have  acquiesced  in 
such  action  without  calling  forth  an  open  conflict.  But 
it  clearly  shows  how  full  of  electricity  the  air  was  and 


THE  BALKANS  141 

how  near  the  storm  really  was;  Russia  and  Germany 
both  were  very  intense  in  their  purposes. 

When  the  war  did  come  Turkey  almost  at  once  took 
sides  with  Germany,  perfectly  convinced  of  the  invin- 
cible strength  of  the  latter.  The  Russian  interests 
were  thus  in  abeyance  and  Russia  had  to  wait,  pa- 
tiently conducting  negotiations  with  her  Allies  to  have 
her  desires  satisfied  in  the  Near  East  after  the  final 
victory. 

The  Allies  on  their  part  were  very  reluctant  to  make 
any  promises  or  definite  arrangements  concerning  the 
fate  of  Turkey.  Toward  the  end  of  1915  they  agreed, 
however,  to  promise  Russia  Constantinople  (some 
porto-franco  arrangement  seemed  best  to  them)  and 
the  control  of  the  Straits.  This  promise  was  finally 
embodied  in  a  special  secret  treaty,  also  made  public 
in  1919  by  the  Bolsheviki. 

In  1917  the  Russian  provisional  government  met 
with  great  difficulties  just  on  this  account,  and  Miliu- 
kov,  the  first  foreign  minister  after  the  abdication  of 
the  Tsar,  had  to  resign,  because  he  defended  these  same 
claims  of  Russia  regarding  Constantinople. 

During  the  following  months  Russian  interests  in 
Turkey  seemed  to  be  entirely  forgotten  and  at  the 
time  of  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  Russia  was 
conspicuously  absent.  By  a  strange  irony  of  fate, 
however,  that  treaty  itself  seems  to  have  gone  to  pieces 
and  the  whole  question  of  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  remains  still  unsettled. 

We  might  add  hi  conclusion  a  few  words  as  to  the 
future  of  the  Turkish  question.  From  the  Russian 


142  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

point  of  view  the  matter  can  be  discussed  from  three 
angles: 

First,  concerning  the  Turkish  rule  in  Europe.  It 
will  stand  to  the  everlasting  shame  of  the  Allies  that 
Turkey  has  been  allowed  to  remain  in  Europe.  The 
allied  nations  were  promised  by  their  governments, 
that  in  case  of  victory  Turkey  will  be  driven  into  Asia, 
where  she  really  belongs;  and  that  very  definite  prom- 
ise was  broken  by  the  treaty  of  Sevres.  To  Russia 
this  is  politically  a  matter  of  indifference.  We  can 
and  shall  condemn  this  allied  policy  morally,  but  we 
will  always  remain  passive  onlookers  at  the  further 
developments. 

The  second  angle  relates  to  the  question  of  Constan- 
tinople, with  its  very  large  and  cosmopolitan  popula- 
tion, where  the  Turkish  element  does  not  play  the  pre- 
ponderant role.  What  is  to  be  done  with  that  city? 
Even  if  the  Turkish  rule  will  disappear  from  Europe, 
there  will  constantly  remain  the  question  of  how  to 
deal  with  the  Turks  of  Constantinople.  We  can  sup- 
pose at  present  that  in  this  last  respect  the  vast 
majority  of  Russians  will  also  be  more  or  less  indiffer- 
ent; in  former  days  many  Russians  would  have  pre- 
ferred for  sentimental  reasons  to  have  the  city  as  their 
own ;  so  many  times  did  the  Russian  armies  come  close 
to  the  walls  of  Constantinople-Byzantium,  that  Rus- 
sians could  not  help  expressing  the  wish  to  occupy  the 
city.  Now,  however,  this  is  quite  impracticable.  In 
the  near  future  every  educated  Russian  will  be  needed 
at  home;  Russia  has  her  own  vast  and  lasting  troubles 
on  hand;  she  cannot  spare  a  single  citizen  to  govern 
an  outside  town.  Thus,  the  only  possible  solution 


THE  BALKANS  143 

would  be  to  establish  an  international  administration 
of  Constantinople,  under  the  League  of  Nations  or  oth- 
erwise;1 Russia  might  be  given  a  chance  to  participate, 
in  case  she  wants,  on  equal  terms  with  the  other 
nations.  No  single  power  will  be  able  to  do  this  alone, 
least  of  all  Greece;  some  people  have  suggested  Bul- 
garia, as  least  objectionable;  the  trouble  is,  however, 
that  these  small  powers  will  never  succeed  in  enforcing 
their  rule  and  remain  themselves  impartial;  on  the 
contrary,  they  will  inevitably  arouse  jealousies  and 
quarrels. 

The  third  and  most  important  phase  of  the  question 
concerns  the  Straits.  No  matter  what  happens  to 
Constantinople,  Russia  must  be  assured  of  the  freedom 
of  the  Straits.  This  is  one  of  the  most  weighty  of  her 
historical  claims,  for  which  she  was  fighting  and  striv- 
ing for  so  many  centuries.  The  question  of  the  Straits, 
again,  has  a  double  meaning,  first,  the  freedom  of  com- 
merce, viz.,  that  there  should  not  be  any  possibility  on 
the  part  of  any  power  to  close  the  Straits  against  the 
outflow  of  raw  materials  from  Russia;  and  second, 
that  the  Straits  should  not  be  used  in  time  of  war  for 
strategic  purposes,  in  other  words,  that  there  should 
not  be  possible  any  military  attack  on  Russia  through 
the  Straits,  or  based  upon  them;  no  fortifications  can 
be  allowed  around  the  Straits;  the  latter  must  not  be 
used  by  any  navy  for  strategic  purposes. 

We  might  hope  that  the  progress  of  international 
relations  will  achieve  these  two  objects:  that  the  Turks 

1  For  example,  an  international  Commission  with  a  Governor-Gen- 
eral at  the  head  and  a  porto-jranco  or  free  port  for  international 
commerce. 


144  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

and  especially  their  rulers  will  sooner  or  later  leave 
Europe,  and  that  such  international  guarantees  will 
be  established,  that  would  make  Russian  commerce 
safe  through  the  Straits  and  would  prevent  the  use 
of  them  as  a  point  of  aggression  against  Russia. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

GERMANY. 
I. 

OUR  narrative  concerning  the  relations  of  Russia 
and  Germany  starts  also,  immediately  after  the  Berlin 
Congress  of  1878,  with  the  description  of  a  rather  hos- 
tile attitude  on  the  part  of  Russia.  She  had  been 
counting  very  much  on  Germany's  support.  Their 
old  friendship,  the  perfect  neutrality  of  Prussia  during 
the  Turkish  war,  the  monarchical  ideals  of  the  two 
Courts  and  not  least  of  all  the  personal  relations  of  the 
two  Emperors  created  the  Russian  hope,  that  when 
English  hostility  became  so  evident  and  the  British 
fleet  was  ready  to  bombard  the  Russian  troops  at  their 
entry  into  Constantinople,  Germany  would  openly  side 
with  Russia  and  prevent  such  disastrous  occurrences. 
Bismarck,  previously,  was  often  talking  of  his  friend- 
ship with  Russia;  often  too,  did  he  say  that  Germany 
must  keep  close  friendship  with  her  eastern  neighbor 
to  preserve  her  monarchical  ideals.  As  is  well  known, 
he  called  his  role  at  the  Congress  of  1878,  that  of  an 
honest  broker,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  did  have 
a  splendid  chance  of  holding  the  balance  between 
Russia  and  England.  The  Russian  government  was 
cognizant  of  this  fact.  And  yet  the  results  of  the  Con- 
gress were  exceedingly  disappointing  to  Russia  and 

1145 


146  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

much  of  the  blame  for  this  diplomatic  defeat  was  put 
by  the  Russians  upon  Germany  and  her  leading  states- 
man, the  Iron  Chancellor. 

Several  times  the  Russian  government  expected 
assistance  or  at  least  sympathy  from  Germany,  but 
invariably  she  found  Berlin's  attitude  very  cool. 
Things  went  so  far  that  in  1879,  Alexander  wrote  a 
long  letter  to  the  Kaiser  complaining  of  this  attitude 
of  the  German  government  and  expressing  his  aston- 
ishment at  the  "systematic  refusal  of  cooperation." 

On  the  whole,  Bismarck  was  not  much  impressed 
by  Russia's  strength;  much  better  than  many  other 
European  statesmen  he  realized  Russia's  weakness, 
caused,  primarily  as  he  thought,  by  internal  dissatis- 
faction and  by  the  revolutionary  movement  that  her 
government  did  not  know  how  to  cope  with.  Conse- 
quently he  directed  all  his  efforts  elsewhere,  building 
up  an  alliance  with  Austria.  His  main  object  was  to 
make  that  alliance  as  strong  as  he  could;  the  under- 
standing with  Russia  was  supplementary.1  At  that 
time  he  looked  at  Russia  as  a  mere  insurance  of  his 
eastern  front,  guarding  Germany  against  any  possible 
understanding  between  Russia  and  France,  his  real 
enemy.  Bismarck  never  for  a  moment  forgot  that 
France  would  some  day  try  to  avenge  her  defeat  of 
1870.  But  he  began  to  cool  considerably  as  to  the 
possibility  of  Russia  being  actively  useful  to  him  in  his 
political  designs,  his  plan  being  that  she  should  play 
merely  a  passive  role. 

Alexander  III,  who  came  to  the  throne  in  1881  after 

1This  was  the  object  Bismarck  had  in  view  at  the  time  of  his 
meeting  with  count  Andrassy  at  Gastein  in  September,  1879. 


GERMANY  147 

the  assassination  of  his  father,  was  very  well  disposed 
towards  Berlin;  his  first  visit  he  paid  in  consequence 
to  the  Kaiser.  The  alliance  of  the  "Three  Emperors" 
was  renewed  in  1881  and  1884.  The  second  time,  in 
1884,  Bismarck  arranged  for  a  personal  meeting  of 
the  three  Emperors,  which  took  place  in  September, 
1884,  at  Skiernevice;  it  was  a  great  demonstration  of 
monarchical  friendship.  But  in  1887,  when  Russia 
inquired  about  the  next  renewal,  she  was  met  in  Ber- 
lin, to  her  great  surprise,  rather  coldly;  the  follow- 
ing negotiations  lasted  longer  than  usual.  In  Novem- 
ber of  that  year  an  important  incident  took  place, 
which  was  bound  to  strain  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries,  the  personal  quarrel  between  Alexan- 
der and  Bismarck  concerning  the  forged  Bulgarian  let- 
ters. Bismarck  never  forgot  Alexander's  words.  His 
demeanor  regarding  the  renewal  offended  the  Tsar  very 
much  and  only  added  to  his  growing  feeling  of  distrust 
of  the  Chancellor's  policy  in  general. 

The  treaty  of  "reinsurance,"  as  Bismarck  called  it, 
between  Russia  and  Germany  was  finally  signed  in 
1887  in  Berlin,  but  there  was  no  success  in  reestablish- 
ing friendly  relation  between  the  two  countries.  There 
remained  a  certain  feeling  of  distrust  and  suspicion  on 
both  sides. 

The  treaty  of  1887  provided :  first,  for  the  status  quo 
in  the  Balkans  and  for  the  recognition  of  the  Russian 
interests  there;  second,  for  the  status  quo  of  the 
Straits;  and  third,  for  the  secrecy  of  this  agreement. 
There  was  an  additional  protocol  attached  to  the 
treaty,  promising  the  assistance  of  Germany  in  re- 
establishing order  in  Bulgaria;  Germany  also  agreed 


148  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

to  remain  "benevolently  neutral"  in  case  Russia  would 
have  to  defend  by  force  of  arms  her  claims  concerning 
the  Straits.  It  was  concluded  once  more  for  three 
years. 

When  the  time  for  its  renewal  came  in  1890  much 
had  changed  in  the  situation  in  Eastern  Europe;  the 
Iron  Chancellor  was  no  more  in  his  towering  position 
decreeing  the  fate  of  the  German  Empire.  The  nego- 
tiations with  Russia  were,  however,  started  in  Berlin, 
but  did  not  progress  rapidly,  and  after  several  months 
of  half-hearted  efforts  were  first  transferred  to  St. 
Petersburg  and  then  finally  dropped.  The  treaty  of 
reinsurance  thus  lapsed.  There  exists  an  opinion  that 
the  main  opposition  to  the  renewal  came  from  the  new 
Chancellor;  Caprivi  maintained  that  it  was  too  offen- 
sive for  Germany's  trusted  ally  and  that  good  relations 
with  Austria  created  a  moral  obligation  for  Germany 
not  to  have  any  secret  understanding  with  Russia. 
We  can  seriously  doubt  the  sincerity  of  that  story; 
Germany  never  evinced  any  moral  scruples  concerning 
her  allies.  Both,  Russians  and  Germans,  asserted 
later  on  that  it  was  due  to  their  initiative  that  the 
transactions  were  broken  off,  and  I  think  that  more 
or  less  both  were  right,  as  these  countries  quite  evi- 
dently rapidly  drifted  apart,  though  the  reluctance  of 
Russia  to  the  renewal  of  the  agreement  of  1887  is  well 
known  and  can  be  historically  proved.  The  Russian 
point  of  view  is  very  lucidly  exposed  by  S.  Goriainov 
in  an  article,  "The  End  of  the  Alliance  of  the  Em- 
perors." (Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  1918,  vol.  23).  The 
author  proves  that  the  Russian  statesmen  were  almost 


GERMANY  149 

unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  the  alliance  was  not 
to  be  renewed,  due  to  the  existing  strained  relations 
between  Russia  and  Austria. 

It  was  then  that  the  real  rapprochement  of  Russia 
and  France  began,  at  first  unconscious,  and  so  thor- 
ough later  on;  in  other  words,  the  policy  that  Bis- 
marck was  always  most  afraid  of. 

We  must  mention  in  this  respect  a  powerful  personal 
anti-German  influence  in  Russia,  namely,  the  feelings 
of  the  Tsar's  wife,  the  empress  Marie.  She  was  a 
patriotic  Dane,  the  daughter  of  king  Christian,  whom 
Bismarck  had  treated  so  badly;  she  never  could  forget 
this  and  was  constantly  urging  Alexander  not  to  be 
too  friendly  with  the  Germans;  her  personal  influence 
on  the  Tsar  was  very  strong. 

As  we  have  mentioned,  Alexander  strove  to  with- 
draw from  west-European  politics  and  concentrated 
all  his  attention  exclusively  on  the  Balkans.  Bismarck 
in  the  '80's  was  taking  himself  a  rather  passive  attitude 
towards  the  Balkan  peoples;  it  was  at  that  time  that 
he  made  his  pointed  remark  that  "The  Balkans  are  not 
worth  the  bones  of  a  single  Pomeranian  grenadier"; 
he  much  preferred  not  to  interfere  and  let  Austria 
fight  out  the  quarrel  with  Russia,  playing  for  him  in 
the  Near  East  the  role  of  the  monkey  taking  the  chest- 
nuts out  of  the  fire.  As  to  Constantinople,  Bismarck 
did  not  care  in  the  least  what  was  happening  there  or 
whose  influence  dominated;  and  he  really  meant  to 
prove  to  Russia  that  he  did  not  care.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, in  1888  he  started  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrich- 
ten  a  whole  campaign,  publishing  a  series  of  articles 


150  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

expounding  the  government's  program.  Gradually, 
however,  he  became  more  truculent  towards  Russia, 
egged  on  by  the  seeming  indifference  of  the  Tsar,  and 
finally  burst  out  with  rage,  when  he  delivered  his 
famous  aggressive  speech  in  the  Reichstag,  saying  that 
"Germany  feared  no  one,  but  God."  This  was  a  direct 
threat  against  Russia  and  was  thus  understood  by  the 
latter. 

Bismarck  was  not  alone  in  his  unfriendly  attitude 
toward  Russia;  one  might  even  say  that  he  was  more 
considerate  than  some  other  Germans.  There  existed 
a  very  strong  group  among  the  German  generals, 
with  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  his  Assistant,  the  Gen- 
erals Moltke  and  Waldersee  at  their  head.  These 
men  were  absolutely  convinced  that  a  war  with  Russia 
would  break  out  sooner  or  later  and  considered,  just 
as  in  the  case  concerning  France,  that  a  "preventive" 
war,  that  would  annihilate  and  break  Russia  up,  was 
far  preferable.  Some  people,  Fried jung  for  example, 
still  think  that  it  would  have  been  much  better  for 
Germany  to  have  struck  then  at  Russia  and  defeated 
her  once  and  for  ever. 

Bismarck's  own  plans  were  more  political  than  stra- 
tegic, possibly  because  he  constantly  underrated 
Russia's  military  strength.  His  own  idea  was  to  break 
Russia  up,  severing  all  the  non-Slav  peoples  and 
forming  out  of  them  an  anti-Russian  alliance  or  else 
a  federation  under  the  guidance  of  Germany  or  of  her 
allies.  The  wonderful  part  of  this  is  that  Bismarck's 
plan  was  made  use  of  much  later  not  only  by  the 
German  government  (for  instance,  at  the  time  of  the 


GERMANY  151 

conclusion  of  the  Brest-Li tovsk  peace),  but  even  by 
some  of  Russia's  western  allies. 

Bismarck's  aggressiveness  reached  its  height  toward 
1888,  and  just  then  suddenly  the  old  Kaiser  died  and 
a  period  of  political  confusion  followed  in  Germany. 
It  was  evident  that  the  emperor  Frederick,  who  suc- 
ceeded Wilhelm  I,  could  not  live  long.  Then  came  the 
accession  of  Wilhelm  II,  who  brought  with  him  very 
kind  feelings  towards  Russia.  The  Tsar  also  at  the 
beginning  was  quite  sympathetic  towards  the  young 
Kaiser.  The  latter,  as  is  well  known,  soon  began  to 
fret  under  the  bullying  Chancellor  and  eventually  got 
rid  of  him. 

There  is  a  story,  dating  from  those  days,  the  gist  of 
which  is,  that  Bismarck,  just  prior  to  his  resignation, 
realized  that  he  had  gone  too  far  with  Russia  and  that 
he  was  ready  to  make  up  with  her,  but  that  his  dis- 
missal prevented  it.  This  is  quite  possible.  The 
rapprochement  of  Russia  with  France,  of  which  he 
knew  much,  was  certainly  not  to  his  taste.  It  may  be 
that  he  began  to  realize  that  it  was  his  own  policy 
that  had  helped  to  estrange  Russia  from  Germany.  It 
was,  however,  too  late  for  him  to  act. 

There  exists  also  another  legend  concerning  Bis- 
marck's views  of  Russia,  namely,  that  all  his  life  he 
advocated  close  friendship  between  Russia  and  Ger- 
many and  that  it  was  really  Wilhelm  II  who  brought 
with  him  the  final  break  between  the  two  countries.1 
This  one  often  hears  from  contemporary  Germans  of 

*The  main  support  for  that  point  of  view  is  found  in  Bismarck's 
own  memoirs  and  the  publications  of  his  friend  Busch. 


152  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

the  old  school,  who  admire  Bismarck  and  his  days  of 
German  greatness.  It  is  only  relatively  true,  however ; 
Bismarck  well  realized  the  possible  dangers  to  Ger- 
many of  an  understanding  between  Russia  and  France. 
His  plan  was  always  to  keep  peace  with  the  eastern 
neighbor  and  not  let  Russia  make  an  agreement  with 
France ;  but  that  is  all.  Bismarck  did  not  realize  that 
he  was  bullying  Russia  and  irritating  her  by  his  over- 
bearing ways.  He  did  not  see  that  his  friendship  with 
Austria  was  exceedingly  unpleasant  to  the  Tsar.  It 
was  this  policy  that  was  chiefly  the  cause  of  the  gradual 
estrangement  of  Russia;  Russia  resented  deeply  his 
desire  to  keep  her  weak. 

The  results  of  Bismarck's  policy  were  quite  evident 
in  1890.  Russia  was  no  longer  under  the  influence  of 
Berlin  although  the  Tsar  was  still  supporting  strongly 
the  monarchical  principle,  and  disliked  the  French 
people. 

II. 

At  his  accession  to  the  throne  Wilhelm  II  was  very 
anti-British.  He  knew  too  that  the  Tsar  was  no  friend 
of  England,  that  Russia  had  great  troubles  on  hand 
on  account  of  her  disputes  with  England.  Though  he 
showed  signs  of  desiring  close  friendship  with  Russia, 
which  met  with  the  hearty  sympathy  of  the  Tsar,  the 
Kaiser  was,  nevertheless,  not  averse  to  a  quarrel 
breaking  out  between  England  and  Russia.  Wilhelm 
ishrewdly  counted  upon  such  a  possibility;  it  would 
have  been  profitable  to  Germany,  as  both  antagonists 
could  only  be  weakened  by  such  a  war.  Russia  cer- 


GERMANY  153 

tainly  was  bound  to  lose  much  by  it  and  England  had 
but  little  to  gain  in  any  case ;  the  gain  would  have  been 
to  Germany's  profit.  It  was  exactly  the  same  idea  that 
prompted  the  Kaiser  to  interfere,  later  on,  with  the 
Boer  uprising  and  still  later  in  the  Japanese  war  with 
Russia,  while  he  was  surreptitiously  urging  the  Tsar  to 
oppose  the  Japanese  claims. 

At  the  same  time,  Wilhelm  was  doing  all  he  could  to 
make  himself  agreeable  to  the  Tsar.  Alexander  III 
liked  him  at  first  and  was  seemingly  inclined  to  renew 
his  friendship  with  Berlin,  so  disappointingly  inter- 
rupted by  the  harshness  and  aggressiveness  of  Bis- 
marck. However,  the  previous  policy  of  the  German 
government  had  by  this  time  become  too  deeply  rooted 
and  Russia  was  too  much  involved  with  France  to  turn 
back.  The  French  advances  and  especially  the  loans, 
in  which  Germany  had  declined  to  participate,  had 
firmly  bound  the  Russian  government  to  France. 

The  first  diplomatic  steps  of  the  young  Kaiser  were 
directed  by  Bismarck,  who  during  the  early  months 
of  the  new  reign  was  still  at  the  helm  of  the  German 
ship  of  State;  it  is  possible  that  this  fact  prejudiced 
Wilhelm  a  trifle  in  his  relations  with  Russia.  The 
heritage  of  the  previous  reigns  also  told  heavily  upon 
him.  Wilhelm  did  not  have  his  hands  free  in  dealing 
with  the  Tsar.  Thus  for  example,  he  paid  Alexander 
a  formal  visit  immediately  following  his  accession  to 
the  throne  and  then  wished  to  see  him  once  more  infor- 
mally. Bismarck  interfered  and  tried  to  prevent  this 
second  visit,  thinking  that  it  would  mean  too  much  of 
a  friendship  between  the  two  Emperors.  The  Kaiser 
was  very  much  displeased  with  Bismarck's  action, 


154  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

deferred  his  visit,  but  finally  did  go  to  Russia  a  second 
time.  The  impression  of  this  friendly  act  was  spoiled, 
however,  because  meanwhile  the  Tsar  had  heard  of 
the  interference  of  the  Chancellor. 

The  real  break  in  the  friendly  relations  between 
Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg,  however,  came  a  few  months 
later.  It  was  caused  by  the  greed  of  East  Prussia. 
The  representatives  of  this  province,  the  so-called 
Junkers,  soon  began  to  dominate  more  and  more  over 
the  German  government  and  forced  the  latter  to  start 
a  new  tariff  policy  against  Russia. 

At  that  time  a  very  strong  man  was  appointed  by 
Alexander  as  minister  of  finance,  S.  J.  Witte,  and  it 
was  due  to  him  that  the  Russian  government  at  once 
firmly  resisted  the  German  demands  for  a  very  unprofit- 
able commercial  treaty.  The  Prussian  jingoes  wanted 
to  impose  prohibitive  duties  on  imports  from  Russia 
and  in  retaliation  Witte  at  once  raised  the  tariff  on 
German  goods.  Germany  was  amazed  at  the  action, 
but  was  helpless.  A  tariff  war  ensued  which  lasted 
about  three  years,  1892-1894,  and  at  first  neither  side 
wanted  to  give  in. 

This,  however,  was  spoiling  all  the  plans  of  the 
German  government.  Russia  seemed  to  slip  away 
from  its  grasp.  The  Franco-Russian  rapprochement, 
on  the  other  hand,  bcame  much  stronger  and  soon  crys- 
tallized into  a  military  agreement.  It  at  once  became 
evident  that  Wilhelm  had  failed  to  establish  a  strong 
and  firm  German  influence  in  St.  Petersburg.  Witte 
had  thwarted  his  plans  and  to  save  the  situation  Ger- 
many had  to  give  in  and  sign  the  commercial  treaty 
of  1894,  thereby  abandoning  her  hopes  of  exploiting 


GERMANY  155 

the  Russian  market  by  getting  cheap  and  abundant 
raw  materials. 

It  was  a  great  victory  for  Russia;  unfortunately,  the 
treaty,  being  signed  for  the  term  of  ten  years,  expired 
in  1904,  just  when  Russia  was  in  the  depths  of  defeat, 
overwhelmed  by  Japan,  and  absolutely  helpless. 
Germany  naturally  made  use  of  this  opportunity  to 
enforce  her  will,  abrogate  the  treaty  of  1894,  and  re- 
place it  by  a  new  one,  in  which  she  had  all  the 
advantages.1 

The  action  of  Germany  in  taking  this  advantage 
could  not  be  forgotten  at  St.  Petersburg  for  a  long 
time  and  the  consequences  of  it  were  still  felt  in  1913- 
1914,  during  the  months  preceding  the  Great  War.  It 
also  helped  to  create  the  belief  that  no  real  friendship 
existed  between  Germany  and  Russia,  notwithstanding 
the  outward  assurances  and  promises  of  the  Kaiser  to 
stand  by  the  monarchical  principle  and  defend  autoc- 
racy in  all  its  glory.  Under  cover  of  friendship  there 
thus  existed  a  strong  undercurrent  of  mutual  suspi- 
cions, that  saved  Russia  from  any  possible  close  under- 
standing with  Germany,  which  would  have  meant  for 
Russia  economic  exploitation  and  political  subjugation 
for  a  long  period  of  time. 

After  the  failure  to  establish  direct  influence  in  St. 
Petersburg  Wilhelm  did  not  give  up  the  idea  of  keep- 
ing a  close  watch  on  Russia's  foreign  relations  and  of 
trying  constantly  to  exert  a  personal  pressure  upon  the 
Tsar.  During  the  reign  of  Alexander  III  this  was 
certainly  impossible.  Alexander  was  too  strong  and 
independent  to  be  swayed  by  Wilhelm.  Again,  he 

1The  new  treaty  was  signed  on  July  28,  1904. 


156  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

was  much  older  and  was  looked  upon  by  the  Kaiser  as 
a  personal  friend  and  relative  of  his  grandfather.  He 
could  play  towards  him  only  the  role  of  an  obedient 
grand-nephew.  But  this  changed  at  the  sudden  death 
of  Alexander.  With  Nicholas  the  situation  was  ex- 
actly reversed ;  Wilhelm  was  the  stronger  and  the  older, 
more  clever  and  more  experienced  in  diplomatic 
intrigue.  His  government  too  was  nearly  always 
stronger  and  abler,  having  little  difficulty  in 
overreaching  the  Russian  ministers,  with  the  exception 
of  Witte  and  one  or  two  others. 

Realizing  his  intellectual  and  technical  superiority, 
Wilhelm  constantly  played  the  role  of  counsellor 
towards  Nicholas,  exerting  upon  him  a  most  pernicious 
influence.  The  Tsar  knew  and  felt  this  influence,  but 
was  too  weak  to  overcome  it.1  One  important  conse- 
quence was  a  strong  feeling  of  dislike  for  the  Kaiser  on 
the  part  of  the  Tsar.  He  never  dared  show  it  but  it 
broke  out  into  a  violent  flame  of  hatred,  when  the  war 
began  in  1914. 

There  exist  many  proofs  of  how  Wilhelm  tried  to 
sway  Nicholas.  For  instance  in  1895,  when  the  Euro- 
pean powers  started  their  policy  of  grab  in  China  and 
exerted  strong  pressure  upon  Japan  to  relinquish  her 
gains,  Port  Arthur  included,  it  was  the  Kaiser  who 
was  backing  Russia.  It  was  then  that  he  sent  his 
famous  telegram,  "greetings  from  the  Admiral  of  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Admiral  of  the  Pacific."  It  was  Ger- 

1  There  is  no  wonder  whatever,  knowing  the  personal  relations  of 
Nicholas  and  Wilhelm,  that  the  former  is  said  to  have  been  con- 
stantly very  nervous  when  he  met  the  Kaiser  and  personally  afraid 
of  him.  This  was  witnessed  for  example  by  Iswolsky,  Russian  foreign 
minister,  who  had  the  opportunity  of  seeing  the  Emperors  together 
several  times. 


GERMANY  157 

many  who  urged  Russia  to  develop  her  expansion 
towards  the  Pacific,  where  she  would  have  to  meet, 
without  any  doubt,  the  Japanese  claims  and  resistance. 
Further,  at  the  time  of  the  Japanese  war,  Wilhelm 
energetically  supported  Russia,  not  by  arms,  but  by 
counsel  (which  was  less  expensive  and  less  dangerous), 
especially  in  her  anti-English  attitude.  When  the 
Dogger  Bank  incident  happened  Wilhelm  expressed 
his  sympathies  with  Russia  and  informed  St.  Peters- 
burg that  the  English  were  marching  into  Afghanistan 
with  the  purpose  of  annexing  that  country.  The  whole 
story  was  simply  an  invention,  made  up  in  order  to 
create  trouble  between  Russia  and  England.  Most 
characteristic  was  the  demeanor  of  Germany  towards 
the  Hague  peace  conferences,  the  initiative  of  which 
belongs,  as  is  well  known,  to  the  Tsar. 

The  first  peace  conference  was  due  to  the  constantly 
augmenting  armaments;  the  great  powers  could  no 
longer  bear  the  increasing  expense;  some  even  were 
desperately  looking  for  relief.  Russia's  situation  was 
one  of  the  worst,  due  to  her  financial  difficulties  and  the 
strain  put  upon  her  by  her  shortsighted  expansion  in 
the  Far  East.  Just  when  her  financial  troubles  seemed 
at  their  worst,  the  St.  Petersburg  government  heard 
that  Austria  had  begun  to  rearm  her  artillery.  The 
Russian  war  office  at  once  laid  plans  for  a  similar 
reform  of  the  Russian  artillery  and  this  called  for  an 
expenditure  that  she  was  not  able  to  meet.  The  clever 
finance  minister,  Witte,  at  once  protested.  He  was 
afraid  of  such  an  appropriation,  as  it  would  be  a  tre- 
mendous strain  on  the  newly  established  gold  currency, 
which  might  have  broken  entirely.  Then  too,  it  would 


158  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

necessarily  curtail  Witte's  plans  for  peaceful  penetra- 
tion of  Manchuria  and  react  on  Russia's  policy  in 
Persia.  His  violent  protests  made  the  other  ministers 
hesitate  and  look  for  some  other  way  to  meet  Austria's 
move.  The  initiative  of  the  new  proposal  belongs  to 
the  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  count  Muraviev.  It  is 
not  known  which  one  of  his  subordinates  originated  it; 
it  was  certainly  not  the  count  himself,  as  he  was  much 
too  ignorant  and  superficial.  However,  he  presented 
a  report  to  the  Tsar,  recommending  a  call  for  a  peace 
conference,  which  would  start  the  idea  of  a  general 
disarmament  program  or  at  least  stop  the  increase  of 
armaments.  The  other  ministers  supported  the  plan 
with  ardor  and  easily  persuaded  the  Tsar  to  send  out  a 
circular  to  all  the  Powers,  calling  such  a  conference 
(August  24,  1898).  This  action  gave  the  Tsar  the 
reputation  of  a  "Peace-Maker."  The  plan  of.such  a 
conference  appealed  so  much  to  the  public  opinion  of 
all  the  nations,  that  no  government  dared  to  oppose 
it,  though  we  know  now  that  not  many  sympathized 
with  it.  The  nations  were  too  tired  and  exhausted  by 
the  constant  increase  in  armaments  and  were  longing 
for  some  guarantee  against  future  wars.  The  Russian 
proposal  was  met  everywhere  with  tremendous  enthu- 
siasm and  the  governments  had  to  comply,  with  the 
hope,  however,  of  thwarting  the  plan  by  sabotage. 
In  this  latter  respect  the  palm  of  success  belongs  to 
Germany.  She  knew  how  to  create  friction  and  practi- 
cally annulled  the  intent  of  the  work  of  the  conference. 
Still  worse  was  her  policy  at  the  second  conference, 
called  in  1907;  here  too  Russia  had  the  initiative. 
The  Americans  were  most  eager  to  have  the  second 


GERMANY  159 

conference  called,  but  President  Roosevelt  gave  way 
to  the  desire  of  the  Russian  government  that  the 
initiative  should  again  come  from  St.  Petersburg. 
Germany  very  successfully  opposed  all  the  more  im- 
portant resolutions  of  this  conference  and  really 
annulled  all  its  work.  The  Russian  government  real- 
ized this  and  the  Tsar  took  it  as  a  personal  offense, 
though  once  more,  he  had  not  the  courage  to  tell 
Berlin  what  he  thought. 

III. 

It  is  important  to  notice  that  just  when  Russia 
was  hi  the  midst  of  her  worst  troubles  during  the 
Russo-Japanese  war,  Wilhelm  chose  to  enforce  upon 
Nicholas  the  famous  agreement  of  Bjorko  (August  24, 
1905).  This  only  shows  what  little  regard  Germany 
had  for  Russian  interests.  The  Kaiser  simply  wanted 
to  make  use  of  her  weakness  in  order  to  force  her 
either  to  break  with  France  or  to  counteract  her  alli- 
ance with  that  country.  He  also  made  use  of  the  per- 
sonal weakness  of  the  Tsar  in  forcing  him  to  sign  that 
treaty  and  keep  it  secret  even  from  his  own  ministers. 
He  was  harping  at  the  same  time  on  the  anti-English 
feelings  of  the  Russians  and  reminding  them  of  Great 
Britain's  attitude  during  the  whole  Japanese  war. 
The  history  of  this  agreement  signed  at  Bjorko  is  too 
well  known  at  present  to  need  any  further  elucidation. 

Witte  had  his  first  hint  about  it  when  returning 
from  Portsmouth.  He  stopped  at  Berlin  and  was 
invited  by  the  Kaiser  to  spend  a  night  with  him  at  his 
hunting  lodge  at  Rominten,  East  Prussia.  But  the 


160  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

whole  story  he  heard  only  from  the  minister  of  for- 
eign affairs,  Lamsdorff,  on  his  return  to  St.  Petersburg. 
He  was  horrified  at  what  he  rightly  deemed  to  be  a 
death  blow  to  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  and  at  once 
set  to  work  to  nullify  its  political  meaning.  Little 
could  be  done,  however,  since  the  Tsar  had  signed  the 
agreement  and  Germany  was  in  no  way  ready  to  release 
him  from  this  obligation.  The  explanatory  notes  sent 
from  St.  Petersburg  could  not  help  him  much.  The 
Tsar,  as  a  consequence,  found  himself  in  a  very  false 
position,  for  at  any  moment  France  might  have  accused 
him  of  duplicity  and  even  betrayal.  It  increased  his 
secret  illfeeling  towards  Wilhelm,  but  could  not  affect 
the  disastrous  consequences,  which  at  once  made  them- 
selves felt.  It  was  in  the  Balkans  that  Germany  first 
made  use  of  her  new  situation,  hampering  the  Russian 
policy  where  it  concerned  Constantinople. 

One  must  say,  however,  that  though  Witte,  clever 
as  he  was,  at  once  perceived  the  meaning  of  the  ill- 
fated  Bjorko  treaty,  he  himself  was  in  no  way  averse 
to  a  three-cornered  understanding  between  Russia, 
France  and  Germany.  Often  had  he  endeavored  to 
bring  about  such  an  agreement  of  the  continental 
powers,  which  would  have  meant  the  isolation  of 
England  and  the  inclusion  of  Austria-Hungary  as  an 
adjunct  only,  and  which  would  have  brought  with  it 
finally  the  triumph  of  Germany,  because  of  Russia's 
inherent  weakness.  Witte  himself  was  thus  only 
against  the  form,  in  which  the  Russian-German  agree- 
ment was  brought  about,  a  form  that  was  bound  to 
create  alarm  and  disappointment  in  France.  He  was 
not  averse  to  the  essence  of  the  treaty.  His  own  idea 


GERMANY  161 

was  to  play  off  Germany  against  France  and  then  reap 
advantages  out  of  their  competition.  His  fundamental 
mistake  was,  however,  that  Russia  after  the  Japanese 
war  was  no  longer  the  rich  bride  with  the  many  suitors, 
but  on  the  contrary  she  was  hopelessly  weak  and  the 
outside  world  knew  it  only  too  well.  The  Kaiser  was 
more  shrewd  in  that  case  than  was  the  Russian  states- 
man and  realized  very  well  how  much  he  succeeded  in 
making  Russia's  position  an  extremely  false  one.  On 
the  day  he  declared  war  against  Russia,  speaking  from 
the  balcony  of  the  Potsdam  Palace,  he  waved  the  text 
of  the  Bjorko  treaty  in  his  hand,  shouting  "Er  hat  mich 
betrogen,  er  hat  mir  gelogen"  (meaning  that  the  Tsar 
promised  to  be  Germany's  ally  and  betrayed  her  in 
taking  sides  with  France).  The  Bjorko  treaty  was 
such,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  the  Tsar  was  bound  to 
betray  one  or  the  other  of  his  two  allies,  France  or 
Germany.  The  Kaiser  knew  quite  well  that  Russia's 
choice  would  necessarily  be  France,  but  this  only  gave 
him  a  good  chance  for  calling  Nicholas  a  traitor. 

The  first  consequences  of  Germany's  free  hand 
towards  Russia  told  very  soon  in  Constantinople, 
where  German  influence  became  predominant.  The 
Germans  developed  a  feverish  activity  in  Turkey; 
their  salesmen  invaded  every  Turkish  town;  their 
merchant  navy  began  to  do  flourishing  business  in  the 
Bosphorus;  their  political  and  semi-political  societies, 
like  the  AU-Deutscher  Verband,  began  their  work 
among  the  Mussulmen.  Every  day  saw  the  increase 
of  Germany's  prestige  and  influence. 

Russia  naturally  was  very  much  alarmed  at  this. 
The  worst,  however,  was  still  to  come,  when  after  the 


162  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Austrian  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Ger- 
many made  her  famous  threat,  standing  in  "shining 
armor"  beside  her  ally.  This  showed  how  much  con- 
tempt was  felt  in  Berlin  towards  Russia  and  how 
convinced  the  German  government  was  of  Russia's 
absolute  helplessness  and  weakness.  Yet  Wilhelm 
could  not  afford  to  quarrel  with  Russia.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  tried  to  allay  her  displeasure  and  indignation 
for  he  was  not  yet  ready  for  a  definite  break.  He  did 
not  feel  that  he  was  sufficiently  firm  in  the  saddle  and 
had  to  be  careful  with  his  eastern  neighbor. 

Strange  to  say,  that  after  all  that  happened  hi  1908- 
1909  the  Kaiser  tried  to  make  himself  once  more 
agreeable  to  Nicholas.1  With  no  great  effort  he  finally 
succeeded  in  making  the  Tsar  pay  him  a  visit  at 
Potsdam.  It  took  place  on  November  4,  1910,  and 
resulted  in  a  new  agreement  between  Russia  and 
Germany,  which  was  signed  August  19,  1911.  The 
Russian  government  agreed  to  connect  its  Persian 
railroad  with  the  Bagdad  line  (Russia  was  supposed 
to  build  a  spur  from  Teheran),  and  practically  give 
Germany  a  free  hand  in  North  Persia  in  regard  to 
German  imports  there.2  From  the  very  first  day  the 
European  governments  heard  of  the  Tsar's  visit  to 
Germany,  accompanied  by  his  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  Sazonoff,  they  were  extremely  alarmed. 
Sazonoff  had  to  issue  a  quieting  communique  to  assure 
them  that  no  questions  of  a  general  nature  were  dis- 

1  See,  the  Willy-Nicky  correspondence,  by  telegraph  and  by  let- 
ter, ed.  by  H.  Bernstein,  N.  Y.,  1918,  and  /.  Don  Levine,  Chicago, 
1920. 

2  North  Persia  was  Russia's  sphere  of  influence  according  to  the 
Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  1907. 


GERMANY  163 

cussed  and  that  the  meeting  had  only  Turkey  and 
Persia  in  view.  Both  London  and  Paris  were  dissatis- 
fied with  the  communique;  the  statesmen  there  knew 
better  and  thoroughly  distrusted  the  Kaiser,  fearing 
at  the  same  time  the  Tsar's  weakness. 

In  other  words,  Germany  succeeded  in  consolidating 
her  economic  influences  in  central  Asia  and  acquired 
the  possibility  of  a  new  trade  route  to  the  Persian 
Gulf.  Russia  on  her  side  did  not  get  any  profit  out 
of  that  understanding. 

The  Potsdam  agreement  once  more  proved  how  little 
reliable  was  the  Tsar's  policy;  how  easily  one  could 
get  around  him  and  how  inconsistent  was  Russia's 
stand  concerning  Turkey,  and  Persia,  Germany  and 
England.  One  of  Germany's  objects  was  to  separate 
Russia  from  England  and  create  trouble  between  them  ; 
the  other,  no  less  alarming  for  England,  was  Ger- 
many's desire  to  enter  the  Persian  market  and  get  an 
outlet  for  her  trade  into  the  Persian  Gulf.  It  was  not 
Russia's  fault  that  she  was  drawn  into  the  world 
conflict,  but  in  no  way  could  she  avoid  it.  The  reac- 
tionary forces  in  Russia  were  never  averse  to  an  under- 
standing with  Germany  and  this  the  Kaiser  knew. 
The  Russian  reactionaries  rightly  saw  in  Germany  the 
only  possible  strong  support  of  dying  autocracy,  and 
in  this  view  they  were  not  mistaken.  Fate,  civilization 
and  progress  were,  however,  against  them  and  firmly 
bound  Russia  to  the  western  Entente,  thwarting  all 
the  Kaiser's  intrigues. 

There  was  one  last  warning  to  Germany,  showing 
clearly  that  all  was  not  right  in  her  plans  in  the  Near 
East.  Namely  the  unexpected  results  of  the  first 


164  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Balkan  war,  when  to  the  amazement  of  Germany 
Turkey  was  so  badly  defeated  by  the  Balkan  allies. 
For  the  moment  it  seemed  that  Germany  was  quite  dis- 
concerted ;  everything  she  had  been  hoping  for  seemed 
to  have  been  lost. 

The  tide  soon  changed,  however,  when  the  quarrels 
of  the  Balkan  allies  saved  Germany's  plans.  The  treaty 
of  Bucharest  proved  much  more  advantageous  for 
Germany  than  Berlin  even  hoped  for  the  previous 
year.  The  most  important  fact  was  that  Turkey  was 
saved  and  was  quickly  recuperating  from  her  defeat 
of  1912.  Germany  was  ready  for  any  sacrifice  to  save 
the  Porte  from  utter  breakdown  and  that  she  meant  to 
do  at  any  cost.  This  was  the  main  object  of  Germany's 
policy  during  the  London  conference  of  the  powers. 

But  on  the  other  hand  there  existed  a  serious  draw- 
back for  Berlin.  Serbia  was  becoming  too  strong  and 
was  threatening  the  Balkan  hegemony  of  Austria. 
Germany's  desire  was  to  see  a  strong  Austria  and  a 
rehabilitated  Turkey,  working  side  by  side,  imposing 
their  will  on  the  rest  of  the  Balkan  nations,  neutraliz- 
ing Russian  influences,  as  far  as  possible. 

In  order  to  counteract  the  strengthening  of  Serbia, 
Germany  was  bound  to  stand  by  Austria  in  whatever 
policy  the  latter  country  might  inaugurate.  As  Vienna 
had  begun  the  policy  of  force,  trying  to  bully  Serbia 
into  subservience,  Germany  was  prepared  to  back  her, 
even  if  such  a  policy  should  involve  her  in  another  seri- 
ous conflict  with  Russia,  The  German  ultimatum  to 
Russia  in  1909  was  so  successful  that  she,  no  doubt, 
thought  she  might  repeat  the  experiment  with  the  same 
immunity  and  success. 


GERMANY  165 

This  brings  us  to  the  very  door  of  the  origin  of  the 
Great  War.  Its  causes  cannot  be  well  appreciated  if 
that  point  is  not  kept  in  mind,  namely  the  absolute 
necessity  for  Germany  to  keep  in  close  touch  with 
Austria  and  back  her  up  "quand  meme"  The  detailed 
analysis  of  the  days  preceding  the  war,  disclosing  the 
immediate  actions  of  the  three  eastern  empires,  is  at 
present  brilliantly  given  by  the  works  of  Kautsky  and 
professor  Fay,  but  to  my  mind  this  is  absolutely  insuffi- 
cient for  the  just  appreciation  of  the  entire  and  com- 
plete situation  which  brought  about  the  war.  That  it 
is  not  sufficient  we  can  judge  by  the  fact  that  such  a 
seemingly  impartial  German  historian  as  professor 
Dehlbruck  does  not  see  it.1 

Toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  there  was 
established  a  seeming  equilibrium  in  European  politics, 
at  least  the  mutual  aims  and  objects  of  the  policies  of 
the  different  countries  were  clear.  The  Near  East  was 
one  of  the  centers  of  trouble  for  there  Russia,  Austria 
and  England  were  in  conflict.  The  first  two  powers 
concentrated  their  attention  on  the  Balkans,  while 
England  was  looking  further,  through  Constantinople, 
into  Asia.  The  other  center  was  in  the  west,  where 
France  was  slowly  but  surely  consolidating  her  posi- 
tion as  against  Germany.  In  the  center  was  Germany, 
&  tremendously  growing  power,  economically  and  so- 
cially, needing  expansion  in  order  to  have  an  outlet  for 
her  increasing  internal  pressure.  She  deliberately  chose 
two  channels  for  it;  North  Africa,  perhaps  a  trifle  less 
Important,  and  the  Near  Eastern  route  into  Asia, 

1See  the  lucid  article  of  Headlam-Morley  in  the  Contemporary 
Review,  March,  1921. 


166  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

through  Constantinople.  There  she  was  bound  to 
come  into  conflict  with  Russia,  at  the  nearer  end  of 
the  route,  and  with  England — at  the  farther  end. 
Germany  associated  herself  with  Austria  to  strengthen 
the  Near  Eastern  route.  It  was  a  heavy  weight  to 
carry  and  proved  fatal  to  her,  as  professor  Fay  clearly 
shows. 

The  first  step  towards  letting  loose  the  forces  of 
Armageddon  was  the  appointment  of  General  Liman 
von  Sanders  to  Constantinople,  which  at  once  made 
evident  the  absolutely  incompatible  claims  of  Russia 
and  Germany  towards  Turkey.  Besides,  the  German 
action  was  quite  unnecessary.  She  could  have  achieved 
the  same  ends  by  much  less  aggressive  means.  Even 
in  Vienna  there  were  a  few  farsighted  men  who  realized 
the  danger;  among  these  count  Tisza,  the  Hungarian 
premier,  was  the  most  prominent. 

In  the  summer  months  of  1914  it  was  entirely  too 
late  to  prevent  war  from  breaking  out.  Beginning 
with  the  preceding  summer,  when  the  treaty  of  Bucha- 
rest was  signed,  the  ball  was  rolling  down  the  hill  and 
its  plunge  into  the  abyss  could  not  be  avoided. 

None  of  the  three  eastern  empires — all  three  des- 
tined to  fall  in  consequence  of  the  war — was  able  to 
stop  Armageddon.  Austria,  because  her  foolish  states- 
men had  called  forth  spirits,  which  they  could  not  in 
any  way  control.  Her  Slavs,  as  well  as  the  Serbians 
were  bound  to  fight  for  independence.  Germany  be- 
cause of  her  own  free  will  she  had  bound  her  fate  so 
inseparably  with  Austria,  and  finally  Russia,  because, 
due  to  her  inconsistent  policy  in  the  Near  East  and 


GERMANY  167 

her  internal  political  weakness,  was  feeling  that  her 
stand  with  the  Slavs  was  threatened,  ruining  her  na- 
tional prestige. 

At  the  present  date  a  dark  cloud  hangs  over  Europe 
again,  and  there  is,  I  think,  a  great  danger  looming  in 
the  background,  the  danger  of  the  future  relations  of 
Russia  and  Germany.  There  is  a  possibility,  that 
Germany  will  go  into  Russia,  that  she  will  control  her 
and  get  out  of  Russia  the  two  things  that  Germany 
needs  in  order  to  be  strong — an  endless  supply  of  raw 
materials  and  man  power.  And  if  that  be  the  case,  if 
Germany  could  permeate  the  Russian  body  politic 
and  control  Russia,  the  question  is  fairly  put,  who 
won  the  war?  There  will  not  be  any  physical  power 
on  earth  to  curb  her  then. 

I  am  sometimes  asked  by  Americans:  After  all,  what 
difference  does  it  make  to  Russians?  If  that  danger 
to  the  outside  world  exists,  as  it  does,  what  do  the 
Russians  care  about  it?  Isn't  it  the  same  for  them 
after  all? 

The  argument  follows  on  the  lines  of  indisputable 
facts, — first,  that  Russia  economically  is  down  and 
out.  She  is  ruined;  her  industries  hardly  exist;  her 
commerce  is  killed;  she  is  prostrate.  On  the  other 
hand,  she  has  tremendous  potentialities.  She  has  great 
natural  wealth,  lying  at  the  easy  reach  of  anyone  ready 
to  exploit  her.  Further,  capital  is  always  allured  by 
such  a  possibility.  The  latter  is  very  tempting;  it  is 
enticing  to  go  into  Russia  and  get  those  natural  re- 
sources and  pump  them  out. 

Some  people  think  that  gold  has  no  smell  attached 


168  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

to  it,  that  capital  is  quite  indifferent,  that  it  cannot 
make  any  difference  if  it  is  German  or  English  or 
American  capital  that  goes  into  Russia,  and  that  Rus- 
sia is  bound  to  be  economically  exploited.  That  theory 
stands  good  with  one  exception.  Economic  exploita- 
tion seems  unavoidable;  it  seems  further  inevitable 
that  Russia  in  the  near  future  will  be  exploited  by  for- 
eign capital.  She  has  no  capital  of  her  own ;  she  must 
be  exploited  by  foreign  capital.  But  foreign  capital 
is  not  the  same  everywhere.  The  saying  that  "gold  has 
no  smell"  is  wrong.  It  does  have  unfortunately  very 
specific  characteristics;  with  economic  exploitation 
there  come  everywhere  the  political  ideals  that  are  un- 
consciously carried  by  those  who  come  in  for  economic 
purposes.  And  if  in  the  future  there  will  occur  the 
permeating  of  the  Russian  body  politic  by  Germans, 
there  will  enter  into  Russia  just  those  ideas  that  we 
were  always  most  afraid  of. 

Such  peaceful  German  penetration  will  be  carried  on, 
first,  by  the  technical  men,  engineers  of  different  call- 
ing; we  might  surmise  that  many  of  them  are  all 
ready  to  go  into  Russia  at  short  notice;  second,  the 
military  men,  officers  of  all  ranks,  who  do  not  have 
any  employment  in  Germany  on  account  of  the  pres- 
ent day  demobilization — there  always  was  an  over 
production  of  such  men  in  Germany  and  most  of  them 
can  hardly  make  a  living  in  their  own  country:  they 
will  be  only  too  glad  to  migrate  eastward;  and  third, 
the  commercial  travellers,  who  will  come  to  Russia  to 
sell  German  goods;  the  Russians  will  be  heartily 
thankful  to  receive  the  latter,  whatever  their  quality; 
they  need  so  much;  nearly  everything  is  lacking  in 


GERMANY  169 

Russia  on  account  of  the  prolonged  civil  war  and  the 
breakdown  of  all  industries;  but  with  all  these  men  will 
inevitably  come  their  political  ideals,  embodying  their 
future  aspirations  and  hopes. 

We  can  presume  that  at  present  Germany  is  sin- 
cerely and  honestly  trying  to  work  off  her  international 
obligations,  imposed  upon  her  by  the  victorious  allies. 
But,  when  Germany  will  have  Russia  under  her  control 
at  her  beck  and  call,  wouldn't  it  be  simply  human  to 
suppose  that  the  feeling  for  vengeance  will  begin  to 
grow  among  Germans,  that  they  will  begin  to  think 
that  they  can  get  back  at  the  allies?  Here  lies  the 
great  danger.  In  the  future  fates  of  European  nations 
there  is  no  factor  on  which  so  much  depends  and  yet 
so  little  heed  is  taken  of  it. 

How  can  one  fight  such  a  danger?  Only  by  under- 
standing, by  a  common  policy  among  the  other  na- 
tions; and  just  that  does  not  exist  at  present. 

Those  among  Americans,  who  believe  in  a  League  of 
Nations — and  I  know  there  are  many  in  this  country 
— do  not  realize  that  the  lack  of  success  of  that  idea 
depends  not  at  all  on  the  faulty  construction  of  this 
or  that  project  of  some  sort  of  structure  of  a  League 
organization;  it  does  not  depend  on  the  personal  mis- 
takes of  a  president  or  a  secretary  of  state  or  a  wrong 
government  policy.  But  it  does  depend  on  the  absence 
of  good  understanding  among  the  great  powers.  And 
as  long  as  there  is  no  real  understanding  there  exists 
no  means  of  fighting  the  oncoming  dangers. 

That  applies  both  to  small  and  to  large  questions. 
For  just  that  reason  the  allies  did  not  oust  the  Turks 
from  Europe;  because  they  do  not  agree  they  cannot 


170  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

settle  the  Russian  question.  They  cannot  defend  the 
minorities  which  are  suffering  from  oppression  in  the 
different  States.  They  cannot  control  the  future  de- 
velopments either  of  Germany  or  Russia.  They  can- 
not finally  build  up  a  successful  League  of  Nations. 

It  is  thus  quite  evident  that  as  long  as  that  under- 
standing does  not  exist,  there  will  be  no  peace  in 
Europe,  nor  in  the  world. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Debidour,  A.,  Histoire  diplomatique  de  1'Europe,  Paris,  1917. 
Seymour,  C.,  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War,  New  Haven,  1916. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
SWEDEN. 

ONE  of  the  most  pernicious  consequences  of  German 
propaganda  was  the  gradual  estrangement  of  Sweden 
from  Russia.  The  Germans  did  all  they  could  to  bring 
about  a  feeling  of  mutual  distrust  between  Sweden  and 
Russia.  The  object  of  such  a  policy  is  easily  explained. 
The  northwest  corner  of  the  Russian  Empire,  where 
Peter  the  Great  built  his  famous  "window  into  Eu- 
rope/' was  always  a  very  vulnerable  point.  It  is  a  back- 
door into  Russia,  both  strategically  and  economically, 
and  besides  threatens  Russia's  best  sea-trade-route, 
across  the  Baltic.  The  Germans  realized  this  very  well, 
knew  the  value  of  such  a  threat,  and  that  a  hostile 
Sweden  could  be  a  very  real  menace  to  Russia. 

This  is  in  no  way  a  new  or  modern  development;  it 
dates  back  to  the  eighteenth  century,  to  the  epoch  when 
Peter  reached  the  Baltic  and  established  Russian  rule 
over  the  southern  coast.  During  a  whole  century  after 
Peter,  the  Swedes  were  hostile  to  Russia,  constantly 
threatening  her  northern  frontiers.  The  question  was 
finally  solved  by  Alexander  I  in  1809,  when  he  an- 
nexed Finland  after  his  victory  over  the  Swedes. 

For  many  consecutive  years  Alexander  was  secretly 
but  steadily  preparing  to  fight  Napoleon ;  it  was  a  sort 
of  obsession  with  him.  He  knew  the  day  was  sure  to 


172  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

come  when  Napoleon's  greed  would  force  him  to  attack 
Russia.  But  the  Tsar  also  realized  the  danger  that  was 
threatening  him  in  such  a  case  from  the  rear.  Na- 
poleon could  attack  Russia  not  only  from  the  west,  by 
way  of  Germany,  but  also  simultaneously  through 
Scandinavia,  going  straight  to  the  capital  of  Russia, 
St.  Petersburg,  which  is  situated  some  twenty  miles 
from  the  Finnish  frontier. 

Thus,  with  statesmanlike  foresight,  preparing  for 
the  coming  struggle  with  Napoleon,  Alexander  en- 
deavored to  secure  his  northern  frontier.  Sweden, 
governed  at  that  time  by  a  half-crazy  and  foolish  sov- 
ereign, was  constantly  bickering  over  all  sorts  of  sec- 
ondary matters  and  finally  brought  about  a  rupture 
with  Russia.  War  followed  and  the  Russians  defeated 
the  Swedes  without  much  difficulty,  drove  them  out 
of  Finland  and  concluded  a  victorious  peace,  signed  at 
Frederickshamn  in  September  1809.  According  to  the 
provisions  of  this  treaty  Sweden  ceded  her  province 
of  Finland  to  Russia,  the  Finns  themselves,  with  few 
exceptions,  hailing  this  cession  with  sincere  delight. 
The  mere  conquest  of  Finland,  however,  was  evidently 
not  sufficient  for  Alexander's  purpose;  the  change  of 
sovereignty  over  the  territory  of  Finland  did  not 
destroy  the  danger  of  an  invasion  by  Napoleon's  troops. 

It  was  the  realization  of  such  a  danger  which 
prompted  the  Tsar  to  what  was  probably  his  greatest 
political  achievement,  namely,  the  granting  of  a  con- 
stitution to  conquered  Finland.  His  purpose  was  to 
foster  among  the  Finnish  people  feelings  of  gratitude 
towards  Russia  and  thus  alienate  their  sympathies  from 
Sweden.  In  a  number  of  acts,  speeches  and  promises, 


SWEDEN  173 

Alexander  secured  constitutional  liberty  to  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Finland,  thus  binding  the  Finnish  people  to 
the  Russian  Empire,  not  by  mere  force  of  conquest, 
but  by  sincere  and  well  deserved  friendship  and  grati- 
tude. 

Thus  was  created  an  ideal  buffer-state  on  Russia's 
northern  frontier,  where  the  Russians  acquired  devoted 
friends,  ready  to  help  them  in  protecting  their  Baltic 
possessions  from  inimical  intrusion.  The  whole  situa- 
tion was  changed  at  a  stroke  of  the  pen,  when  the 
Russian  and  Swedish  plenipotentiaries  signed  the 
Frederickshamn  treaty.  Russia  could  not  be  attacked 
directly.  Napoleon  would  have  first  to  cross  an  enemy 
country,  easily  protected  against  foreign  invasion  by 
its  topographic  peculiarities. 

Twice  in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  did 
Finland  successfully  play  the  role  of  such  a  buffer,  pro- 
tecting and  defending  Russia's  northwestern  frontier; 
once  as  early  as  1811,  when  the  long  awaited  attack  by 
Napoleon  finally  took  place,  as  Alexander  had  antici- 
pated, and  the  second  time,  during  the  Crimean  war 
with  England  and  France,  when  these  allies  unsuccess- 
fully attacked  the  Finnish  coast. 

But  this  clever  policy  of  Alexander  was  only  the 
first  step  of  his  general  plan.  Next  came  the  effort  to 
smooth  out  the  troubles  with  Sweden,  make  her  for- 
get her  historic  enmity  towards  Russia,  as  well  as  her 
recent  defeat  and  loss  of  the  Finnish  province. 

In  that  matter  too,  Alexander  adopted  an  extremely 
clever  course  and  was,  consequently,  very  successful. 
The  Swedish  throne  was  soon  to  become  vacant,  the 
king  having  no  male  descendants.  Alexander  helped 


174          RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

one  of  Napoleon's  ambitious  and  unscrupulous 
marshals,  Bernadotte,  to  be  elected,  Heir  Apparent, 
later  to  succeed  as  king  of  Sweden.  Alexander  knew 
that  for  the  gift  of  a  crown,  Bernadotte  would  abandon 
his  former  master,  and  therefore,  urged  and  helped 
him  in  the  realization  of  his  ambition.1 

Thus,  when  Napoleon's  attack  came,  Alexander  had 
in  Sweden  a  good  friend  and  not  an  enemy,  and  in  ad- 
dition, a  man  of  great  military  talent,  one  of  Napoleon's 
best  generals,  thoroughly  acquainted  with  Napoleon's 
strategy  and  ready  to  meet  him  with  his  own  weapons 
of  warfare. 

This  stroke  of  Alexander's  genius  was  one  of  the  first 
serious  diplomatic  reverses  of  Napoleon,  which  opened 
the  way  to  his  final  defeat  on  the  frozen  plains  of  Rus- 
sia. 

For  a  long  time  the  Finns  were  well  satisfied  with 
their  national  existence ;  Russia  practically  never  inter- 
fered, leaving  them  alone  to  develop  their  political  and 
social  institutions,  not  forcing  them  to  take  any  part 
whatever  in  the  burdens  of  the  Russian  state,  in  taxa- 
tion or  recruiting.  Finland  had  her  own  legislation, 
her  own  administration  and  her  own  courts  of  law. 
The  Russian  Governor-General  seldom  interfered  in 
the  local  administration. 

This  happy  state  of  affairs  lasted  up  to  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  when  some  Russian  national- 
ists started  the  most  dangerous  and  shortsighted  policy 

*As  a  territorial  compensation  for  the  loss  of  Finland,  Sweden 
was  promised  the  annexation  of  Norway,  which  led  to  the  Moss 
Convention  of  1814,  when,  by  the  efforts  of  Alexander,  Bernadotte 
and  some  others,  a  special  form  of  union  between  Sweden  and 
Norway  was  established,  which  lasted  for  nearly  a  century,  up  to 
1905. 


SWEDEN  175 

of  russification,  attempting  gradually  to  take  away 
from  Finland  her  constitutional  privileges  and  thus 
necessarily  creating  a  national  conflict  of  vast  political 
importance. 

Germany  was  not  slow  in  realizing  the  great  possible 
advantage  of  such  a  nationalistic  struggle.  Her  Gen- 
eral Staff,  always  alert  and  so  well  informed,  had 
studied  the  lessons  of  the  Napoleonic  and  Crimean 
wars  and  knew  very  well  how  vulnerable  this  north- 
western corner  of  the  Russian  empire  was. 

Germany  now  began  to  make  strenuous  efforts  to 
alienate  Sweden  from  Russia.  German  propaganda 
made  great  capital  out  of  the  russification  of  Fin- 
land, trying  to  prove  to  Sweden  how  dangerous  this 
was  to  the  Swedes  themselves — that  it  was  merely 
meant  by  the  Russian  imperialists  as  a  first  step  to- 
wards threatening  Sweden  proper  and  then  attacking 
her  and  conquering  still  more  Swedish  territory.  Espe- 
cially did  this  propaganda  harp  on  the  idea  of  Russia 
wanting  an  ice-free  harbor  on  the  northern  coast  of 
Scandinavia,  for  the  purpose  of  getting  a  firm  foot  on 
the  Arctic  Sea.  There  was  even  invented  a  special 
story  about  an  apocryphal  testament  of  Peter  the 
Great,  who  entrusted  his  successors  with  the  task  of 
securing  such  a  northern  harbor  for  Russia,  as  a  neces- 
sary complement  to  his  newly  built  port,  St.  Peters- 
burg. Needless  to  say  this  was  pure  fiction,  but  it  had 
the  desired  effect  on  Sweden ;  the  Swedes  were  greatly 
alarmed  and  not  without  good  reason. 

One  must  add  that  unfortunately  some  Russian  gov- 
ernment officials  were  also  much  at  fault  in  this  case. 
There  lived  in  Stockholm  a  Russian  colonel,  whom  the 


176  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Swedes  caught  red-handed,  spying  on  the  Swedish  mili- 
tary activities.  A  great  noise  was  made  of  this  incident 
by  the  chauvinists  of  both  countries,  which  necessarily 
increased  the  national  friction  on  both  sides.  But 
worst  of  all  for  the  Swedes  was  the  reorganization  of 
the  Russian  army,  undertaken  by  the  minister  of  war, 
General  Kuropatkin.  His  plans  were  first  put  in 
action  in  May  1901.  He  had  in  view  Germany  only 
and  in  particular  the  fact  mentioned  above  of  the  great 
advantages  of  Finland's  territory  for  strategic  pur- 
poses of  attack  against  Russia — having  an  army  there 
and  threatening  at  the  same  time  the  Russian  naval 
bases.  Here  again,  the  events  of  the  Great  War  amply 
justified  Kuropatkin's  anxiety  about  Russia's  northern 
frontier,  but  in  Sweden,  under  the  influence  of  German 
propaganda,  all  this  was  taken  to  mean  military  prepa- 
rations for  an  invasion  of  Scandinavia  and  as  purely 
imperialistic  designs  of  the  Russian  reactionaries. 
Nothing  could  convince  the  Swedes  to  the  contrary, 
neither  the  Tsar's  personal  assurances  nor  the  repeated 
notes  and  acts  of  the  Russian  government.  The  Stock- 
holm government,  as  well  as  the  Swedish  nation  at 
large,  were  absolutely  sure  that  Russia  seriously  con- 
templated an  aggression  against  Sweden  and  Norway 
and  that  she  was  preparing  her  way  to  reach  the  Arctic 
Ocean  by  gathering  before  hand  a  very  strong  army  in 
Finland.  In  order  to  pave  the  way  for  such  a  conquest, 
Russia  wanted,  so  most  of  the  Swedes  thought,  to 
avoid  any  impediments  from  the  side  of  the  Finns,  by 
subduing  them  by  force. 

Berlin  naturally  looked  at  this  increasing  friction 
between  Russia  and  Sweden  with  pleasure  and  joy;  it 


SWEDEN  177 

was  just  what  Germany  wanted.  On  the  one  side,  she 
knew  that  Russia  was  much  too  weak  for  such  aggres- 
sion and  that  the  foolish  policy  of  the  russification  of 
Finland  would  only  further  increase  this  weakness,  by 
creating  hatred  on  the  part  of  the  Finnish  nation, 
and  on  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  were  counting  on 
the  increase  of  enmity  towards  Russia  among  the  Swed- 
ish nation  in  order  to  bring  the  latter  into  an  alliance 
with  the  Teutonic  powers  or  at  least  to  create  there 
such  hostility  against  Russia  that  it  would  end  any 
possible  understanding  between  Sweden  and  the  En- 
tente powers.  In  these  endeavors,  in  both  ways,  Ger- 
many scored  a  brilliant  success.  Though  Sweden  never 
dared  join  Germany  openly  during  the  Great  War,  her 
government  was  favoring  the  Teuton  powers  by  every 
possible  means  and  was  inimical  to  Russia  and  her 
Allies. 

There  were  two  short  breaks  in  this  feeling  of  mutual 
suspicions  and  hostility  between  Russia  and  Sweden; 
one  in  1908,  the  other  in  1912,  but  both  proved  very 
short  lived.  The  first  case  happened  in  1908,  when  at 
the  instigation  of  the  Sit.  Petersburg  cabinet  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Baltic  Sea  was  taken  up  by  the  neighboring 
powers.  The  more  liberal  and  farseeing  members  of 
the  Russian  government  were  rather  alarmed  by  the 
absolutely  unnecessary  irritation  of  Sweden  and  tried 
their  best  to  obliterate  the  mutual  pressure.  Among 
those  most  anxious  for  a  peaceful  solution  of  this 
trouble  was  Russia's  foreign  minister,  A.  Iswolsky, 
who  initiated  the  negotiations  concerning  the  Baltic 
Sea  and  finally  succeeded  in  bringing  about  the  signing 
in  St.  Petersburg  of  a  convention  (1908)  by  Russia, 


178  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Germany,  Sweden  and  Denmark,  confirming  the  status 
quo  ante  of  that  sea  and  its  coasts.  A  visit  to  Stock- 
holm of  the  Tsar  of  Russia  followed  in  the  summer  of 
1909,  which  tended  to  persuade  the  Swedish  govern- 
ment of  the  friendly  intentions  of  Russia,  but  as  I  said, 
for  a  very  short  while  only.  Russia's  policy  in  Finland 
was  too  much  in  contravention  of  her  verbal  assur- 
ances. 

The  year  1912  saw  the  second  attempt  at  reconcilia- 
tion in  the  Russo-Swedish  relations,  when  the  Swedish 
king  returned  the  Tsar's  visit  and  came  to  see  him  in 
the  Finnish  fjords.  The  Tsar  and  king  Gustav 
were  accompanied  by  their  ministers  of  foreign  affairs, 
Sazonoff  and  Ehrensvard,  and  long  conversations  took 
place  concerning  the  mutual  relations  of  the  two  coun- 
tries, as  well  as  the  Baltic  Sea  and  the  Finnish  question. 
This  seemed  to  satisfy  the  Swedes  for  the  time  being, 
but  again,  unfortunately,  it  did  not  last.  It  helped 
however  to  create  a  distinct  line  of  cleavage  among  the 
Swedes.  The  Swedish  liberals,  then  in  power,  with 
Staaff  as  prune  minister  and  Ehrensvard  as  minister 
of  foreign  affairs,  were  now  convinced  of  the  absence 
on  the  part  of  Russia  of  any  aggressive  designs  against 
Sweden  or  Scandinavia.  They  quite  evidently  realized 
that  the  army  reforms  and  changes  of  garrisons  were 
not  directed  in  any  way  against  Sweden  and  that  on 
the  other  hand,  the  Russian  policy  in  Finland  was  only 
the  result  of  a  handful  of  criminally  shortsighted  in- 
dividuals among  the  Russian  ruling  class,  who  were 
striving  to  take  from  Finland,  by  any  possible  means, 
mostly  by  coercion,  her  constitutional  autonomy,  as  it 


SWEDEN  179 

was  too  much  of  a  contradiction  to  their  beloved  prin- 
ciples of  autocracy. 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  liberals  at  that  time 
were  not  in  the  majority  among  the  Swedish  ruling 
classes,  though  they  always  had  the  support  of  the 
masses.  The  conservatives  and  the  reactionaries  were 
constantly  much  stronger  among  the  ruling  bureau- 
cracy and  military  class  and  they  tenaciously  held  to 
quite  opposite  views  concerning  the  "Russian  danger." 
It  is  difficult  to  say  how  much  sincerity  there  was  in 
their  anxiety  about  Russian  aggression,  but  outwardly 
they  certainly  made  a  great  show  of  it  and  found  hearty 
support  in  the  German  propaganda  and  secret  in- 
fluences. 

As  usual,  the  Swedish  reactionaries  made  a  great 
case  for  themselves  and  their  policy,  mostly  out  of 
the  question  of  national  defence.  This  matter  is  al- 
ways and  everywhere  the  choice  subject  for  conserva- 
tive and  chauvinistic  propaganda.  The  liberals  had 
to  withstand  repeated  and  rabid  attacks  and  though 
they  often  had  a  strong  majority  in  the  Riksdag  (as  for 
instance  in  1911,  when  the  liberals  disposed  of  101 
votes,  while  the  Socialists  had  63  and  the  conservatives 
only  70),  nevertheless  their  position  was  made  insecure 
by  the  energetic  antagonism  of  the  ruling  classes,  the 
Court,  the  bureaucracy  and  the  military. 

During  the  months  preceding  the  Great  War  much 
activity  was  displayed  by  the  German  propagandists 
in  Sweden;  the  Swedish  conservatives  lent  a  willing 
ear  to  these  intrigues,  with  the  object  of  getting  even 
with  the  liberals  and  to  wrest  the  government  power 


180          RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

from  them.  Quite  exceptional  methods  were  employed 
by  them  to  oust  the  liberals,  who  were  reluctant  to  add 
any  new  elements  of  strain  to  the  trouble  with  Russia. 
The  conservative  papers  were  making  a  terrific  outcry 
about  Russia's  treacherous  designs.  First,  the  con- 
servatives began  a  private  collection,  raising  a  fund  for 
the  building  of  a  warship,  as  the  government  declined 
to  make  the  necessary  appropriations;  twenty-five  mil- 
lion kronas  were  raised  in  this  way.  I  think  there  can 
hardly  be  found  any  other  example  in  the  history  of 
the  whole  modern  world,  of  a  man-of-war  being  built 
by  private  subscription.  Its  military  significance  was 
certainly  not  important  to  the  Russian  fleet,  which  was 
about  ten  times  stronger  than  the  Swedish  naval 
forces,  but  its  political  meaning  was  enormous,  as  a 
demonstration  of  hostility  towards  Russia.  Second 
must  be  mentioned  the  great  peasant-pageant  also 
staged  by  the  conservatives,  hi  order  to  prove  that  their 
views  were  not  only  the  policy  of  one  or  two  ruling 
classes,  but  that  they  were  backed  by  the  nation.  The 
conservatives  induced  some  thirty-two  thousand  peas- 
ants to  form  in  procession  in  Stockholm  and  petition 
the  king  to  devote  more  efforts  to  national  defence. 
There  cannot  be  found  many  examples  of  such  a  case  in 
modern  history,  where  a  political  party,  representing  a 
small  minority  of  the  people,  succeeded  in  staging  such 
a  demonstration.  Gustav,  whose  sympathies  were  with 
the  conservatives,  graciously  received  the  peasant  pro- 
cession and  promised  them  that  the  Government  would 
devote  its  attention  to  the  matters  of  defence.  The  lib- 
eral ministry  had  to  exert  a  tremendous  pressure  on 
the  king  in  order  to  lessen  the  impression  made  by  this 


SWEDEN  181 

foolish  demonstration.  Worst  of  all  was  the  fact  that 
the  liberals  could  not  simply  resign,  for  that  would 
have  meant  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  conservatives, 
who  were  eagerly  looking  for  the  chance  of  getting  into 
office.  The  latter  could  not  succeed  by  any  other 
means,  as  the  parliament  majority  was  against  them. 

The  Russian  conservative  and  reactionary  press  nat- 
urally answered  this  demonstration  of  hostility  and 
many  other  minor  ones  that  followed,  by  very  vituper- 
ative and  vicious  attacks  on  Sweden  and  Finland,  and 
these  were  hailed  in  Sweden  as  the  desired  "Gefundenes 
Fressen"  and  proof  of  Russian  enmity  and  aggression, 
whereas  the  liberal  and  moderate  press  of  Russia  was 
effectively  gagged  by  the  reactionary  government  and 
had  no  chance  whatever  to  counteract  all  this  artificial 
propaganda.  The  most  curious  fact  about  it  is,  that 
Russians  never  even  noticed,  until  it  was  too  late,  the 
role  that  the  German  propaganda  played  in  the  case. 
Neither  did  most  of  them  realize  the  harm  done  in  the 
matter  by  the  Russian  policy  of  coercion  in  Finland. 

Finally  there  happened  a  very  unfortunate  Court 
incident  which  also  greatly  helped  to  intensify  the  mu- 
tual hostility  of  the  two  countries.  We  mean  the  di- 
vorce of  the  Russian  Grand  Duchess,  Maria  Pavlovna, 
from  the  Swedish  prince.  She  was  married  only  a  short 
time,  but  her  conduct  in  Stockholm  and  at  the  Swed- 
ish Court  made  an  extremely  bad  impression  on  the 
prudish  Swedes.  After  having  had  great  freedom  in 
Russia,  the  Grand  Duchess  Maria  found  the  Swedish 
Court  life  dull  and  slow  and  tried  in  every  way  to  show 
her  superiority  and  contempt,  hurting  the  feelings  of 
the  Swedes  repeatedly.  The  Russian  minister  in 


182           RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS  WITH 

Stockholm,  Savinsky,  was  also  very  much  to  blame  for 
her  most  extraordinary  conduct.  The  Tsar  tried  to 
shield  his  unruly  cousin  and  finally  sanctioned  her  di- 
vorce, which  created  a  great  scandal  in  Sweden  and 
hurt  the  Swedish  national  pride,  thereby  pouring  more 
oil  on  the  already  spreading  fire  of  national  hatred. 

Thus  in  the  summer  of  1914,  when  the  Great  War 
broke  out,  the  Germans  had  a  well  and  carefully  pre- 
pared case  in  Sweden  and  only  the  frantic  efforts  of  the 
Swedish  liberals  and  the  thoroughly  peace  loving  ten- 
dencies of  the  Swedish  people  saved  that  country  from 
the  disasters  of  taking  part  in  the  war. 

In  western  Europe  and  America  many  people  won- 
dered why  Sweden  seemed  so  hostile  to  the  Entente 
and  so  friendly  to  Germany,  helping  her  by  thought 
and  act.  This  was  not  the  case,  however;  it  was  purely 
and  simply  distrust  and  even  hatred  of  Russia  which 
actuated  the  Swedes,  but  these  feelings  were  confined 
to  the  reactionary  and  conservative  elements  exclu- 
sively. Those  feelings  were  created  artificially  and 
cleverly  fostered  and  strengthened  by  the  German 
propaganda,  because  Berlin  realized  better  than  any- 
one else  the  weak  point  of  Russia,  her  northern  defence. 

Sweden  was  saved  from  the  disasters  of  becoming  a 
belligerent  power  by  two  facts,  first,  because  her  re- 
actionaries and  conservatives  were  after  all  only  a  small 
minority  and  were  never  backed  by  the  mass  of  the 
people;  and  second,  on  account  of  th*e  freedom  of  the 
press,  publicity  and  public  discussion  that  existed  at 
the  time  Armageddon  first  swept  over  Europe.  As 
long  as  a  liberal  ministry  kept  the  power  in  their  hands, 
backed  by  a  strong  parliamentary  majority,  the  con- 


SWEDEN  183 

servatives  could  not  achieve  their  avowed  aim  of  drag- 
ging Sweden  into  the  war.  As  long  as  the  liberals  were 
in  power  they  did  not  allow  any  secret  diplomacy  to 
prevail  and  thus  they  saved  Sweden  from  a  great  na- 
tional calamity.  When  the  conservatives  finally  came 
into  power,  after  the  war  was  already  under  way,  it 
was  too  late  for  them  to  find  any  enthusiasm  among 
the  masses  and  even  among  the  staunchest  supporters 
of  their  own  party  for  any  participation  in  the  horrors 
of  warfare. 

This  is  probably  one  of  the  best  examples  of  the 
advantages  to  be  gained  by  discarding  secret  diplomacy. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
SOME   ITEMS. 

A  FEW  conclusions  from  the  preceding  pages 
might  not  be  amiss.  We  have  seen  that  in  the  case 
of  France  the  relations  were  growing  slowly  but  stead- 
ily better,  and  finally  a  friendly  alliance  with  France 
was  established  to  the  great  satisfaction  of  Russia. 
This  really  meant  that  Russia  was  definitely  bound 
with  the  west,  western  culture  and  western  political 
ideals,  and  at  the  same  time,  it  meant  a  break  sooner 
or  later  in  her  relations  with  Germany,  a  break  that 
liberal  Russia  was  hailing  with  enthusiasm  on  account 
of  the  support  that  autocracy  steadily  received  from 
Berlin. 

In  the  history  of  Russia's  relations  with  France  un- 
fortunately the  French  loans  played  a  decisive  role. 
One  cannot  help  feeling  that  France  in  this  respect  had 
a  very  good  means  of  influencing  the  Russian  govern- 
ment and  forcing  them  to  bring  about  constitutional  re- 
forms. This  especially  was  true  at  the  critical  moment 
after  the  Japanese  war  when  the  first  rumblings  of 
the  revolutionary  thunder  were  heard  all  over  Russia. 

This  might  be  also  a  lesson  as  to  the  great  dangers  of 
government  inter-State  loans,  of  one  government  sup- 
porting another  with  selfish  motives,  and  not  minding 
the  interests  of  the  people  at  large.  One  might  wish 

184 


SOME  ITEMS  185 

that  in  the  future  governments  would  not  recur  to 
such  means. 

With  England  we  saw  the  opposite  process  develop- 
ing, of  a  long  established  policy  of  mutual  distrust  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  an  antagonism  that  lasted  up 
to  1907,  and  then  suddenly  changed  only  on  account  of 
the  realization  by  the  English  government  of  the  grow- 
ing German  danger.  German  expansion,  in  particular 
in  the  Balkans  and  the  Near  East,  became  a  very  real 
threat  to  England,  so  much  so  that  her  statesmen  pre- 
ferred to  reverse  her  traditional  policy  and  first  ap- 
proach France  and  then  conclude  a  friendly  entente 
with  Russia. 

Here,  I  think,  are  hidden  the  real  roots  of  the  Great 
War.  The  change  that  came  over  England  between 
1903  and  1908  necessarily  reversed  the  whole  European 
situation. 

During  the  last  decades,  the  far-sighted  English 
statesmanship  was  badly  handicapped  by  the  old 
methods  of  procedure  of  Downing  Street.  It  is  dim- 
cult  to  say  if  it  was  simply  a  matter  of  routine  or  the 
deeply  rooted  psychology  of  the  men  in  the  foreign 
office  that  prevented  them  from  employing  a  more 
liberal  foreign  policy.  The  action  of  Sir  Edward  Grey 
in  the  question  of  Persia,  as  we  have  seen,  might  be 
cited  as  the  best  possible  example.  In  other  words,  the 
British  government  realized  very  well  the  tremendous 
dangers  that  threatened  Europe  on  account  of  Ger- 
many's aggression,  and  yet  they  failed  to  impart  their 
knowledge  of  the  situation  to  their  own  people.  A 
direct  consequence  of  that  policy  was  that  the  English 
people  could  not  up  to  the  last  understand  the  motives 


186  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

of  the  change  of  policy  that  had  come  over  Great  Brit- 
ain when  she  started  to  work  for  a  rapprochement  with 
Russia.  Exactly  the  same  argument  applies  to  the 
Russian  government,  only  in  a  much  stronger  way. 
The  Russian  government,  deficient  as  it  was,  never 
had  the  confidence  of  their  people.  As  a  general  con- 
sequence of  that  situation  we  might  say  that  Great 
Britain  also  lost  a  remarkable  chance  during  those 
years  of  influencing  the  Russian  government  and  forc- 
ing upon  it  constitutional  concessions. 

There  might  possibly  be  one  excuse  for  it:  namely, 
that  the  British  statesmen,  realizing  the  imminence 
of  a  clash  with  Germany,  considered  that  it  was  too 
late  to  attempt  to  support  any  Russian  reforms,  that 
the  needs  of  the  moment  were  so  pressing  that  they 
could  not  wait  for  the  necessarily  slow  development 
of  Russian  constitutionalism. 

As  to  Russia's  relations  with  the  Far  East  we  saw 
that  the  events  of  the  decade  preceding  the  Japanese 
war  were  so  very  artificial  and  unnatural  and  brought 
upon  Russia  such  disastrous  consequences  only  on  ac- 
count of  the  short-sightedness  of  the  Tsar's  surround- 
ings. Russia's  interests  ought  to  have  been  concen- 
trated upon  her  own  development  and  in  the  Near 
East,  leaving  the  Far  East  to  a  more  hopeful  future. 

Describing  the  Austro-Russian  relations,  I  wanted 
to  emphasize  their  complex  and  contradictory  ten- 
dencies as  a  typical  example  of  European  diplomatic 
entanglements.  The  interests  of  both  countries  cen- 
tered in  the  Balkans,  and  necessarily  clashed  at  the 
time  of  the  German  intrusion. 

In  the  Balkans,  we  witnessed  the  struggle  between 


SOME  ITEMS  187 

Slavism  and  Teutonism,  the  one  inwardly  weakened  by 
a  deficient  government  order  and  mutual  suspicion, 
the  other  one  much  too  aggressive  and  impulsive  to  be 
able  to  stop  for  a  moment  and  consider  the  rights  and 
interests  of  its  opponents.  The  Russian  policy  in  the 
Balkans  was  from  the  beginning  very  inconsistent  and 
unsatisfactory,  which  can  be  explained  exclusively  by 
the  short-comings  of  the  government  system  of  the 
former  Russian  Empire. 

Pan-Slavism  as  a  national  movement,  uniting  all 
the  Slav  peoples  into  one  big  family,  was  bound  to  fail, 
as  we  have  seen,  for  two  main  reasons,  because,  first, 
the  smaller  nations  could  not  trust  the  larger  one, 
Russia,  as  long  as  the  latter  had  such  a  deficient  gov- 
ernment system,  and  second,  because  the  smaller 
states  were  themselves  constantly  at  odds,  fighting  and 
bickering  over  selfish  and  foolish  personal  claims  and 
aspirations.  In  the  future,  we  can  hope,  that  these  dis- 
tracting factors  will  gradually  disappear  and  the  Slav 
nations  will  unite  in  some  form  of  alliance  for  mutual 
support  and  friendship.  The  smaller  nations  can  only 
gain  by  such  mutual  assistance  in  the  stern  modern 
struggle  for  existence.  It  can  be  accomplished  as  soon 
as  Russia  develops  some  stable  form  of  government. 

As  to  the  relations  with  Germany,  two  facts  stand 
out:  first,  the  constant  aggression  of  Bismarck,  who 
tried  to  satisfy  his  political  ambitions,  relying  exclu- 
sively on  Russia's  weakness;  not  wanting  any  break 
with  Russia  and  trying  to  keep  outward  friendship,  he 
still  succeeded  in  antagonizing  the  Russian  government 
as  well  as  the  people.  Later  on,  William  II  tried  to 
carry  on  the  same  policy,  only  much  less  successfully 


188  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

because  of  the  evident  duplicity  of  his  methods.  The 
little  success  he  had  was  possibly  due  to  the  weakness 
of  Nicholas  II,  who  never  found  moral  courage  to  with- 
stand the  apparently  friendly  counsels  of  the  Kaiser. 
In  other  words,  the  most  significant  meaning  of  the 
Russo-German  relations  was  constantly  the  upholding 
and  strengthening  of  the  monarchical  principle  in  all 
its  glory  and  in  contravention  to  the  pressing  needs 
of  the  time. 

The  consequence  of  this  German  policy  was  that 
only  a  very  few  Russians  and  only  those  who  belonged 
to  the  extreme  reactionary  camp  were  advocating  an 
alliance  between  Russia  and  Germany.  This  is  pos- 
sibly the  most  striking  example  of  the  way  Russian 
foreign  policy  was  influenced  by  the  internal  political 
and  social  conditions.  The  Russian  reactionaries  and 
conservatives  constantly  advocated  a  close  friendship 
with  Berlin,  hoping  to  find  there  the  much  needed  sup- 
port for  their  own  defence  of  dying  autocracy,  whereas 
liberal  and  progressive  Russia  looked  further  west  and 
tried  to  establish  firm  connections  with  the  western 
constitutionalism  of  France.  And  it  was  in  this  last 
respect  that  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  had  its  great- 
est historical  meaning. 

The  study  of  the  history  of  Russia's  foreign  rela- 
tions is  most  instructive  in  this  respect,  as  it  gives  such 
a  vivid  picture  of  the  developments  of  modern  times 
and  of  the  interrelations  and  involved  connections  of 
the  historical  forces,  binding  all  civilized  nations  into 
one  huge  family. 

As  to  the  future,  one  can  be  sure  that  Russia's  for- 
eign policy  will  not  be  complex.  She  will  have  to  con- 


SOME  ITEMS  189 

centrate  her  forces  and  all  her  attention,  of  necessity, 
on  her  own  internal  development  and  on  establishing 
again  lasting  social  stability.  Fortunately  in  this  re- 
spect, Russia  is  absolutely  self-sufficient;  she  possesses 
vast  natural  resources,  hardly  surpassed  by  any  other 
country;  she  needs  no  colonies,  she  easily  can  avoid 
outward  aggression,  she  will  never  need  to  fight  for  "a 
place  in  the  sun,"  being  well  satisfied  with  what  she 
has,  as  long  as  she  retains  her  free  connections  with 
the  outside  world. 

In  this  last  respect  the  most  important  question  will 
always  remain  Russia's  free  access  to  the  warm  seas, 
through  the  Black  Sea  and  the  Baltic.  As  soon  as  these 
outlets  will  be  satisfactorily  guaranteed,  Russia  will 
not  have  any  trouble  in  building  up  friendly  relations 
with  the  other  powers  and  nations.  This  serves  to 
explain  the  importance  for  Russia  of  Constantinople, 
on  one  side,  and  of  the  future  relations  with  Baltic 
peoples,  on  the  other.  It  will  also  remain  the  key  to 
Russia's  intercourse  with  the  Balkan  nations  hi  par- 
ticular and  with  the  world  at  large,  in  general. 

It  was  said  long  ago  and,  I  think,  it  is  realized  by 
most  people  at  the  present  moment,  that  without  Rus- 
sia there  is  no  peace  in  Europe  and  that  the  progress 
of  civilization  depends  very  much  on  the  return  of  the 
great  Slav  nation  to  normal  life  and  international 
intercourse. 

Finally,  the  history  of  Russia's  foreign  relations 
during  the  last  half  century  can  be  used  as  a  poignant 
example  of  the  evils  of  the  former  methods  of  Euro- 
pean diplomacy,  which  brought  so  much  harm  to  so 
many  nations. 


CHAPTER  X. 

SECRET  DIPLOMACY. 

I. 

DURING  the  preceding  course  of  lectures  I  have  often 
had  to  point  out  cases  of  secret  diplomatic  transactions 
and  the  evils  they  invariably  brought  upon  Russia  and 
the  other  powers.  The  history  of  the  foreign  rela- 
tions of  Russia  gives  convincing  evidence  of  how  much 
harm  secret  diplomatic  intercourse  between  nations 
can  bring  in  its  train.  This,  however,  is  fortunately 
well  realized  at  the  present  day  by  all  educated  people. 
Very  much  scientific  material  has  been  accumulated 
lately  on  this  question ;  we  know  quite  well  that  many 
of  the  causes  of  the  Great  War  are  due  to  the  methods 
used  by  the  European  foreign  offices.  I  find  that  per- 
haps even  too  much  stress  is  laid  upon  the  study  of 
examples,  illustrating  these  methods  and  too  little  at- 
tention is  paid  to  the  ways  and  means  of  eradicating 
the  evil.  Thus,  not  long  ago,  I  heard  an  interesting 
valedictory  address  by  the  President  of  the  American 
Association  of  Political  Science,  giving  his  audience  a 
frightful  array  of  facts  concerning  secret  diplomacy. 
If  we  go  back  a  century,  we  can  find  cases  that  are 
truly  amazing  from  our  point  of  view,  of  kings  and 
potentates  playing  their  private  little  game  of  dispos- 

190 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  191 

ing  of  the  fate  of  "their"  peoples,  "their"  territory, 
"their"  states.  Not  much  was  said,  however,  by  the 
orator,  as  to  why  this  evil  still  persists  in  our  day, 
when  so  many  efforts  are  made  to  make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy. 

This  is  more  important  for  political  science  espe- 
cially, as  it  is  intrinsically  connected  with  some  of  the 
basic  political  problems  of  the  modern  state.  We  find 
that  both  the  fundamental  institutions  of  democracy 
are  closely  bound  up  with  it,  namely,  parliament  and 
public  opinion.  But  with  this  difference,  whereas 
the  latter  seems  to  increase  constantly  its  powers  and 
influence,  the  former  is  unmistakably  and  yet  so  un- 
justly losing  its  popularity. 

Take  for  example  the  writings  of  a  contemporary 
school  of  political  science  and  you  will  find  there  most 
abusive  language  applied  to  parliamentary  institutions. 
To  these  writers  everything  seems  wrong  with  the 
modern  parliament;  some  of  them  even  try  to  build 
up  systems  of  government  without  any  parliaments. 
One  must  acknowledge  that  the  great  number  of  at- 
tacks are  perfectly  justified,  the  evils  painted  are  real 
ones,  not  mere  inventions  of  sensational  reformers. 
Further,  such  criticism  applies  not  only  to  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  countries,  but  even  in  a  greater  measure  to  most 
of  the  other  countries.  There  is  little  to  chose  between 
the  French  Chamber  and  the  Italian,  to  cite  only  one 
example. 

Yet  there  seems  to  be  no  substitute  suggested;  all 
the  systems  which  are  constructed  without  the  parlia- 
mentary institutions  are  not  really  worth  mentioning 
or  taking  seriously.  Then  too,  it  is  quite  a  remarkable 


192  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

fact  that  nearly  all  criticism  of  parliaments  is  negative. 
All  reformers  are  satisfied  to  point  out  the  evils;  hardly 
one  of  them,  who  has  studied  the  origins  and  causes  of 
these  evils,  suggests  any  possible  ways  to  eradicate  or 
avoid  them.  It  is  in  this  latter  field  alone,  that  scien- 
tific investigation  ought  really  to  center. 

In  the  domain  that  we  have  just  been  studying,  viz., 
foreign  relations,  we  can  easily  notice  two  very  im- 
portant developments,  first,  the  gradual  and  steady 
growth  of  parliamentary  influence  as  the  best  and 
most  powerful  channel  of  control  by  public  opinion, 
expressing  the  will  of  the  nation,  and  second,  paralyz- 
ing or  minimizing  this  control,  an  abundant  remnant 
of  ancient  ideas  and  institutions  dating  back  to  those 
days,  when  foreign  relations  were  the  private  (pos- 
sibly the  most  private)  business  of  kings  and  em- 
perors, their  own,  personal  or  dynastic  property,  so  to 
speak,  their  dower  or  gift,  their  inheritance  or  their 
purchase.1 

This  applies  not  only  to  such  unusual  personalities 
as  Louis  XIV  or  George  III,  Frederick  the  Great  or 
Tsar  Peter,  but  to  all  the  lesser  crowned  heads  as  well, 
and  reaches  far  down  into  the  nineteenth  century.  In 
many  a  German  textbook  of  the  middle  of  that  cen- 
tury one  can  find  numerous  examples,  taken  from  ex- 
isting constitutions  (no  mere  pia  desideria  of  worship- 
pers of  autocracy),  of  rights  and  privileges  of  monarchs 

1The  history  of  extradition  probably  is  the  best  possible  ex- 
ample of  the  changes  brought  about  in  this  domain;  in  former 
times  the  extradition  of  criminals  was  a  personal  matter  with  the 
monarchs.  They  cared  very  little  about  the  criminals  themselves 
and  still  less  did  they  consider  the  welfare  of  the  nation.  Only 
gradually  did  the  institution  of  extradition  become  a  national  mat- 
ter, controlled  by  international  law  and  public  interests. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  193 

in  matters  of  foreign  relations,  when  the  nation  as  such 
counted  for  little  or  nothing.  This  is  perhaps  the  most 
doleful  and  certainly  the  most  pernicious  inheritance 
of  autocracy,  which  prevailed  in  Europe  in  the  seven- 
teenth and  eighteenth  centuries. 

Only  very  slowly  and  at  the  cost  of  great  efforts  did 
the  individual  parliaments  succeed  in  gradually  estab- 
lishing their  right  of  participation  to  a  slight  degree  at 
least  in  this  important  state  function.  And  it  might 
be  looked  at  as  one  of  the  great  victories  of  constitu- 
tionalism, when  the  principle  of  such  parliamentary 
participation  was  recognized,  first  by  political  science 
and  later  by  constitutional  practice.  We  must  qualify 
this  statement,  however,  by  saying  that  though  this 
principle  seems  to  be  accepted  everywhere  unani- 
mously, the  parliamentary  practice  is  still  very  uncer- 
tain and  in  many  ways  deficient. 

The  means  by  which  the  parliaments  of  different 
countries  established  their  participation  in  foreign  af- 
fairs were  usually  the  ones  already  tried  many  times, 
namely,  by  holding  the  strings  of  the  purse  and  thus 
forcing  the  governments,  kings  and  ministers  to  seek 
the  consent  of  the  nation's  representatives  "in  Parlia- 
ment assembled"  for  the  contracting  of  international 
obligations.  As  soon  as  the  latter  necessitated  any 
expenditure,  parliaments  had  to  be  consulted  and  this 
gave  the  representatives  their  chance  to  learn  something 
of  and  investigate  the  questions  of  foreign  relations. 

In  exactly  the  same  way  parliaments  secured  another 
means  of  participation,  namely,  in  controlling  the  re- 
cruiting system  of  a  state  and  thus  taking  part  in  the 
composition  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  nation.  The 


194  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

contingent  of  the  army  could  hence  be  established  only 
with  the  consent  of  parliament. 

Finally,  two  very  important  questions,  taken  from 
the  domain  of  foreign  relations,  received  special  at- 
tention in  this  respect  and  soon  became  the  exclusive 
function  of  parliament — all  matters  concerning  the 
territory  of  the  state  and  the  final  ratification  of  inter- 
national treaties.  The  former  could  no  longer  be  con- 
sidered as  the  private  property  of  a  monarch,  which 
he  could  give  away  as  a  present  to  his  friend  or  a  dowry 
to  his  daughter,  slicing  off  a  part  "of  his  people."  The 
most  recent  examples  of  such  methods  are  the  policy 
of  Napoleon,  when  he  was  distributing  conquered  ter- 
ritory among  his  relatives  and  supporters  and  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  in  1815,  which  practically  did  the 
same  thing.  The  inhabitants  of  such  "distributed" 
territories  counted  for  little  or  nothing  in  those  days 
and  it  was  only  towards  the  middle  of  the  century 
that  those  ideas  began  to  die  out.1 

As  to  the  second  principle,  of  the  participation  of 
parliament  in  the  ratification  of  international  treaties 
this  became  recognized  by  international  and  constitu- 
tional law  only  towards  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  It  developed  very  gradually.  At  first,  foreign 
relations  were  still  looked  at  as  the  personal  privilege 
of  the  monarch,  but  it  was  considered  as  advantageous 
for  him  to  have  "his"  people  consulted,  providing 
greater  weight  to  his  agreements  and  policies.  Only 
much  later  was  this  additional  participation  of  parlia- 

*In  the  United  States  this  is  less  realized  for  the  very  simple 
reason  that  Americans  never  had  to  deal  with  autocracy  as  a 
form  of  government  and  from  the  start  of  their  national  life 
considered  the  territory  of  their  States,  as  their  national  property. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  195 

merits  transformed  into  a  conditio  sine  qua  non  of 
ratifying  international  treaties.  Monarchs  were  forced 
to  adopt  such  a  method  of  ratification  of  treaties  in 
order  to  satisfy  their  people ;  the  latter  rightly  insisted 
on  it  in  order  to  safeguard  their  interests,  as  a  nation, 
and  finally,  the  counter-agents,  the  other  contracting 
nations,  required  it  in  order  to  secure  better  guarantees 
of  the  fulfillment  of  such  treaties. 

One  must  state,  however,  that  the  theory  of  political 
science  was  very  reluctant  to  accept  and  register  these 
changes.  Some  schools,  especially  some  German  ones, 
tenaciously  clung  to  the  old  ideas,  making  every  pos- 
sible effort  to  save  the  dying  principle  of  the  exclusive 
powers  of  the  Head  of  the  State.  Thus  for  example, 
some  of  the  most  brilliant  German  jurists,  Laband 
among  others,  insisted  on  the  distinction  of  the  force  of 
the  act  of  ratification  inside  the  State  and  outside, 
relating  to  the  other  contracting  powers.1 

II. 

If  the  theory  of  political  science  was  slow  in  accept- 
ing the  new  idea,  practical  life  and  legislation  were  still 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Jellinek,  G.,  Gesetz  und  Verordnung,  Heidelberg,  1908. 

Korfl,  S.  A.,  Parlement  et  affaires  exterieures,  Revue  de  Politique 

Internationale,  VII,  1914. 

Meier,  E.,  Abschluss  von    Staatsvertragen,  Leipzig,  1874. 
Michon,  L.,  Traites  internationaux  devant  les  Chambres,  Paris,  1901. 
Crandall,  Treaties,  their  making  and  enforcement,  New  York,  1904. 
Ebren,  Droit  de  traiter,  considere  dans  ses  rapports  avec  la  forme 

d'etat. 
Dauzat,  A.,  Role  des  Chambres  en  matiere  des  traites  internationaux, 

Paris,  1899. 

Merignhac,  A.,  Traite  de  droit  public  international,  Paris,  1907. 
Weil.  B.,  Mitwirkung  der  Volksvertretung  bei  Staatsvertragen,  Strass- 

burg,  1906. 


196  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

less  impressed  by  such  a  movement.  The  constitutions 
of  the  different  European  countries  began  to  be  in- 
fluenced very  slowly  indeed  and  thus  kept  up  for  a 
long  time  the  old  fiction,  that  foreign  relations  and 
diplomacy  were  the  exclusive  function  or  even  the 
privilege  of  the  Head  of  the  State,  emperor,  king  or 
president,  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  being  his 
dependent  agent,  whereas  parliament  or  the  parlia- 
mentary committees  were  still  looked  upon  as  un- 
pleasant intruders  or  bothersome  meddlers,  who  had 
to  be  constantly  pacified  by  concessions. 

Some  constitutions,  however,  were  an  exception,  ac- 
cepting the  principle  of  necessary  cooperation  between 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  government 
in  foreign  affairs,  granting  the  parliament  a  share  in 
the  ratification  of  treaties  and  by  this  means  opening 
the  door  to  the  influence  of  public  opinion  on  the 
diplomatic  relations  of  the  respective  countries. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  world's 
constitutions  could  be  classified  into  three  groups.  To 
the  one  belonged  a  few  constitutions,  which  still  rigidly 
kept  to  the  old  idea,  that  foreign  affairs  were  the 
exclusive  domain  of  executive  activity,  not  admitting 
of  any  cooperation  of  legislative  authorities. 

The  second  group,  numerically  also  very  small,  con- 
tained the  few  constitutions  which  assured  the  legisla- 
tive branch  full  equab'ty  or  at  least  ample  rights  of  co- 
operation in  foreign  affairs.  Finally  the  third  group, 
composed  of  the  vast  majority  of  constitutions  con- 
tained only  half-hearted  attempts  at  providing  some 
means,  usually  very  limited,  of  parliamentary  coopera- 
tion in  certain  questions,  concerning  the  foreign  rela- 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  197 

tions  of  a  nation.  The  most  frequent  cases  in  this 
respect  were  the  requirement  of  parliamentary  sanc- 
tion of  financial  burdens  put  upon  the  country  by  an 
international  treaty,  or  of  the  most  vital  questions  of 
war  and  peace.1  But  just  in  this  latter  respect  we  will 
see  how  easy  it  was  for  the  executive  to  avoid  coopera- 
tion or  even  to  deceive  parliament. 

To  sum  up :  the  forward  movement  during  the  nine- 
teenth century,  as  often  happens,  was  very  slow,  where- 
as some  principles  seemed  to  have  been  finally  well 
established  and  generally  accepted,  their  practical 
working  was  still  very  much  limited  and  restricted. 

But  also,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  it  is  only  the  first 
step  that  is  difficult  and  once  the  door  is  opened,  the 
new  ideas  develop  of  their  own  force  and  power  and 
conquer  new  fields.  The  cooperation  of  parliaments 
in  certain  questions  opened  the  door  and  gradually 
public  opinion  began  to  increase  its  influence.  One 
must  remember  in  this  respect,  that  in  other  domains 
of  political  and  social  life  of  the  modern  nations  public 
opinion  has  only  very  lately  won  its  permanent  in- 
fluential position.  It  is  not  so  very  long  ago  that  public 
opinion  hardly  played  any  role  worth  mentioning. 
Thus  the  achievements  in  the  domain  of  foreign  rela- 
tions were  not  so  very  far  behind  the  rest  in  develop- 
ment. 

The  main  trouble  lay  with  the  parliaments  them- 
selves; in  other  words  the  first  means  of  influence, 
which  public  opinion  had  adopted  (by  which,  figura- 

1  BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Leord,  Beitrag  zur  Lehre  von  der  Gultigkeit  der  Staatsvertrage. 
Rivier,  A.,  Principes  du  droit  des  Gens,  II,  Paris,  1896. 
Textbooks   on  international  law  by  Ullman,  Nippold,  Merignhac. 


198  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

lively  speaking,  it  had  opened  the  door  to  wider  in- 
fluence) were  deficient.  The  parliamentary  system, 
toward  the  end  of  the  century  began  itself  to  deterior- 
ate and  in  many  respects  did  not  work  satisfactorily. 
Contemporary  literature  on  the  subject  of  parliament- 
ary deficiencies  affords  overwhelming  testimony.  As 
mentioned  above  there  grew  up  even  a  whole  school, 
that  is  at  present  questioning  the  main  subject,  the 
necessity  of  retaining  parliaments  as  a  conditio  sine 
qua  non  of  the  modern  state.  I  do  not  consider  that 
the  attacks  on  the  modern  parliament  are  without  any 
foundation.  Qn  the  contrary,  one  must  admit  that  the 
parliamentary  systems  do  not  work  well,  that  they  are 
honeycombed  with  defects  and  even  with  some  evils, 
and  urgently  call  for  reform  and  revision.  Again,  in 
the  domain  of  foreign  relations  this  seems  to  be  more 
evident  and  conspicuous  than  anywhere  else. 

The  plenary  sessions  of  parliaments  do  not  work 
well  anywhere.  They  are  usually  overcrowded  with 
work,  selfishly  interested  in  politics,  apt  to  devote  most 
of  their  time  to  bickering  with  the  executive,  prating 
or  obstructive,  impractical  or  else  too  much  absorbed 
in  local  and  petty  questions,  which  restrict  their  na- 
tional horizon  and  in  many  other  ways  make  them 
lose  touch  with  the  public  opinion  of  their  own  coun- 
try, not  to  mention  the  wider  field  of  international 
relations  and  world  politics. 

All  this  necessitated  the  introduction  of  remedies, 
in  most  cases  by  substituting  committee  work  for  the 
plenary  sessions.  Thus  it  happened  that  in  many 
countries  all  over  the  world,  not  alone  in  Europe,  the 
burden  of  serious  work  slowly  gravitated  into  the  secret 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  199 

sessions  of  all  sorts  of  parliamentary  committees.  The 
executive  authorities  too,  much  preferred  dealing  with 
such  committees;  they  are  eager  everywhere  to  attain 
practical  results,  to  push  through  the  legislation  that  is 
necessary  for  their  policies,  and  naturally  find  it  much 
easier  and  more  agreeable  to  have  to  deal  with  a  com- 
mittee, which  usually  represents  the  pick  of  the  most 
capable  parliamentarians,  than  with  a  turbulent  and 
unruly  plenary  session,  bent  on  bitter  criticism  of  the 
government,  and  yet  unwilling  to  share  the  respon- 
sibilities. 

This  tendency  to  devolve  the  serious  work  upon  the 
parliamentary  committees  has  however  one  grave 
drawback.  The  work  of  the  committees  is  everywhere 
strictly  secret,  the  committees  are  nowhere  in  direct 
touch  with  public  opinion,  neither  do  they  seem  to  be 
influenced  by  the  latter  to  any  appreciable  degree.1 
In  the  domain  that  interests  us  at  the  present  time 
this  drawback  proved  most  pernicious,  as  it  tended 
to  neutralize  the  achievements  of  parliamentary  co- 
operation in  foreign  affairs.  By  this  means,  the  execu- 
tives and  foreign  offices  could  keep  the  influential 
members  of  parliament  informed  of  their  foreign 
policies,  thereby  satisfying  their  personal  ambitions 
and  yet  have  the  transactions  as  safely  secret  as  ever 
before.  As  we  have  just  said,  public  opinion  did  not 
seem  to  be  able  to  reach  behind  the  closed  doors  of 
committee-rooms. 

Thus  there  was  created  a  circulus  vitiosus:  parlia- 
ments did  not  work  well  in  their  plenary  sessions,  com- 

*This  does  not  apply  however  to  the  United  States  Congress,  as 
in  most  cases  the  Congressional  committees  are  working  publicly, 
and  hardly  ever  close  their  doors. 


200  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

mittees  had  to  be  substituted,1  but  the  latter  excluded 
publicity,  the  main  merit  of  the  parliamentary  system 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  executive  ministers  re- 
verted with  pleasure  to  the  old  system  of  impenetrable 
secrecy.  The  recent  enemies  of  the  parliamentary  sys- 
tem find  no  small  amount  of  material  for  attack  just  in 
these  facts.  They  rightly  point  out  the  easy  way  of  es- 
tablishing collusion  between  the  committee  members 
and  the  government  officials,  the  former  being 
influenced  and  sometimes  even  perverted  by  the 
methods  and  ideas  of  the  latter,  and  usually  as  a  re- 
sult, the  nation  is  cheated  out  of  its  influence  or  par- 
ticipation in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 

Thus,  new  ways  have  to  be  found  to  remedy  the 
situation ;  it  will  not  do  to  simply  decree  the  abolition 
of  parliaments.  The  increase  of  committee  work  was 
unavoidable  and  in  other  ways  proved  beneficial.  For 
instance,  it  certainly  improved  the  methods  of  legis- 
lation and  increased  its  efficiency.  The  most  vital  and 
necessary  remedy  would  seem  to  be  the  introduction  of 
some  forms  of  publicity  into  committee  work  and  the 
creation  of  ways  and  means  of  influencing  this  work 
by  the  public  opinion  of  the  country.  What  has  been 
won  for  parliaments,  must  now  bei  established  for 
parliamentary  committees  and  their  work  with  the 
executive  ministers. 

"There  existed  once  a  very  strong  movement  among  specialists 
in  political  science  advocating  the  increase  and  strengthening  of 
parliamentary  committee  work.  Some  writers  saw  salvation  from 
the  superficial  prating  of  parliaments  only  in  the  creation  of  special 
committees  of  foreign  affairs,  which  would  be  able  to  control  the 
executives,  but  at  whose  expense?  This  applies  especially  to  Great 
Britain. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  201 

III. 

If  we  examine  closely  the  domain  of  foreign  rela- 
tions, we  can  easily  notice  that  they  have  a  double 
function.  Locke  was  the  first  to  point  this  out,  when 
he  defined  his  "federative  power";  but  at  that  tune 
it  hardly  had  any  practical  meaning,  all  the  executive 
functions  being  united  in  the  hands  of  the  irresponsible 
king.  Thus  it  passed  unnoticed  in  the  theory  of 
political  science  and  acquired  its  significance  only  in 
the  nineteenth  century. 

One  of  these  two  functions  consists  in  acts  that 
create  a  legal  obligation  for  the  state  (or  nation).  All 
treaties,  obligations,  understandings  and  agreements 
would  come  under  this  head.  The  other  function  is 
constituted  by  the  daily  intercourse  of  states  (or  na- 
tions), the  transactions  which  do  not  create  any  legal 
obligation,  diplomacy  in  the  technical  meaning  of  the 
word,  conversations  between  foreign  secretaries  and 
diplomatic  representatives.  The  first  function  in- 
variably binds  the  state  in  some  way  or  other,  the 
second  one  does  not  affect  its  legal  obligations,  but 
usually  prepares  the  way  for  the  acts  of  the  first  group. 

It  is  very  hard  in  some  cases  to  draw  the  line  between 
the  two  functions,  which  is  easily  explained  by  their 
past  history.  In  former  days,  as  we  have  said,  both 
functions  were  in  the  hands  of  the  head  of  the  state 
and  his  ministers  and  only  too  often  a  mere  word,  a 
promise,  the  vague  utterance  of  a  monarch  or  his  am- 
bassador created  a  legal  obligation  for  the  state.  That 
is  why  diplomacy  in  those  days  was  such  a  dangerous 


202  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

game  and  such  a  wily  craft.  Transactions  were  usually 
couched  in  such  vague  terms,  that  governments  could 
construe  them  as  they  chose  and  all  of  them  were  built 
on  purely  personal  relations  and  mutual  trickery. 
Much  of  this  has  certainly  disappeared  in  the  modern 
state  and  yet  some  of  the  obnoxious  consequences  still 
linger  on,  hampering  the  smooth  sailing  of  the  ship 
of  state,  as  unseen  reefs  and  rocks  under  a  seemingly 
safe  surface  of  the  ocean  of  life. 

Two  great  changes  have  been  effected  in  the  modern 
state  concerning  these  functions,  and  both  tend  to- 
ward establishing  a  line  of  marked  distinction  between 
them,  enhancing  the  meaning  of  the  first  and  dimin- 
ishing the  role  of  the  second. 

The  introduction  of  compulsory  participation  in  the 
first  function  of  other  institutions,  for  example  par- 
liaments, and  not  leaving  it  exclusively  to  the  head  of 
the  state;  through  such  participation  and  also  because 
of  greater  publicity,  the  people  of  a  state  know  much 
better  the  details  of  international  relations  of  the  pres- 
ent day.  Second,  modern  international  relations 
have  become  the  business  of  central  governments,  the 
diplomatic  agents  having  lost  their  former  significance. 
As  soon  as  any  international  question  becomes  of  some 
importance,  it  is  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  ambassa- 
dors and  settled  directly  by  the  ministers  of  foreign 
affairs.  The  great  facilities  of  modern  communica- 
tions, the  telegraph  and  the  wireless,  have  made  this 
possible  and  established  direct  ties  between  the  respec- 
tive foreign  offices.  The  personal  "talks,"  conversa- 
tions and  "assurances"  of  ambassadors  have  lost  much 
of  their  former  meaning;  every  word  of  theirs  can  be 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  203 

easily  checked  up  by  their  governments  and  is  also 
watched  and  controlled  by  public  opinion,  informed 
and  often  advised  by  the  daily  press. 

Thus  the  second  function  tends  to  become  gradually 
a  purely  preparatory  one;  at  present  it  can  be  looked 
upon  as  an  established  principle,  that  this  function 
must  not  create  any  legal  obligation  for  a  state,  or  at 
least  when  such  an  obligation  arises  (in  very  excep- 
tional cases)  the  onus  probandi  weighs  heavily  on  the 
state  which  admits  such  a  possibility. 

One  of  the  axiomatic  principles  of  modern  political 
science  is  the  theory  that  a  state  can  be  bound  only 
by  its  own  will;  for  every  legal  obligation  of  a  state 
there  must  exist  the  sanction  of  the  sovereign 
authority  of  that  state.  Nothing  can  be  legally  im- 
posed from  without.  This  is  the  meaning,  for  example, 
of  the  peace  treaties,  signed  by  the  vanquished  na- 
tions. Germany  was  forced  to  sign  the  Versailles 
Treaty  in  order  that  the  victorious  Allies  could  get 
from  her  the  necessary  legal  sanction  of  the  conditions 
of  peace,  imposed  upon  the  vanquished  nation.  The 
Allies  could  have  occupied  Berlin,  crushed  the  German 
nation,  if  they  had  so  wished,  but  they  could  not  im- 
pose legal  obligations  on  the  German  state  without 
getting  the  legal  sanction  in  the  form  of  consent  from 
Germany. 

In  former  days  the  head  of  a  state  was  perfectly  free 
to  impose  whatever  obligations  he  deemed  best  upon  a 
nation;  at  present,  such  sovereign  power  is  vested  in 
other  institutions,  usually  the  parliament,  as  th3  sole 
representative  of  the  nation.1 

1This  is  axiomatically  accepted  by  most  of  the  writers  on  inter- 


204  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

This  axiom  gives  us  the  clue  to  the  legal  explanation 
of  the  participation  of  the  different  state  institutions 
in  the  above  mentioned  functions.  The  first  creates 
legal  obligations  for  the  state,  or  binds  it  in  its  inter- 
national relations  and  the  participation  of  parliament 
is  absolutely  necessary,  whereas  in  the  second  function, 
though  in  some  cases  possibly  desirable,  is  not  neces- 
sary and  can  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  government, 
the  diplomatic  representatives  and  foreign  offices. 

The  same  distinction  of  these  two  functions  leads  us 
to  a  better  understanding  of  the  present  day  antagon- 
ism between  publicity  and  secrecy.  In  former  days 
when  that  distinction  was  purely  theoretical,  and  both 
functions  alike  were  looked  upon  as  a  personal  right 
or  rather  privilege  of  the  head  of  the  state,  the  whole 
field  of  international  relations  was  enshrouded  in  ab- 
solute secrecy.  All  international  transactions  were  per- 
sonal and  secret  and  under  that  fatal  cover  of  secrecy, 
the  methods  employed  by  the  transacting  heads  of 
states,  were  only  too  often  based  on  trickery  and  dis- 
honesty. At  the  present  time  all  this  has  changed  and 
though  many  of  the  old  elements  still  influence  modern 
international  relations,  their  improvement  is  great  and 
quite  evident. 

As  we  have  seen,  with  the  participation  of  parlia- 
ments came  publicity.  At  least  as  a  principle  it  be- 
came recognized  that  in  the  domain  of  the  first  func- 
tion (where  legal  obligations  were  being  created  for  a 
state)  publicity  ought  to  prevail  and  secrecy  ought 

national  law.  See,  Nys,  E.,  Droit  international,  vol.  Ill;  M.  Lie, 
Legitimation  des  Traktat.  Heilborn,  Der  Staatsvertrag,  Archiv  fiir 
off.  Recht,  Bd.  12,  1897;  Dauzat,  Le  role  des  Chambres  en  matiere 
de  traites  internationaux,  Paris,  1899. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  205 

to  be  eradicated.  The  ideal  is  not  yet  attained,  many 
of  the  old  evils  still  exist,  but  modern  states  are  on  the 
right  path  and  publicity  will  some  day  win  its  final 
victory.  This  is  what  former  President  Wilson  so 
brilliantly  formulated  in  his  famous  phrase,  "open  cove- 
nants, openly  arrived  at." 

In  the  domain  of  the  other  function,  secrecy  can 
still  persist  and  probably  always  will  remain  the  domin- 
ant factor  and  usual  method.  There  is  no  danger  in 
this  case,  as  long  as  this  function  is  merely  a  prepara- 
tory one,  consisting  of  introductory  negotiations,  mak- 
ing ready  for  future  obligations.  In  fact  these  prepara- 
tory negotiations  often  gain  from  being  kept  secret; 
publicity  usually  only  harms  them  in  arousing  mutual 
jealousies,  competition  or  strife.  And  there  is  no  dan- 
ger, so  long  as  the  first  principle  is  firmly  established, 
namely,  that  as  soon  as  it  comes  to  creating  a  legal 
obligation  of  a  state,  other  organs  or  institutions  than 
the  foreign  office  must  participate  and  secrecy  there- 
after must  stop. 

Unfortunately  there  exists  one  difficulty  of  no  mean 
significance.  On  account  of  their  historical  past  these 
two  functions  are  in  many  cases  not  easily  distinguished 
from  each  other.  This  tells  chiefly  in  one  respect ;  the 
second  function  is  in  some  cases,  not  merely  a  prepara- 
tory one,  as  it  ought  to  be,  but  tends  to  bind  the  state 
legally,  or  at  least  its  transacting  government  agents. 
The  foreign  offices  are  very  apt  to  take  upon  them- 
selves more  responsibility  than  they  ought  to  have  and 
thus  give  their  counter-agents,  the  governments  of 
other  countries,  assurances  and  promises,  which  be- 
come binding  upon  a  state,  without  having  called  for 


206  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

the  necessary  participation  either  of  parliamentary 
representatives  or  of  the  public  opinion  of  a  nation. 

One  must  say  that  of  all  the  modern  branches  of 
government,  the  foreign  offices  are  most  apt  to  make 
use  of  this  method  of  circumventing  the  constitutional 
principle  of  publicity.  Other  ministries  dare  it  very 
seldom  and  when  they  do,  they  are  in  most  cases  forced 
to  account  for  it  by  parliamentary  control  whereas  the 
foreign  offices  somehow  escape  this  control. 

The  explanation  is  also  a  historical  one.  It  is 
closely  bound  up  with  the  old  idea  of  national  honor 
and  dates  back  to  the  time  when  a  mere  word  of  a 
monarch  or  foreign  minister  was  deemed  sufficient  to 
put  any  obligation  upon  a  nation.  That  psychological 
point  of  view,  in  contradiction  to  the  described  political 
principles,  still  exists  among  many  peoples.  Some  na- 
tions still  consider  that  their  head  of  state,  foreign 
minister  or  ambassador  can  "bind  them  in  honor"  to 
a  certain  policy  or  a  certain  promise,  no  matter  how 
secretly  given  or  in  what  flagrant  violation  of  or  con- 
tradiction to  their  national  policy  or  constitutional 
ideals. 

Most  often  it  is  done  by  the  method  of  "fait  accom- 
pli"; the  government  agent,  the  head  of  state,  the 
foreign  minister  or  ambassador  (extremely  rarely  the 
latter,  however)  has  long  and  elaborate  negotiations 
with  a  like  government  agent  of  another  country, 
makes  promises,  establishes  certain  lines  of  policy,  ac- 
cepts certain  international  obligations  and  thus  spins 
a  whole  web  of  international  relations,  which  tend  to 
create  legal  obligations.  When  the  plan  or  policy  is 
ready,  the  agent  bluntly  puts  it  before  his  nation  or 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  207 

parliament  and  forces  them  to  accept  it,  because  his 
acts  have  "bound  in  honor"  the  state,  he  represents, 
the  fiction  being  that  his  counter-agent,  the  represen- 
tative of  another  nation  could  expect  him  to  have  the 
full  authority  and  right  to  deal  in  this  way  and  not 
to  suspect  any  constitutional  requirement  of  coopera- 
tion on  the  part  of  some  other  organ  or  institution. 

Very  much  mischief  has  been  done  by  the  use  of  this 
method  and  unfortunately,  it  must  be  said  that  not 
only  the  reactionary  agents  of  the  old  regimes 
made  use  of  it,  those  men  who  are  always  ready  to 
revert  to  ancient  methods,  but  even  most  liberal  repre- 
sentatives among  enlightened  statesmen.  The  two 
most  prominent  examples  in  this  respect  are  Presi- 
dent Wilson  and  Lord  Grey,  the  first  using  the  method 
of  "fait  accompli"  in  his  endeavor  to  force  upon  the 
United  States  Senate  the  agreements  he  signed  with 
his  European  allies,  the  second  making  use  of  the  same 
method  during  his  negotiations  with  France  concern- 
ing Belgium  prior  to  the  Great  War,  which  forced  upon 
Great  Britain  (not  only  England,  but  the  whole  British 
Empire,  Canada,  Australia  and  the  other  Dominions) 
the  participation  in  a  war  against  Germany.1 

The  possible  dangers  of  this  method  are  so  great 
and  so  very  evident  that  they  hardly  need  any  further 
elucidation. 

The  history  of  Russia's  foreign  relations  affords 
a  good  lesson  in  this  respect.  We  can  easily  establish 
the  following  summary  of  evils  brought  forth  by  Rus- 
sia's secret  diplomacy. 

1.  Secrecy  did  much  harm  to  the  Franco-Rus- 
1  Loreburn,  Earl,  How  War  Came,  London,  1919. 


208  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

sian  alliance  because  it  prevented  public  opinion  in 
both  countries  from  supporting  the  Russian  constitu- 
tional movement;  a  constitutional  Russia  would 
have  been  an  infinitely  stronger  and  better  ally 
and  friend  to  France  and  no  one  would  realize  that 
better  than  the  French  nation  itself.  Secrecy  in  the 
mutual  relations  of  France  and  Russia  made  two  mis- 
takes on  the  part  of  France  possible,  the  loaning  of 
money  to  the  Russian  autocracy  and  worse  still  the 
assistance  in  the  persecution  of  the  Russian  revolution- 
aries, radicals  and  liberals,  which  France  never  would 
have  tolerated  had  she  known  it  in  time.  The  same 
arguments  apply  in  an  identical  manner  to  Russia,  with 
this  difference,  that  public  opinion  in  Russia  had  far 
less  influence  under  the  Tsar's  regime  than  in  repub- 
lican France. 

2.  Secrecy  is  much  to  blame  for  the  constant  fric- 
tion and  enmity  which  existed  between  Russia  and 
England.    The  history  of  the  Persian  question  is  pos- 
sibly the  best  example.    How  much  trouble  could  have 
been  avoided  if  both  countries  had  had  a  chance  to 
publicly  discuss  in  full  detail  the  pending  Anglo-Per- 
sian agrement  in  1906-1907! 

3.  The  methods  of  secret  diplomacy  were  a  potent 
cause  of  the  Russo-Japanese  conflict.    There  would  not 
have  been  a  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  had  the 
Russian  government  acted  openly  and  fairly  in  the 
decade  preceding  1904.     Beginning  with  the  aggres- 
sion against  China  in  1895-1898,  through  the  occupa- 
tion of  Port  Arthur  and  the  Liaotung  peninsula,  the 
refusal  to  withdraw  the  troops  from  Manchuria  and 
finally  ending  in  the  criminal  enterprise  on  the  Yam, 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  209 

where  Besobrasoff  was  exploiting  the  private  conces- 
sions of  the  Romanoff  family;  all  that  long  list  of  inter- 
national abuses,  which  irritated  not  only  Japan,  but 
even  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world,  was  possible  only 
because  of  the  secrecy  which  enshrouded  the  actions 
of  the  Tsar's  government. 

4.  Finally,  it  was  again  secret  diplomacy  which 
proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  dangerous  causes  of  the 
Great  War  with  Germany.  It  was  the  secret  urgings 
of  the  Kaiser,  pushing  the  Tsar  towards  a  war  with 
Japan,  it  was  Germany's  secret  efforts  to  create  a 
quarrel  between  Russia  and  England,  it  was  the 
mischievous  treaty  of  Bjorko,  which  was  meant  to 
undermine  the  Franco-Russian  alliance,  it  was  the 
secret  negotiations  and  promises,  given  by  Nicholas 
at  Potsdam  in  1910,  and  finally,  it  was  the  secret  in- 
trigues of  Russian  diplomacy  in  the  Balkans,  which 
slowly  but  unavoidably  created  the  atmosphere  of  mu- 
tual distrust,  competition  and  suspicion,  which  led  to 
the  general  conflagration.  Here  again  one  can  be  ab- 
solutely sure,  that  had  publicity  of  these  negotiations 
existed,  had  the  nations  of  Europe  had  the  chance  of 
discussing  freely  their  international  relations,  war  could 
have  been  avoided.  Least  of  all  did  the  nations  at  large 
want  a  war.  Their  preference  for  peace  was  clearly 
evident;  only  certain  classes  and  governments  desired 
a  conflict,  while  some  others  were  criminally  indiffer- 
ent. But  the  fight  against  these  belligerent  classes  and 
governments  was  possible  only  in  one  way,  namely, 
by  publicity,  by  divulging  their  secret  policies  and 
negotiations. 


210  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

IV. 

When  the  evil  is  once  determined  it  is  much  easier 
to  find  a  remedy  for  it. 

The  defence  of  secrecy  in  diplomatic  negotiations  is 
usually  based  on  one  or  several  of  the  following  argu- 
ments. 

The  most  important  one  consists  in  the  pointing  out 
of  the  fact  that  secrecy  always  insures  rapidity  of  nego- 
tiations; the  more  publicity  is  given,  the  more  there  is 
discussion  of  them  and  the  longer  time  it  takes  to  arrive 
at  any  decision.  This  is  very  true,  but  rapidity  comes 
invariably  at  the  expense  of  public  satisfaction  and 
international  stability. 

Secrecy,  it  is  asserted,  lessens  competition  and  some- 
times even  eliminates  competitors  entirely  to  the  great 
advantage  of  the  secretly  negotiating  powers.  This  is 
also  quite  true,  but  it  also  comes  at  the  great  expense 
of  international  instability  and  creates  all  kinds  of 
dangers  as  we  have  seen  above. 

Less  frequently  does  one  meet  with  the  argument 
that  secrecy  of  negotiations  abates  national  enmities 
and  hatreds,  not  giving  free  play  to  such  ill  feelings. 
Examples  are  usually  cited  in  such  cases  concerning 
the  damage  done  by  the  so-called  yellow  press  in  differ- 
ent countries. 

Further  it  is  asserted,  we  can  still  find  many  prej- 
udices and  misconceptions  in  international  relations  as 
elsewhere  and  the  free  discussion  of  such  prejudices 
only  helps  to  magnify  them,  further  distorting  the 
truth.  Thus  at  times  of  chauvinistic  revivals  the  dis- 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  211 

cussion  of  international  relations  invariably  tends  to 
strengthen  the  ill  will  of  nations  towards  one  another 
or  at  least  prevents  any  possible  amicable  settlement. 

Then  it  is  often  pointed  out  that  public  opinion 
everywhere  is  a  very  unstable  factor.  It  might  be 
easily  swung  one  way  or  another  and  each  change  is 
apt  to  upset  the  equilibrium,  sometimes  achieved  with 
great  effort  and  by  overcoming  many  difficulties. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  secret  negotiations,  kept 
from  public  opinion,  are  much  easier  to  conduct  for 
statesmen,  officials  and  bureaucrats,  and  public  opin- 
ion, fickle  as  it  is,  often  does  upset  their  best  laid  plans. 
One  can  easily  imagine  their  grief  and  annoyance  at 
such  occurrences. 

Finally,  the  shortcomings  of  modern  parliamentary 
proceedings  are  also  cited  as  an  argument  against  pub- 
licity and  in  defence  of  secrecy.  Thus  for  instance,  it 
is  pointed  out  that  the  present-day  parliamentary  elo- 
quence in  no  way  helps  diplomacy.  The  members  of 
parliament  only  too  often  want  their  opinion  registered 
for  their  own  electorates  and  prate,  most  inconsider- 
ately, of  the  diplomatic  usages  or  the  needs  of 
the  nation.  There  is,  alas,  very  much  truth  in  such 
criticism. 

However,  all  these  arguments  lose  their  force  and 
miss  the  point  as  soon  as  we  confront  them  with  the 
above  mentioned  division  of  functions.  When  legal  ob- 
ligations are  being  created  for  a  nation,  the  latter  has  a 
full  right  to  know  about  them,  discuss  them  at  length 
and  take  up  as  much  time  as  is  needed,  no  matter  what 
impediments  this  may  place  in  the  way  of  diplomatic 
negotiations.  As  to  enmities  and  ill-feelings  between 


212  EUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

nations,  publicity  and  free  discussion  of  international 
relations  is  really  the  only  means  to  fight  them.  Secrecy 
only  helps  to  increase  prejudices  and  misconceptions 
and  in  no  case  alleviates  these  evils.  The  argument 
concerning  rapidity  of  negotiations  has  certainly  no 
meaning  whatever  in  these  cases. 

It  is  quite  different  with  the  second  function,  the 
diplomatic  negotiations  in  the  strict  meaning  of  the 
word.  Secrecy  in  these  cases  can  be  and  usually  is  es- 
sential to  success.  As  long  as  publicity  of  the  first  func- 
tion is  assured  and  the  responsibility  of  the  govern- 
ment to  the  people  is  firmly  established,  there  is  no 
danger  whatever  in  secret  diplomatic  negotiations,  be- 
cause the  latter,  in  such  cases,  cannot  have  any  bind- 
ing force  upon  the  nations  and  are  merely  preparatory 
to  the  final  stage  of  negotiations,  when  the  legal  obliga- 
tions are  really  created  and  established. 

Thus  we  come  to  the  first  necessary  conclusion :  the 
pressing  need  of  carrying  into  practice  the  mentioned 
division  of  functions,  the  introduction  of  as  much  pub- 
licity as  possible  into  the  first  case,  concerning  those 
international  negotiations  which  create  legal  obliga- 
tions between  the  states  and  the  establishment  of  ac- 
tual responsibility  of  government  officials  (ministers 
\  and  diplomats)  for  their  work  as  international  agents. 
When  this  is  well  assured,  secrecy  can  be  admitted  con- 
cerning the  diplomatic  negotiations  in  all  the  prepara- 
tory stages,  such  as  "conversations,"  "talks"  and  "nego- 
tiations." 

The  second  conclusion  relates  to  the  need  of  reform- 
ing the  foreign  offices  and  the  system  of  diplomatic 
representation  among  the  nations.  It  is  a  well  known 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  213 

fact  that  in  the  present  day  systems  of  government, 
the  ministers  of  foreign  affairs  are  invariably  the 
least  responsible  branch  of  thq  administration  and 
least  affected  by  the  modern  ideas  of  responsibility  and 
efficiency.  Their  methods  of  work  are  usually  quite 
archaic.1  They  are  the  very  last  ones  to  be  reformed, 
for  their  methods  have  hardly  changed  since  the  down- 
fall of  autocracies.  Then  too,  as  life  became  more  com- 
plex, the  work  of  the  foreign  offices  also  became  much 
more  diversified  and  complicated,  the  burden  of  work 
became  much  heavier  and  the  tasks  to  be  achieved  more 
delicate  and  involved.  This  differentiation  of  work 
necessarily  lessened  the  possibilities  of  control.  As 
time  went  on  the  foreign  offices  in  most  countries  be- 
came very  independent,  running  their  business  on  their 
own  responsibility  and  according  to  their  own  methods. 
Not  only  was  it  hard  for  parliament  to  keep  a  watchful 
eye  on  them,  but  even  the  other  branches  of  govern- 
ment tended  to  stand  off.  This  is  easily  noticeable  in 
the  cabinet  system;  other  ministers  invariably  try 
their  best  not  to  interfere  with  their  colleague,  who  is 
in  charge  of  the  foreign  office.  They  have  usually  no 
time  and  no  desire  for  such  interference,  leaving  the 
minister  of  foreign  affairs  a  free  hand.  Only  in  ex- 
ceptional cases,  for  instance,  at  the  time  of  discussions 
concerning  the  general  budget  or  some  important  treaty 
and  international  policy  or  finally  at  the  personal  re- 
quest of  the  foreign  secretary  or  the  head  of  the  state 
does  the  cabinet  take  part  in  the  discussion  of  matters 
concerning  the  foreign  office. 

1Some  writers  even  point  out  that  the  foreign  offices  and 
diplomatic  services  have  developed  a  language  of  their  own  in 
their  mutual  intercourse. 


214  KUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

We  can  discern  the  same  tendency  in  some  parlia- 
ments, to  shun  the  close  control  of  foreign  offices  on 
account  of  the  great  technical  complications  which  such 
a  control  calls  for.  And  all  this  augments  the  dangers 
of  secret  diplomacy,  lessening  the  responsibility  of  the 
minister  of  foreign  affairs.1 

In  other  words  the  whole  machinery  of  diplomacy 
needs  overhauling  and  calls  for  urgent  reform.  This 
is  our  second  important  conclusion. 
-  The  diplomatic  service,  first,  needs  unification.  The 
complexity  of  modern  international  intercourse  calls 
into  service  many  kinds  of  agents,  attaches,  consuls  and 
other  men.  The  army  and  the  navy  have  their  own, 
the  commercial  departments  have  theirs,  the  colonial 
offices  also  often  maintain  agents,  sometimes  the  gov- 
ernment railroads,  shipping  offices  and  other  depart- 
ments have  agents.  Most  of  them  try  to  outdo  one 
another,  have  their  own  policy  and  conduct  their  own 
negotiations.  This  is  as  a  rule  very  detrimental  to  the 
general  policy  of  the  state;  especially  dangerous  are 
the  military  attaches,  who  are  at  times  entrusted  with 
purely  diplomatic  negotiations,  preparatory  to  all  sorts 
of  military  alliances.  Such  agents  ought  to  retain  their 
independence  only  concerning  purely  technical  matters 
and  in  all  other  questions  must  be  absolutely  sub- 
ordinated to  the  chief  diplomatic  representative,  am- 
bassador or  minister,  of  their  country.  This  is  the  first 
necessary  reform;  the  Russian,  as  well  as  the  German 
systems  were  most  deficient  in  this  respect,  due  to 

1  Compare  for  example :  Morrell,  Ph.,  The  Control  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  The  Contemporary  Review,  Nov.,  1912,  and  Ponsomby,  A., 
Democracy  and  Diplomacy,  London,  1915.  Both  authors  take 
an  extreme  point  of  view. 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  215 

autocracy  which   always  prefers  personal  influences 
and  commissions. 

Second,  the  reform  must  reach  £he  diplomatic 
agents  themselves.  The  professional  caste  system  has 
certain  advantages,  but  it  is  very  harmful  in  many 
other  ways.  The  diplomatic  haughtiness,  aloofness 
and  secretive  methods  are  proverbial.  The  best  means 
of  eradicating  these  evils  seem  to  be,  the  opening  of  the 
diplomatic  profession  to  all  educated  men,  selected  by 
competition  and  abolishing  once  and  for  all  the  class 
privileges  of  this  service.  This  is  realized  in  most 
countries  at  the  present  day.  The  ambassadorial 
offices  must  be  filled  exclusively  by  men,  specially 
chosen  or  by  means  of  promotion,  as  a  reward  to  the 
man  who  was  the  longest  in  office  and  not  for  political 
pull  or  for  reason  of  wealth.  Such  a  reform  is  made 
easier  by  the  fact  that  the  diplomatic  agent  has  lost  in 
our  day  his  former  importance,  as  the  mam  negotiations 
are  usually  conducted  directly  between  the  foreign 
offices;  any  way  the  diplomatic  agent  has  always  the 
wire  at  his  disposal  and  can  ask  for  instructions  with 
the  least  possible  difficulty  and  get  an  answer  in  a  few 
hours,  no  matter  how  distant  he  is  from  his  govern- 
ment. 

Third,  the  reform  must  concern  the  central  foreign . 
offices  themselves;  this  is  the  most  difficult  question. 
They  must  be  not  only  modernized  but  better 
controlled,  as  to  their  general  policies.  Publicity,  again, 
is  one  of  the  best  means.  Better  and  more  constant 
relations  should  exist  between  the  foreign  office  and 
the  press,  so  that  the  nation  may  better  keep  in  touch 
with  the  international  relations  of  its  government. 


216  RUSSIA'S  FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

All  these  reforms  are  urgently  needed  in  most  coun- 
tries. The  details  can  be  elaborated  only  in  connection 
with  the  local  constitutions.  The  evils  of  secret 
diplomacy  and  the  defects  of  the  systems  of  diplomatic 
representation  and  foreign  offices  were  made  evident 
by  the  Great  War  and  cannot  be  passed  over  lightly. 
The  best  and  latest  example  of  secret  diplomacy  were 
the  allied  treaties  of  1915.  I  will  never  forget  the  con- 
sternation of  the  Russian  Provisional  Government, 
when  in  1917  the  foreign  minister,  P.  Miliukov,  com- 
municated to  them  the  contents  of  these  treaties.  Most 
of  these  enlightened  Russian  statesmen  suspected  some 
such  agreements,  but  not  one  of  them  had  any  idea 
of  the  real  purport  of  the  arrangements  of  1915.  One 
can  absolutely  affirm  that  not  one  of  those  arrange- 
ments would  have  been  possible  if  the  light  of  pub- 
licity had  been  thrown  on  them  at  their  inception. 

On  the  other  hand  we  can  cite  several  cases,  when 
modern  governments  had  recourse  to  publicity  in 
settling  their  international  disputes  and  in  every  case 
only  advantages  were  gained  by  this  means.  Concern- 
ing Russia  for  instance,  it  was  the  case  several  times 
in  the  Balkan  question,  relating  to  Russian  aggression 
in  China  and  finally  in  the  unfortunate  Dogger  Bank 
incident,  which  nearly  brought  upon  Russia  a  war  with 
England  and  which  was  averted  only  by  the  fact  that 
the  contending  powers  were  willing  to  arbitrate  and 
that  full  publicity  was  given  the  incident  in  both 
countries. 

What  a  powerful  weapon  publicity  and  the  participa- 
tion of  public  opinion  are  in  international  relations  we 
can  judge  by  the  fact  that  recently  instances  occurred, 


SECRET  DIPLOMACY  217 

when  a  chief  of  state  and  a  member  of  a  government 
tried  to  reach  the  public  of  a  country  above  the  head 
of  their  governments.  In  former  days  this  was  some- 
times done,  but  invariably  in  an  anonymous  form. 
(Bismarck  used  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten  and  other 
governments — their  so-called  official  or  semi-official 
press).  As  Professor  Hyde *  points  out,  it  was  recently 
done  openly  in  two  cases;  first,  when  President 
Wilson  appealed  to  the  Italian  people  in  the  Fiume 
dispute,  in  April  1919,  and  second,  when  Lord  Grey 
tried,  in  January  1920,  to  enlist  the  sympathies  of  the 
English  nation  with  the  reservations  to  the  treaty  of 
Versailles,  drawn  up  by  the  United  States  Senate. 
Both  cases  are  a  good  illustration  of  the  above  men- 
tioned tendency  to  enlarge  the  influence  of  public 
opinion  in  international  relations. 

Consequently,  I  believe  that  we  may  look  forward 
to  a  far  greater  knowledge  of  foreign  relations  on  the 
part  of  the  public  at  large,  to  an  increasing  control  by 
public  opinion  and  to  a  gradual  drawing  together  of 
all  civilized  nations  and  the  recognition  of  certain  basic 
principles  of  equity  and  justice  which  will  lead  event- 
ually to  the  achievements  of  a  Court  of  Justice  and  a 
successful  League  of  Nations. 

1  International  Law,  Chiefly  as  Interpreted  and  Applied  by  the 
United  States,  1922. 


INDEX 


Abaza,  Russian  admiral  and  ad- 
venturer in  Korea,  82,  83. 

Adrianople,  Treaty  of  (1829),  127. 

Afghanistan,  made  a  buffer-state 
by  England,  against  Russian 
aggression,  32;  English  rule  es- 
tablished over,  33;  Russian 
recognition  of  British  influence 
in,  36;  results  of  role  as  buffer- 
state,  47. 

Africa,  German  imperialistic  de- 
signs in,  43. 

Alexander  I  of  Russia,  annexa- 
tion of  Finland  by,  171-172. 

Alexander  II  of  Russia,  4;  com- 
plains to  Kaiser  of  attitude  of 
Bismarck  and  German  govern- 
ment, 146. 

Alexander  III  of  Russia,  2 ;  acces- 
sion of,  5;  policy  of  isolation 
preferred  by,  for  Russia,  5; 
early  dislike  of,  for  France,  6^-7 ; 
reasons  for  change  in  policy 
regarding  French  and  German 
relations,  7-12;  difficulties  with 
Bismarck,  10-11;  pleasant  im- 

Eression  made  upon,  by  Wil- 
elm  II,  11;  relations  with  and 
policy  toward  Bulgaria,  118- 
120;  e.arly  disposition  of,  to- 
ward Germany,  146-147;  quar- 
rel between  Bismarck  and,  over 
forged  Bulgarian  letters,  147; 
\Vilhelm's  early  friendly  feel- 
ings toward,  151,  152-154; 
Kaiser's  attempted  renewal  of 
friendship  with,  in  1910-1911, 
162. 

Alexander  of  Battenberg,  2,  118; 
deputation  in  interests  of,  in 
England  and  in  France,  8; 
sides  with  Bulgarians  against 


Tsar  Alexander  III,  118-119; 
deposition  of,  120. 

Alexeiev,  Admiral,  in  Korea,  83. 

Algeziras  incident,  support  of 
France  by  England  and  Russia 
in,  41. 

Andrassy,  Count,  premier  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, 94-95. 

Appert,  General,  incident  of  the 
recall  of,  from  St.  Petersburg, 
6-7. 

Armenian  massacres  of  the  '90's, 
36. 

Asia,  Central,  troubles  between 
Russia  and  England  over,  32- 
33. 

Austria,  support  given  by,  to 
Bulgaria,  31 ;  Anglo-Russian 
secret  agreement  concerning, 
45;  given  preference  by  Bis- 
marck over  Russia  in  matter  of 
alliance,  146. 

Austria-Hungary,  account  of  rela- 
tions between  Russia  and,  93- 
113. 

Autocracy,  secret  diplomacy  a 
weapon  of,  51. 

Avellan,  Admiral,  in  command 
of  Russian  squadron  on  visit 
to  France  (1893),  16. 

Badmaieff,  Russian  adventurer, 
60. 

Balkans,  effects  of  wars  in,  on 
Russian  and  Austrian  policies, 
44,  111-112;  account  of  Russia's 
relations  with,  114-144;  alliance 
of  countries  of  (1912),  124. 

Baltic  Sea,  convention  of  1908 
concerning  status  of,  177-178; 
importance  to  Russia  of  free 
access  through,  189. 


219 


220 


INDEX 


Barclay,  Sir  George,  English  rep- 
resentative in  Persia,  48. 

Beaconsfield,  Lord,  4;  aid  given 
by,  to  Turkey  against  Russia, 
28;  annihilation  of,  in  1880,  29. 

Belgium,  documents  taken  from, 
published  by  German  govern- 
ment (1918),  12;  early  loans  to 
Russia  by,  17. 

Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  exposure 
of  Chinese  affairs  by,  62. 

Berlin-Bagdad  Railroad,  43,  138. 

Berlin  Congress  of  1878,  4,  145; 
humiliation  of  Russia  by,  4,  28, 
134;  effects  on  Austro-Hungar- 
ian  affairs,  94. 

Bernadotte,  Marshal,  elected 
King  of  Sweden,  173-174. 

Besobrasoff,  General,  Russian  ad- 
venturer, 82,  83. 

Bismarck,  2,  5,  7;  erroneous  tac- 
tics of,  toward  Russia,  8,  9; 
stormy  interview  between  Alex- 
ander III  and  (1887),  10-11, 
147;  accession  of  Wilhelm  II 
and  resignation  of,  11;  poor 
diplomacy  of,  32;  as  "an  hon- 
est broker,"  49;  policy  and  for- 
eign relations  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary dictated  by,  94-96;  paci- 
fication of  Russia  by,  96-98; 
blamed  by  Russia  for  disap- 
pointing results  of  Berlin  Con- 
gress (1878),  145-146;  builds  up 
alliance  with  Austria  rather 
than  Russia,  146;  increasingly 
unfriendly  attitude  toward  Rus- 
sia, 149-150;  plans  of,  due  to 
underrating  of  Russia's  mili- 
tary strength,  150-151 ;  reported 
change  in  feelings  toward  Rus- 
sia prior  to  resignation,  151- 
152 ;  results  of  policy,  152 ;  chief 
characteristics  of  policy  of,  to- 
ward Russia,  187-188. 

Bjorko  Treaty,  2,  25,  39,  110-111; 
enforced  by  Kaiser  during 
Russo-Japanese  war,  159-160 ; 
an  exa'mple  of  evils  of  secret 
diplomacy,  209. 

Black  Sea,  importance  of  Rus- 
sia's free  access  through,  189. 


Boer  War,  effect  of,  on  relations 
of  European  powers,  37-38. 

Boisdeffre,  General,  mission  of, 
to  Russia,  14-15. 

Bokhara,  occupied  by  Russia,  33. 

Bolsheviki,  publication  of  secret 
treaties  by,  140,  141. 

Boris,  Bulgarian  Crown  Prince, 
124. 

Bosnia-Herzegovina,  annexed  to 
Austria-Hungary,  103,  105,  137 ; 
sensation  created  in  Europe  by 
annexation,  108;  effect  on 
Serbia,  129. 

Bosphorus,  Russia  claims  con- 
cerning, 5;  Russia's  interest  in 
freedom  of,  134,  143;  signifi- 
cance of  question  of,  143-144, 
189. 

Boxer  uprising,  and  effects,  68-67, 
76. 

Bratianu,  Rumanian  statesman, 
132. 

Brest-Litovsk  peace,  151. 

Browne,  E.  G.,  criticism  by,  of 
English  policy  in  Persia,  47; 
quoted  on  the  conception  of  a 
peaceful  Russia  and  a  bellig- 
erent Germany,  52. 

Bucharest,  Treaty  of,  126,  139, 
164,  166. 

Bulgaria,  French  coolness  toward 
deputation  from,  8;  Russia's 
relations  with,  31-32,  114-127; 
joins  Central  Powers  in  Great 
War,  127. 

Cadets,  Russian  Constitutional 
Democrats  called,  21. 

Carnot,  President,  Russo-French 
agreement  promoted  by,  9; 
visit  of  Grand  Duke  Constan- 
tine  to,  16. 

Carol,  Rumanian  King,  132. 

Cassini,  Count,  Russian  Minister 
in  China,  56. 

Cassini  convention,  the,  56. 

Chang-Ing-Huan,  Chinese  states- 
man, 65. 

China,  activities  of  Russia  and 
other  European  Powers  in,  54- 
61;  European  loans  to,  55; 


INDEX 


221 


open  door  policy  promoted  by 
United  States  in,  61-62;  Boxer 
uprising,  66-67;  convention  of 
1902  with  Russia,  67;  arrange- 
ment with  Russia  concerning 
Mongolia,  70-74. 

Chinese  Eastern  railroad,  build- 
ing of,  56-57,  59. 

Committee  system  in  parlia- 
ments, 198-199. 

Constans,  first  French  minister 
to  persecute  Russian  revolu- 
tionaries, 13. 

Constantine,  Grand  Duke,  visit 
of,  to  President  Carnot,  16. 

Constantinople,  Anglo-Russian 
secret  agreement  concerning 
(1915),  45,  141;  Russia's  aim 
the  conquest  of,  133-134;  ques- 
tion of,  still  unsettled,  141- 
143. 

Cowen,  Joseph,  conversation  with 
Kropotkine,  35. 

Curzon,  Lord,  in  Persia,  41. 

D'Aehrenthal,  Count,  Austrian 
ambassador  to  Russia,  102; 
policy  and  aims  of,  103-104; 
ability  as  a  diplomat,  104; 
plans  of,  for  spreading  Aus- 
trian administrative  system 
over  Balkans,  107-108;  manip- 
ulation of  Austrian  press  by, 
111. 

Dalmatian  coast,  Anglo-Russian 
secret  agreement  concerning, 
45. 

Dalny.    See  Talienwan. 

Danef,  Bulgarian  ambassador  to 
Russia,  123. 

Delcasse,  French  foreign  minister, 
39;  creator  of  Anglo-French 
Entente,  44;  appointed  ambas- 
sador to  St.  Petersburg,  44. 

Diplomatic  service,  suggested  re- 
form of,  214-216.  See  Secret 
diplomacy. 

Dogger  Bank,  incident,  38,  216. 

Dondoukoff,  Russian  general  in 
Bulgaria,  118. 

Doubassoff,  Russian  Admiral,  at 
Port  Arthur,  63. 


Eastern  Rumelia,  annexation  of, 
by  Bulgaria,  31  n.,  119. 

Edward  VII  of  England,  a  great 
factor  in  European  diplomacy, 
40;  arrangement  of  Triple  En- 
tente by,  40-44. 

Ehrensvard,  Swedish  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  178. 

Ehrnroot,  Russian  general  in  Bul- 
garia, 118. 

"Encirclement  of  Germany" 
theory,  40. 

England,  early  enmity  of,  to- 
ward Russia,  4,  5;  account  of 
relations  between  Russia  and, 
27  ff.;  troubles  over  Turkey, 
due  to  fears  of  British  imperi- 
alists, 28-30;  support  given 
Bulgaria  by,  31;  difficulties 
over  Central  Asia,  32-33;  ef- 
forts of,  to  stop  Armenian 
atrocities  thwarted  by  Russia, 
36;  alliance  with  Japan,  38, 
78-81;  naval  agreement  be- 
tween Russia  and,  45;  activ- 
ities in  Persia  as  affected  by 
Russian  relations,  46-51. 

Entente  of  the  Three  Emperors, 
97,  147,  148. 

Enver  Bey,  leader  among  Young 
Turks,  135-136. 

Europe,  future  danger  to,  from 

Kaceful  penetration  of  Russia 
,-  Germany,  167-170. 


Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,  policy  of, 
of  balancing  Russia  against 
Austria,  122. 

Finland,  Russian  fortification  of, 
to  exert  pressure  on  Sweden, 
85;  annexation  of,  to  Russia, 
171-172;  granting  of  constitu- 
tion to,  172-173;  role  as  a  buf- 
fer-state, 173;  policy  of  russi- 
fication  started  by  Russian  na- 
tionalists, 174-175. 

Fiume,  Anglo-Russian  secret 
agreement  concerning  (1915), 
45. 

Flourens,  French  foreign  minister, 
8. 


222 


INDEX 


Foreign  offices,  need  of  reform- 
ing methods  of,  212-216.  See 
Secret  diplomacy. 

Forgatch,  Count,  Austrian  minis- 
ter in  Serbia,  130. 

France,  friendship  of  Russia 
sought  by,  5;  account  of  rela- 
tions between  Russia  and,  6  ff., 
149;  persecution  of  Russian 
revolutionaries  begun  by 
(1890),  13;  heavy  price  paid  by, 
for  Russia's  official  friendship, 
13-14;  formal  announcement  of 
Russian  alliance  (1895),  16; 
loans  to  Russia  by,  16-24 ;  help 
given  Russia  during  war  with 
Japan,  19;  arguments  for  and 
against  "loan  which  saved 
Russia"  (1906),  19-23;  close 
bonds  with  Russia  after  loan  of 
1906,  24-25;  historical  meaning 
of  Russian  alliance,  25;  grave 
miscalculations  of,  25-26; 
strengthening  of  bonds  with 
Russia  due  to  Anglo-Russian 
hostility,  35. 

Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke, 
105-106;  so-called  "Trialism" 
sponsored  by,  106. 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor,  at  St. 
Petersburg,  100. 

Freycinet,  French  foreign  secre- 
tary, 9,  16. 

Friedjung,  historian  and  assistant 
of  Count  d'Aehrenthal,  111; 
part  played  by,  in  forged  Bul- 
garian letters,  130;  a  "preven- 
tive" war  against  Russia  fa- 
vored by,  10. 

Germany,  clumsy  foreign  policy 
of,  8;  origins  of  agreement  be- 
tween France  and  Russia  as 
defence  against,  9;  constant  ir- 
ritation of  Russia  by,  11;  not 
willing  to  participate  in  loans 
to  Russia,  17;  refuses  to  par- 
ticipate in  Russian  loan  of 
1906,  24;  bungling  diplomacy 
of,  32;  understanding  between 
Witte  and,  37;  formation  of 
[Triple  Entente  against,  40-44; 


view  taken  by,  of  Russian  deal- 
ings with  China,  59-60,  63,  78- 
79,  84;  Japanese  alliance  not 
sought  by,  7&-79;  relations  be- 
tween Austria-Hungary  and, 
after  1867,  93-111;  disturbed 
over  alliance  of  Balkan  coun- 
tries, 124 ;  reasons  for  Bulgaria's 
leaning  toward,  126;  Rumanian 
alliance  with  (1883),  132;  es- 
tablishment of  influence  of,  in 
Turkey,  134-140;  attitude  to- 
ward Balkan  wars,  138-139; 
Turkey  sides  with,  in  Great 
War,  141 ;  account  of  relations 
with  Russia  after  1878,  145-166; 
future  danger  to  Europe,  from 

Eeaceful  penetration  of  Russia 
y,  167-170;  Sweden  estranged 
from  Russia  by  propaganda  of, 
171,  175-177,  179,  181;  Sweden 
favorable  to,  in  Great  War,  177. 

Gervais,  Admiral,  in  command  of 
French  fleet  at  Kronstadt,  15. 

Giers,  Count  de,  Russian  for- 
eign minister,  15-16. 

Gladstone,  W.  E.,  reforms  in  Tur- 
key demanded  by,  28 ;  moderat- 
ing influences  of,  in  troubles 
between  Russia  and  England, 
30. 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  letter  to  Sir 
Arthur  Nicholson,  42;  policy  in 
Persia,  47;  a  victim  of  methods 
of  secret  diplomacy,  51;  meth- 
od of  "fait  accompli"  used  by, 
207. 

Gustav,  King  of  Sweden,  178, 
180. 

Harden,  Maximilian,  articles  by, 
42. 

Hart,  Sir  Robert,  adviser  of 
China,  54. 

Hartmann,  Russian  revolution- 
ary, 7. 

Hartwig,  Russian  minister  to 
Persia,  48. 

Hay,  John,  U.  S.  Secretary  of 
State,  62. 

Hayashi,  Baron,  as  a  statesman, 
78. 


INDEX 


223 


Hungarians,  similarity  to  Prus- 
sians, 94. 
Hyde,  Professor,  cited,  217. 

Ikdam,  The,  organ  of  Young 
Turks,  135. 

Iswolsky,  A.,  Russian  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  91,  102-103, 
156  n.;  deception  of,  by  Count 
d'Aehrenthal,  107-108;  protest 
of,  against  annexation  of  Bos- 
nia-Herzegovina, 109;  negotia- 
tions concerning  Baltic  Sea  ini- 
tiated by  (1908), 177-178. 

Italy,  secret  treaty  between  Eng- 
land and  Russia  concerning, 
45;  Triple  Alliance  entered  into 
by,  98;  estrangement  of,  from 
Austria  by  Russia,  110;  treaty 
between  Rumania  and  (1888), 
132. 

Ito,  Marquis,  Japanese  states- 
man, 78. 

Japan,  help  of  France  to  Russia 
in  war  with,  19;  events  leading 
to  English  alliance  with,  38-39, 
78-81;  significance  of  victory 
over  Russia,  41 ;  enmity  of,  in- 
curred by  Russia,  57-58;  war 
between  Russia  and,  69;  chap- 
ter on  Russia's  relations  with, 
since  1895,  75-92. 

Joffre,  General,  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, 44. 

Karageorgievitch  dynasty  in 
Serbia,  128. 

Kaulbars,  Russian  general  in  Bul- 
garia, 118. 

Khiva,  occupied  by  Russia,  33. 

Kiao-chow,  acquired  by  Ger- 
many, 43. 

Kokand,  occupied  by  Russia,  33. 

Komura,  Japanese  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  79-80. 

Korea,  a  center  of  troubles  in 
Far  East,  61;  first  difficulties 
between  Russia  and  Japan  over 
(1895-1896),  77;  Russian  de- 
signs on,  82-85. 


Kramarz,  Bohemian  leader,  108. 

Krasnovodsk,  occupied  by  Rus- 
sia, 33. 

Kronstadt,  visit  of  French  fleet 
to,  15. 

Kropotkine,  Russian  revolution- 
ary, 7;  memoirs  of,  cited,  34-35, 
38. 

Kruger  telegram,  incident  of  the, 
38. 

Kuangchouwan,  occupied  by 
French,  65. 

Kuropatkin,  General,  58,  64;  re- 
sponsibility of,  for  Russo-Jap- 
anese war,  84-85;  fate  of,  86; 
reorganization  of  Russian  army 
by,  started  in  1901,  176. 

Kwantung  peninsula,  German 
force  landed  on,  63. 

Laboulaye,  French  ambassador  to 
Russia,  8;  responsibility  of,  for 
Russo-French  alliance,  8-9  ; 
success  of  French  policy  toward 
Russia  due  to,  10. 

Lamsdorff,  Count,  Russian  for- 
eign minister,  3,  101;  mistakes 
of,  in  treatment  of  Japanese 
negotiators,  79-81. 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  letter  to  Hard- 
inge,  41;  active  in  forming 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  79. 

League  of  Nations,  lack  of  suc- 
cess dependent  on  absence  of 
good  understanding  among 
great  powers,  169-170. 

Liakhof,  Cossack  Colonel  in 
Persia,  48-50. 

Liao-tung  peninsula,  Russian 
plans  concerning,  57;  leasing 
of,  by  Russia,  65;  returned  to 
Japan  by  Portsmouth  Peace 
Treaty,  89. 

Li  Hung  Chang,  Chinese  states- 
man, 55;  transactions  with  Rus- 
sia, 55-61. 

Loans,  dangers  of  government 
inter-state,  184-185. 

Lobanoff,  Prince,  Russian  foreign 
minister,  3,  36;  ignorance  of, 
60. 

Lobanoff- Yamagata  Protocol,  77. 


224 


INDEX 


Macedonia,  the  storm  center  of 
the  Balkans,  101 ;  Bulgarian  ac- 
tivities in  (1896-1910),  121. 

Manchuria,  Russian  plans  con- 
cerning, 56-57;  spread  of  Rus- 
sian influence  in,  68-69;  Japa- 
nese influence  in,  after  Ports- 
mouth Peace  Treaty,  89-90. 

Maria  Pavlovna,  divorce  of,  181. 

Marie,  Empress,  wife  of  Alexan- 
der III  of  Russia,  149. 

Marling,  English  representative 
in  Persia,  48. 

Masaryk,  Professor,  Serbian  lead- 
er, now  President  of  Czecho- 
slovakia, 130. 

Merv,  occupied  by  Russia,  33. 

Milan,  King  of  Serbia,  120;  ab- 
dication of,  128. 

Miliukov,  P.,  Russian  foreign 
minister,  141,  2l'6. 

Mohrenheim,  Russian  ambassa- 
dor recalled  from  Paris,  7;  re- 
turn of,  as  ambassador  to 
France,  8. 

Moltke,  General,  150. 

Mongolia,  Russia's  designs  in, 
70-73;  tripartite  agreement  of 
1915  regarding,  73-74. 

Montebello,  Count,  French  am- 
bassador to  St.  Petersburg,  16. 

Montenegro,  friendship  of,  sought 
by  Serbia,  130;  relations  be- 
tween Russia  and,  131-132. 

Morgan,  J.  P.,  &  Co.,  withdrawal 
of,  from  Russian  loan  of  1906, 
24. 

Morocco,  incident,  the,  43;  Rus- 
sian support  of  France  in,  24. 

Moss  Convention  of  1814,  174  n. 

Motono,  Japanese  ambassador  to 
Russia,  91. 

Muraviev,  Count,  Russian  for- 
eign minister,  3,  63,  158. 

Murgab,  occupied  by  Russia,  33. 

Napoleon,    Alexander    I's    fight 

against,  171-172. 
Nelidoff,  Russian  ambassador  to 

Turkey,  114. 

Neutzlin,  French  banker,  22. 
Nicholas  II  of  Russia,  2;  blame 


placed  on,  for  Russian  policy 
toward  Japan,  92;  meeting  with 
Francis  Joseph  at  Miirzsteg, 
102;  attitude  taken  by  Wilhelm 
II  toward,  156;  dislike  of,  for 
Kaiser,  156. 

Nicholas  of  Montenegro,  Prince, 
131-132. 

Obrenovich    dynasty   in   Serbia, 

120;    under    Austrian   control, 

128. 
Obroutcheff,     General,     Russian 

Chief  of  Staff,  15,  16. 
Open  door  policy  in  China,  62, 

69;    effect    of   Russo-Japanese 

war  on,  91. 

Pan-Slav  movement,  5,  96,  98, 
114,  127;  study  of,  115-118;  at 
its  best  in  1877-1878,  117;  two 
main  reasons  why  certain  to 
fail,  187. 

Parliamentary  institutions,  dis- 
cussion and  criticism  of,  in  con- 
nection with  secret  diplomacy, 
191-200;  shortcomings  of,  a 
chief  argument  for  secret  di- 
plomacy, 211. 

Persia,  Russian  bank  in,  37; 
Russian  plans  in,  thwarted  by 
England,  41 ;  effect  of  Anglo- 
Russian  relations  on,  46-51. 

Peter  I,  King  of  Serbia,  128-129. 

Plehve,  Minister  von,  58;  re- 
sponsibility of,  for  Russo-Japa- 
nese war,  84-85;  fate  of,  86. 

Pqklevsky-Kozell,  Russian  min- 
ister in  Persia,  50. 

Port  Arthur,  Russian  plans  con- 
cerning, 57;  occupied  by  Rus- 
sians, 63;  returned  to  China  by 
Japan,  75;  events  following 
Japan's  loss  of,  76;  returned  to 
Japan  by  Portsmouth  Peace 
Treaty,  89. 

Portsmouth  Peace  Conference, 
41,  87-89. 

Potsdam  conference   (1910),  111. 

Public  opinion,  influence  of,  on 
foreign  policy,  52;  parliamen- 
tary government  the  best  chan- 


INDEX 


225 


nel  of  control  by,  192;  hamper- 
ing of  expression  of,  by  par- 
liamentary committees,  199 ; 
power  as  a  weapon  of  partici- 
pation in  international  rela- 
tions, 216-217. 

Rasputin,  the  monk,  132. 

Reval  meeting  between  Nicholas 
II  and  Edward  VII,  42,  105, 
136. 

Ribot,  French  prime  minister,  9, 
16;  formal  announcement  of 
Franco-Russian  alliance  by 
(1895),  16. 

Roberts,  General,  33. 

Roosevelt,  President,  and  Russo- 
Japanese  peace,  87-89. 

Rothschilds,  story  of,  and  French 
loan  of  1891,  18;  decline  to 
take  part  in  loan  of  1906,  23. 

Rumania,  coolness  of  relations 
with  Russia,  132-133. 

Russia,  results  to,  of  Berlin 
Congress  of  1878,  4,  28,  134;  im- 
possibility of  policy  of  isola- 
tion for,  5;  account  of  rela- 
tions of,  with  France,  6  ff.; 
policies  of  years  1886-1890  to- 
ward Germany  and  France,  11- 
12;  formal  announcement  of 
French  alliance  (1895),  16; 
French  loans  to,  16-24;  close 
relations  with  France  after 
loan  of  1906,  24-25;  historical 
meaning  of  French  alliance, 
25;  mistakes  in  French  policy 
toward,  25-26;  relations  with 
England,  27  ff.;  open  enmity 
with  England  in  70's,  28;  diffi- 
culties over  Bulgaria,  31 ;  crisis 
over  Central  Asia,  32-33;  ad- 
vance of,  into  Central  Asia, 
33;  activities  in  the  '90's,  36-39; 
bank  founded  in  Persia  by,  37; 
naval  agreement  with  England, 
45 ;  relations  with  England  over 
Persia,  46-51;  relations  with 
China,  54-61;  convention  of 
1902  with  China,  67;  account 
of  relations  with  Japan  since 
1895,  75-92;  reasons  for  Japan's 


choice  of  England  as  an  ally 
rather  than,  78-81 ;  chapter  on 
relations  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary, 93-113;  relations  with 
Bulgaria,  114-127;  and  Pan- 
Slavism,  116-118;  present-day 
help  given  to,  by  Bulgarian 
people,  127;  account  of  rela- 
tions with  Serbia,  127-130;  be- 
comes protector  of  Serbia,  130- 
131 ;  relations  with  Montenegro, 
131-132;  relations  with  Ru- 
mania, 132-133;  the  long  quar- 
rel with  Turkey,  133;  relations 
with  Germany  after  Berlin 
Congress  of  1878,  145-166;  dan- 
ger to  Europe  foreseen  in  fu- 
ture relations  of  Germany  and, 
167-170;  account  of  relations 
with  Sweden,  171-183;  lessons 
from  study  of  foreign  relations 
of,  188-189;  summary  of  evils 
produced  by  secret  diplomacy 
of,  207-209. 

Russo-Chinese  bank,  founding  of, 
by  Witte,  58-59;  an  aid  in 
spread  of  Russian  influence  in 
China,  68. 

Russo-Japanese  war,  38-39,  86-89; 
artificial  and  wholly  unneces- 
sary, 92. 

Samarkand,  occupied  by  Russia, 
33. 

Sanders,  General  Liman  von,  ap- 
pointed to  Constantinople,  166. 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  28,  134. 

Sazonoff,  3;  efforts  of,  to  settle 
Bulgarian  troubles,  123-124; 
efforts  at  counteracting  policy 
of  Germany  in  Turkey,  140. 

Secret  diplomacy,  ill  effects  of,  in 
Persia,  50-51,  185-186;  a  weap- 
on of  autocracy,  51;  dangers 
of,  shown  by  Russo-Japanese 
difficulties,  92 ;  advantage 
gained  from  discarding  of, 
shown  by  case  of  Sweden,  183; 
evils  of,  shown  by  history  of 
Russia's  foreign  relations,  189; 
the  origins  of,  201-203;  discus- 
sion of  operation  of,  205-207; 


226 


INDEX 


summary  of  evils  resulting 
from  Russia's,  207-209;  argu- 
ments for  and  against,  and 
search  for  remedy  for,  210-217. 

Serbia,  sides  with  Russia  against 
Bulgaria  (1885),  119-120;  de- 
feat of  Bulgaria  by  (1913),  125; 
account  of  relations  between 
Russia  and,  127-131 ;  Russia  be- 
comes avowed  protector  of, 
130-131;  increasing  strength  of, 
in  1913,  a  drawback  for  Ger- 
many, 164. 

Sevres,  Treaty  of,  141 ;  provisions 
of,  regarding  Turkey,  142. 

Shimonoseki  treaty  of  1895,  57. 

Shuster,  Morgan,  American 
Treasurer-General  in  Persia, 
48-50. 

Skierniewice,  meeting  of  three 
Emperors  at,  147. 

Slavs.   See  Pan-Slav  movement. 

Slivnitsa,  Serbians  defeated  by 
Bulgarians  at,  120. 

Soboleff,  Russian  general  in  Bul- 
garia, 118. 

Staaf,  Swedish  premier,  178. 

Stokes,  Major  C.  B.,  English  rep- 
resentative in  Persia,  48,  49. 

Sweden,  pressure  exerted  by  Rus- 
sia upon,  by  fortifying  Finland, 
85;  account  of  relations  be- 
tween Russia  and,  171-183; 
government  of,  favorable  to 
Germany  in  Great  War,  177. 

Taalat,    leader    among    Young 

Turks,  135-136. 
Talienwan,  leasing  of,  by  Russia, 

65;     returned    to    Japan    by 

Portsmouth  Peace  Treaty,  89- 

90. 

Tashkent,  occupied  by  Russia,  33. 
Testament  of  Peter  the   Great, 

175. 
Thomas,  Albert,  French  socialist 

minister,  45. 
Three  Emperors,  alliance  of  the, 

97,  147;  end  of,  148. 
Tibet,  English  influences  assured 

in,  41. 


Tisza,  Count,  Hungarian  premier. 
166. 

"Trialism,"  political  scheme 
called,  105-106. 

Triple  Entente,  formation  of,  40- 
44. 

Turkey,  trouble  between  Russia 
and  England  over,  27,  28-31; 
revolution  in,  42,  44,  136;  An- 
glo-Russian secret  treaty  con- 
cerning, 45;  alliance  of  Balkan 
countries  against,  and  defeat  of 
(1912),  124-125,  138;  account 
of  long-standing  quarrel  and 
troubled  relations  with  Russia, 
133-144 ;  Germany's  influence 
in,  134-140;  question  of  future 
of,  141-144. 

United  States,  attitude  of,  toward 
China,  61-62;  "open  door"  pol- 
icy of,  for  China,  62;  bad  im- 
pression made  in,  by  Russian 
activities  in  China,  66. 

Vannowsky,     General,     Russian 

minister  of  war,  16. 
Victoria,  Queen,  death  of,  40  n. 
Vishnegradsky,    Russian    finance 

minister,  17. 
Vladimir,  Grand  Duke,  visit  of, 

to  Paris,  15. 

Washburn,  W.  D.,  proposes  loan 
to  China  by  American  com- 
pany, 58. 

Waldersee,  General,  150. 

Wei-Ha-Wei,  occupied  by  Eng- 
lish, 65. 

Wilhelm  I  of  Germany,  10;  death 
of,  11,  151. 

Wilhelm  II  of  Germany,  acces- 
sion of,  11;  sending  of  mother 
to  Paris  by,  14;  early  friendly 
feelings  toward  Russia,  151, 
152-154;  advantage  gained  by, 
in  death  of  Alexander  III  and 
accession  of  Nicholas,  155-156; 
attempts  at  renewed  friendship 
with  Tsar  in  1910-1911,  162. 

"Willy-Nicky"  correspondence, 
162  n. 


INDEX 


227 


Wilson,  President,  method  of 
"fait  accompli"  used  by,  207. 

Witte,  S.  J.,  Russian  finance  min- 
ister, 17,  18,  20,  21,  22;  an  out- 
standing figure  in  the  '90's,  36- 
37;  policy  in  Persia,  47-48; 
plans  of,  for  railroad  construc- 
tion and  peaceful  penetration 
in  China,  56-58;  responsibility 
of,  for  enmity  of  Japan,  58; 
mismanagement  of  proposed 
Japanese  alliance  by,  79-81 ;  not 
chiefly  to  blame,  for  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  84;  representa- 
tive of  Russia  at  Portsmouth 
peace  negotiations,  87-88;  suc- 
cessful resistance  by,  to  un- 
profitable commercial  treaty 
with  Germany,  154-155. 


Yalu  River,  Russian  concession 
on,  82-83. 

Younghusband,  Colonel,  Tibetan 
expedition  of  (1906),  41. 

Young  Turks,  influence  of  Ger- 
many on,  43,  135-136;  revolu- 
tion of  1908  brought  about  by, 
136;  independence  of,  137; 
hatred  of  foreigners  by,  138; 
defeat  of,  by  Balkan  countries, 
138. 

Yuan  Shi-Kai,  Chinese  states- 
man, 73. 


Zagreb,  Austrian  court-martial  in, 

130. 

Zankoff,  Bulgarian  premier,  119. 
Zukunjt,  Harden's  articles  in,  42. 


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